Dear Helmuth
My suggestion is that you integrate Luhmann’s system theory of
self-organization and autopoiesis into Peirces broader metaphysics and
pragmaticist semiotics. I have made an attempt in Cybersemiotics. Why
information is not enough , which you can probably improve. See also
Cybersemiotics.com for more material.
Best
Søren Brier
Fra: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 18. maj 2014 21:09
Til: [email protected]
Emne: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] objects
Dear Phyllis,
Not from a linguistic focus, but I am trying to make up a systems theory that
fits with Peirces semiotic: www.signs-in-time.de<http://www.signs-in-time.de> .
Maybe it is not really a theory, but an attempt to visualize semiotics and
interpreting systems by little pictures. But it is contradicting
Parsons/Luhmann theory, so maybe it is a theory too: In it eg. with a social
system, the people are secondness (form) of the system, but for Luhmann they
are Umwelt. In my "theory", memory contents belong to the form of a human
communication and thinking system, and are possible objects, even when they are
eg. a memory of a quality or of a relation. By "memory contents" I mean the
stored memories, not the contents of counsciousness, that would be altersense,
secondness of the mind (thirdness). It is very difficult, and maybe I am wrong
at some or many places (this has happened before). Now I see the complication,
that when a representamen (sighting of a green frog) is meeting the three
objects: Memories about quality, entity and relation, these three objects (or
object parts) are among each other a semiotic triad too. I dont know yet how to
handle this. Perhaps it has something to do with sign classes, but I am not yet
with sign classes.
Best regards,
Helmut
Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Dear Helmut,
I suspect that you must be coming from a linguistics focus. I spent several
hours yesterday with two young linguistics graduates whose training had taught
them to collapse qualities & entities into things and call them all things
without differentiation and to identify them with "memory content(s)." They,
too, argued that one representamen could be three things, each "thing" being
qualities or entities, but merely labeled as memory content.
I do not see the advantage to semiotic research & development in collapsing the
three into the one term, "memory content", without acknowledging the quality,
thing (entity), relationship triad. It seems as though the simplification of
the terminology of semiotic structure could lead to difficulty
analyzing/interpreting structural and operational meaning.
Regards,
Phyllis Chiasson
Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
The singular-plural thing I was wondering about, is, that according to Peirce,
the immediate object ist the (one) object as represented in the sign. But I
feel, that one representamen can represent (call) eg. three memory contents:
quality, entity, possible relations between both. Perhaps my irritation is
based on my identifying "called memory content" with "object", but the object
(singular) would rather be the three called memory contents as picked up and
brought together by the representamen.
Best regards,
Helmut
Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Yes, I think it would be more correct from Peirce's perspective to say that
green is a quality (property, characteristic) of some frogs. Qualities may (or
likely do) relate to the physical properties of humans in some way, but
Peirce's semiotic is normative, logically objective and not dependent upon
human minds. It's both the whole of formal logic and the lead of formal logic,
as speculative grammar.
The late semiotician, Thomas Sebock developed a thoroughgoing "semiotic web"
that is shown in diagrammatic form in John Deeley's intro to the book
"FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS." I find that diagram and Deeley's introduction to this
book as a very useful overview for understanding/explaining the breadth/depth
of Peircean semiotics (and its contrast with de Saussure).
Regards,
Phyllis Chiasson
Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
(oops, ok, not klick answer, but fill in peirce list adress)
So would it be better not to say, the name of the object is "green", but:
"Green is a quality things can have"? This would be a memory content, and I
assume, that memory contents are parts of the form of a human (possible
objects): They have their limited space somewhere (in the cortex), but are
permanent in time. Behaviour parts (possible representamens) are limited in
time (like an impulse), but have no spatial limits in the system of
interpretance: Like the sighting of a green frog.
Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Can a quality be an object? Or is an object a relationship between a quality
(or qualities) and a thing?
Helmut Raulien <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Dear Peircers,
I think, there is one assumption that hinders the understanding of semiotics:
The triad of representamen-object-interpretant suggests, that there be only one
object implied. I think that this is not so. In one semiosis, there are most
likely more than one objects involved. Example: Representamen being the
sighting of a green frog. You being a young child, who knows a frog from a
black-and-white sketch in a fairy tale book. Also you know colours. One object
is "frog", the other is "green", the third is the concept you already have
about relations between attitude and entity, namely: "A sighted trait might be
typical for the sighted thing". This third object is also called by the
representamen, because the representamen is carrying with it a trait (green)
and a frog. Now the representamen fits to these three objects, and in an
abductive process of your mind, a new object is created: "possibly all frogs
are green". This object is (by induction) strenghened by the subsequent
sighting of some more green frogs. But then you spot a red frog, and you have a
deduction: The object is inverted: "possibly all frogs are green" is deleted
and replaced by: "Not all frogs are green". The object "A sighted trait might
be typical for the sighted thing" is slightly weakened. Well, thats how I
assume, thinking works, dont you think so? A reflexive process always implies
abduction, induction and deduction, and at least abduction requires more than
one object. Now dont say, that the green frog is the one object: He is long
gone, diven into the water, as you are still thinking about it, dont you? Best,
Helmut
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