Ulysses,
Sorry it took so long to respond to your email.
> Sung do you define the triadic sign as a network or do you use a network
> to represent the triadic sign?
I would say I do both, because I believe that the concept (or the mental
image) of the triadic sign is a neuronal dissipative structure (i.e.,
the firing patterns of neurons) localized somewhere in our cerebral cortex
that can be expressed/represented either verbally (i.e., in words or
symbols) or visually (e.g., in networks or icons).
If this explanation is right, we can view the triad of (i) neural
dissipative structure (NDS) corresponding to a concept, (ii) symbols, and
(iii) icons as forming a mathematical category:
a b
Neural Dissipative Structure (NDS) ------> Icons ------> Symbols
| ^
| |
|___________________________________________|
c
Figure 1. The NDS corresponding to the concept of the triadic sign
expressed in terms of icons first and then as symbols. a = visual output
from the brain; b = translating visual images into words; c = information
flow from the brain to the eternal world. The composition condition, a|b =
c, must hold in order for the network to represent a category, i.e., a
followed by b must correspond to c.
The verbal equivalent of Figure 1 would be:
Neural dissipative structures (NDSs) determine (5826-1)
the iconic sign (e.g., network) which in turn
determines its interpretant in the form of symbols
in such a way that the symbols correspond to NDSs.
Of course, the NDS corresponding to the concept, triadic sign, can be
expressed first as a symbol and later as a network, as depicted in Figure
2:
a b
Neural Dissipative Structures --------> Symbols -------> Icons
| ^
| |
|____________________________________________|
c
Figure 2. The NDS corresponding to the concept of the triadic sign
expressed in terms of symbols first and then as icons. a = verbal output
from the brain; b = translating symbols to the iconic sign of networks; c
= information flow from the brain to the eternal world. The composition
condition, a|b = c, must hold in order for the network to represent a
category, i.e., a followed by b must correspond to c.
Recent fMRI measurements of neural processes involved in categorizing
colors
(https://www.sciencenews.org/article/brain-uses-decision-making-region-tell-blue-green)
indicate that the visual input of colors to the human brain are
categorized in brain areas independent of the language areas, thus
justifying the separation of icons and symbols in Figure 1 and 2.
With all the best.
Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Sung do you define the triadic sign as a network or do you use a network
> to represent the triadic sign?
>
> On Wednesday, April 9, 2014, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> I am afraid you do not understand what a network is. For example, did
>> you know that a node of a network can be changed not only to another node
>> but to an edge of a new network or even to a whole new network ? This is
>> very similar to the Peircean sign which can refer to an object, a
>> relation, or to a system of other signs.
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> ". . . you can't merge them and declare that a network (5822-1)
>> node is no longer a discrete object but is the same as
>> a 'functor'"
>>
>> I did not declare that "a network node is no longer a discrete object".
>> I simply stated the properties of a network commonly accepted by network
>> scientists such that a node of network can be any entities, e.g., a
>> physical object or a relation between objects, just as the Peircean sign
>> can refer to any entities regardless of whether or not they are physcial
>> objects or relations between them.
>>
>>
>> With all the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>> > Mathematical category theory isn't the same as network theory or
>> graphical
>> > network theory. Therefore, you can't merge them and declare that a
>> network
>> > node is no longer a discrete object but is the same as a 'functor' .
>> Nor
>> > are
>> > the three parts of the Peircean triad similar to three mathematical
>> > categories...
>> >
>> > Edwina
>> > ----- Original Message -----
>> > From: "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]>
>> > To: <[email protected]>
>> > Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 8:19 PM
>> > Subject: [biosemiotics:5821] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"
>> >
>> >
>> >> Edwina wrote:
>> >>
>> >> " . . . a network assumes the individual existence of,
>> (5819-1)
>> >> for example, two entities. Two nodes; Both are individually
>> >> existent."
>> >>
>> >> As Ulyssess points out, it all depends on the intention of the
>> >> diagrammer,
>> >> and not a network itself, as to what the nodes and edges of a network
>> >> refer to - they can refer to existent entities or non-existent ones.
>> For
>> >> examples, nodes can be "relations" (e.g., functors' in category
>> theory)
>> >> and the associated edges can be "relations bweteen relations" (e.g.,
>> >> "natural transformations" in category theory).
>> >>
>> >> With all the best.
>> >>
>> >> Sung
>> >> ___________________________________________________
>> >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>> >> Rutgers University
>> >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> >> 732-445-4701
>> >>
>> >> www.conformon.net
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> Ulysses - I presume you know of the 'three tailed graph' that Peirce
>> >>> made
>> >>> in his analysis of the semiosic process. 1.347. That's not a
>> network.
>> >>>
>> >>> Again, a network is not, in my view, similar to the Peircean triad,
>> for
>> >>> the basic reason that a network by definition consists of single
>> >>> existent
>> >>> units (nodes, vertices, points) that are connected to each other in
>> >>> various ways (edges, lines, links). The object, representamen and
>> >>> interpretant in the semiosic act do not exist, as themselves, as
>> >>> individual entities separate from the semiosic act and thus, are not
>> >>> operative in a network.
>> >>>
>> >>> You wrote: " I don't see why you can't stipulate that an edge plus
>> two
>> >>> end
>> >>> nodes corresponds to one aspect the sign, and that each
>> >>> edge-plus-two-nodes shares one node in the center; and the whole
>> >>> network
>> >>> is a sign. If graph theory is so codified as to bar the this
>> >>> interpretation, then I stand corrected. "
>> >>>
>> >>> Again, this isn't about the codification of graph theory; it's about
>> >>> 'what
>> >>> is a sign'. You, like Sung, are ignoring the nature of a network.
>> >>> Again,
>> >>> a
>> >>> network - and this has nothing to do with just a graph but with
>> >>> functioning as a network....a network assumes the individual
>> existence
>> >>> of,
>> >>> for example, two entities. Two nodes; Both are individually
>> existent.
>> >>> The
>> >>> Peircean relation doesn't operate that way; it doesn't operate as a
>> >>> connection between separate existential units.
>> >>>
>> >>> And a line with two end nodes is a dyad, again, it assumes that
>> there
>> >>> are
>> >>> two separate existential units connected in some way. But the
>> Peircean
>> >>> relation, eg, between Object and Representamen, doesn't function
>> that
>> >>> way;
>> >>> it's not a dyad. The Representamen doesn't exist as an existential
>> >>> individual unit. The immediate Object doesn't exist as an
>> existential
>> >>> individual unit. The Immediate Interpretant doesn't exist as an
>> >>> existential individual unit. This triad exists only within a dynamic
>> >>> transformative process - and it's not
>
>
>
> --
> Ulysses
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
