Cathy, List, Thank you for your thoughtful reply. You said, "This is very good but I want to call it 'modeling monism'". Perhaps we mean the same thing: modeling monism with pluralism?
Mara Woods On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Catherine Legg <[email protected]> wrote: > Mara - it is interesting to think about whether the nature of the final > opinion would be so very much more highly developed than our current > beliefs as to be unrecognisable by us as the truth even were we 'hit over > the head with it', so to speak. > > I wonder whether the pragmatic maxim might have a role to play, though, in > anchoring both sets of beliefs in specific expectations about how the world > will behave based on those beliefs, which will serve to make their meaning, > well, clear. So for instance a frog understands flies in a very basic > rudimentary way, and an entomologist in a highly sophisticated way. But > both expect the fly to pass them by in a particular kind of trajectory. > > > In a later message, you wrote: > "Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of > inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the > inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when > comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the > representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something > about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate > object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In > other words: modeling pluralism." > > This is very good but I want to call it "modeling monism" > :-) Cathy > > > On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Mara Woods <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, List, >> >> I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take >> my attention this week. >> >> Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my >> own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs >> will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a >> future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample >> propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much >> use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because >> we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to >> rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose >> of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant >> by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular >> propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs >> required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. >> >> Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is >> something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand >> it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? >> Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my >> thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. >> >> Mara Woods >> >> >> On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Mara, list, >>> >>> Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >>> for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >>> with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >>> further reflection. You wrote: >>> >>> MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >>> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >>> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >>> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >>> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >>> a dynamic or continuous process. >>> >>> If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >>> alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >>> induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of >>> regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the >>> sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the >>> truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. >>> On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative >>> position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of >>> them. >>> >>> As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static >>> representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final >>> belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope >>> that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality >>> of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. >>> You concluded: >>> >>> MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the >>> community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the >>> object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct >>> simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does >>> it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the >>> concept is related to other concepts? >>> >>> Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that >>> any final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R. >>> >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List, >>>> >>>> Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of >>>> Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by >>>> Cornelis de Waal. >>>> >>>> >>>> Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: >>>> >>>> Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on >>>> the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, >>>> and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies >>>> principles outside of logic itself. >>>> >>>> As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing >>>> implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the >>>> course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, >>>> after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that >>>> this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may >>>> think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and >>>> mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those >>>> subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an >>>> eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted >>>> but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of >>>> nominalism versus realism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the >>>> first sections of the chapter. >>>> >>>> Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that >>>> generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human >>>> intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' >>>> practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general >>>> sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into >>>> the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves >>>> inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in >>>> particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the >>>> universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be >>>> explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford >>>> explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination >>>> of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create >>>> explanatory patterns out of randomness? >>>> >>>> These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general >>>> explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to >>>> foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic >>>> components of the universe. >>>> >>>> Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, >>>> is to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special >>>> sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude >>>> metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He >>>> divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or >>>> questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding >>>> time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions >>>> regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also >>>> called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. >>>> >>>> According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of >>>> reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality >>>> consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim >>>> thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of >>>> people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community >>>> of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from >>>> individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a >>>> shared opinion about it. >>>> >>>> If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original >>>> metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of >>>> inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are >>>> to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would >>>> be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and >>>> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >>>> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >>>> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >>>> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >>>> a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the >>>> sign and its final interpretant in a later post). >>>> >>>> Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object >>>> of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to >>>> get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the >>>> pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only >>>> intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to >>>> produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of final >>>> beliefs are real. It seems that the import of the intellectual effect of >>>> intellectual concepts comes from the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only >>>> the consequences for rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because >>>> only the habits of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the >>>> consequences of, and intentionally maintains are rightly considered >>>> beliefs? Or is it because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically >>>> applied to those consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational >>>> conduct that can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)? >>>> >>>> Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably >>>> because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a belief must >>>> include what the indefinite community settles on, that aspect of the belief >>>> must be included in its definition. Also presumably, just as the object has >>>> to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or >>>> logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of >>>> it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the >>>> isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more >>>> general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Mara Woods >>>> >>>> M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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