Excellent, germane. Thanks. S *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>*
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 5:55 PM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Gary and list > > > > *Since there seems to be a quiet time here in these American holidays > allow me to sum up a little on the view on the metaphysical background we > have developed here that makes it possible for Peirce to make a new > integration of science and religion, by changing the view of both through > constructing that original philosophy he himself called semiotic > pragmaticism.* > > > *----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* > > > > Peirce's philosophical work proceeds in a way that suggests a new > understanding of science and religion as well as the relation between them, > which transcends our usual way of thinking of these matters in the West > Peirce's triadic semiotics worked on an original solution to the > metaphysical problems connected to the relation between science, > philosophy, mathematics and religion in the modern world. Peirce was truly > a mathematical philosopher, believing that philosophy must begin with logic > resting in turn upon pure mathematics. > > > > His theory of abduction rests on a philosophy of anticipation and includes > a theory of the divine on an evolutionary basis (Agapism). This still > stands out as an original renewal of a form of evolutionary theology after > Hegel that is compatible with modern science. It is an evolutionary theory > of anticipation, of *would-bes* or propensities as *reals* and therefore > about *Chance, Love and Logic,* as Cohen (1923) calls it, in the form of > a theory of evolution intertwined with a theory of signification, > cognition, and communication that unites meaning and rationality through a > theory of hope. In opposition to Descartes (1984) Peirce proposes that the > process of inquiry proceeds in the direction from anticipation or hope to > the strengthening of belief through the phenomenon of habit-taking: > > The question of the nature of belief, or in other words the question of > what the true logical analysis of the act of judgment is, is the question > upon which logicians of late years have chiefly concentrated their > energies. Is the pragmatistic answer satisfactory? (CP 5.28-29) > > > > Peirce's pragmaticist semiotics attempts to bridge the gap between natural > sciences and humanities by combining a phenomenological approach with an > evolutionary and realistic understanding of nature and society in the > development of meaning and logic. He further writes: > > > > Such is our guess of the secret of the sphinx. To raise it from the rank > of philosophical speculation to that of a scientific hypothesis, we must > show that consequences can be deduced from it with more or less > probability, which can be compared with observation. We must show that > there is some method of deducing the characters of the laws which could > result in this way by the action of habit-taking on purely fortuitous > occurrences, and a method of ascertaining whether such characters belong to > the actual laws of nature. (CP 1.410) > Why a concept of the divine supplements the idea and functioning of science > > Peirce's evolutionary theory must be seen as a process in which signs are > integrated into ever more complicated contexts in nature, culture and > minds. Thus there is a network of forces that further this evolutionary > process. Peirce's perspective is an attempt to understand science on the > basis of a compatible interpretation of a possible religious ground opposed > to the modern declared atheistic materialistic ground. It is in the hope > that the old war between empirical truth and existential belief can be > exchanged for a mutual synergy on a non-dogmatic basis. Peirce accepts a > kind of final causation, but under evolutionary temporal conditions in > which "in the long process of creation God achieves his own being" (Peirce, > MS 313). His teleology is not tied to any kind of necessitarianism, but is > integrated into an evolutionary agapism. > > > > Peirce's point is that God is real (as Firstness) but does not exist as > Secondness (meaning an entity that interacts with others), but what God is > might be revealed at the end of man's systematic inquiry. If, through this > process of inquiry, we converge towards a stability of meaning, we have > reached the Peircean final interpretant. In Peirce's philosophy, God as > thirdness is agape or evolutionary love, which makes the universe grow > evolutionarily by taking habits. Therefore an aspect of God is the body of > laws developing through habits in evolution. The human pursuit of knowledge > of these laws is science. It is the being of God as a very abstract being > without material form that guarantees the existence of the object of the > scientific enterprise and ensures realism instead of nominalism--or radical > constructivism as we would call it today (DeMarco, 1972). In Peirce's > view, science is the only road to common knowledge about the world as > Secondness and Thirdness, where personal religiosity is a matter of the > vague experience of the Firstness of pure feeling in free musing (CP > 6.452). > > > > An important way into understanding Peirce is to stress that from his > synechistic view there have to be some deep invisible connection between > matter and mind. Like Whitehead, he suggests a *process view*. Peirce > integrates chance as a foundational element--*tychism*. Peirce considered > tychism to be a fundamental element of his metaphysics. The basis of > reality is a spontaneously generating field or force of possible existences > of quale-consciousness, which he called Firstness. It is a level of pure > potentialities, like the quantum vacuum field, a concept and theory that > was not invented in Peirce's life time. So these potentialities or virtual > qualities manifest themselves in concrete phenomena like forces and will, > which he calls Secondness. They are immediate differences and resistances > between phenomena (haecceities). Peirce adopts Duns Scotus' term > *haecceity* to designate the arbitrary here-and-nowness of existence, a > person or object's this-ness, the brutal facts based on relations. This > haecceity* Peirce* identified as *pure Secondness*. > > What Scotus calls the haecceities of things, the hereness and nowness of > them, are indeed ultimate. Why this which is here is such as it is; how, > for instance, if it happens to be a grain of sand, it came to be so small > and so hard, we can ask; we can also ask how it got carried here; but the > explanation in this case merely carries us back to the fact that it was > once in some other place, where similar things might naturally be expected > to be. Why IT, independently of its general characters, comes to have any > definite place in the world is not a question to be asked; it is simply an > ultimate fact. (CP 1.405) > > > > Peirce's view of haecceities as being unexplainable as singular events is > close to the modern understanding of quantum events. Quantum physics cannot > deduce the singular event, but can only make a probability model from > thousands of them. This would be Thirdness in Peirce's paradigm. But in > modern quantum physics, there is an undetermined spontaneity of the single > event that is not explainable in itself from a scientific point of view and > quantum mechanics thereby breaks with classical deterministic mechanicism. > For Peirce the problem is that empiricist philosophy says that our ideas > come from direct experience of things. Peirce points out that it amounts to > the claim that individual pieces of data can be known directly in > themselves, that is, without any knowledge of associated concepts. But this > would be contrary to his foundationally view of *synechism *namely that > everything is connected to everything else in a hyper-complexity like the > one we find in the mathematical line where a new cut can always be inserted > between two points no matter how refined they are defined. It also means or > supports his basic epistemology, that all knowledge is fallible--it cannot > be proven true. In Peirce's words, > > The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified. For > fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always > swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy. Now > the doctrine of continuity is that *all things* so swim in continua .... > (Peirce CP 1.171) > > As Kultgen (1959-60) argued, it is important that both Peirce and > Whitehead (1929) thus deny Kant's (1981/1990) distinction between nature > and freedom. To Peirce, nature has spontaneity and pure chance at its basis > in Firstness and reasonability in Thirdness. Peirce denies the distinction > between the phenomenological and the noumenal, understood as the > thing-in-itself, because this idea of the incognizable appears as a > null-term of theoretical and practical thought. For Peirce, the real is > wholly open to our pragmatic observation and thinking and there is no > absolute difference between objects of theoretical and practical thought. > Metaphysics is seen as an observable ideal limit of empirical enquiry > (Kultgen, 1959-60). Thus Peirce makes* a full naturalization of all > possible knowing in the universe,* including the subjective and > intersubjective phenomena. As opposed to Schopenhauer's Will that seeks its > own, Peirce's evolutionary love is - like Plato's - not egoistic. Thus *his > conception of cosmic love is an evolutionary and developmental principle.* > > > > *The Great Emptiness* > > If we view the Universe as a system, then it follows that it is the > largest system of all, and all other systems are *subsystems. *But what > then is the environment of the universe*? *And what is before and outside > of this space-time system? And is it not from here the whole manifest > universe emerges? Peirce suggests that the universe is the immanent part > of the divine and that the other part is a transcendental emptiness (tohu > bohu) "behind and before" the manifest world (CP 6.490). > > One way to interpret this is that the transcendental part of the divine is > not conscious, but obtains consciousness through creating the concrete > manifest world in time, space and energy (Secondness) as well as laws and > signification (Thirdness). God is real as a general, but does not exist as > an actual. The real in Peirce's paradigm is not only external things! The > existent, or Secondness, is that, which reacts against other things. The > external world then does not consist merely of existent objects and their > reactions because *among the reals Peirce also counts words, signs, > general types and would-bes as their tokens exists* ( CP 8.191). Thus > Peirce does not believe that the external world is completely independent > of our semiosis. The universe newer completely escapes its sign nature and > become a completely independent "thing". In Peirce's scholastic realism the > thirdness of reals are vagues, would-bes or possibilities (CP 5.453). Thus > we must believe that there are real tendencies and possibilities in the > world, as later exemplified in quantum physics, with its concept of virtual > particles and probability waves. Truth is a possibility through science, > it is the settling of the irritation of doubt, but, with the means we have, > truth will always be provisional. > > Peirce thought of *qualia *as* reals, *but not* actuals*. Qualisigns > cannot be actuals in themselves; they have to be carried by other things. > There can thus be no empirical scientific investigation of them per se, > only their manifestation as sign-tokens! Thus, though Peirce operates with > God as a necessary being in his metaphysics, this being does not have the > Secondness that produces empirical facts to be investigated by science (CP > 6 199). This makes for an unusual conception of God in Peirce's philosophy. > For Peirce the divine is Firstness of Firstness or pure potential quality > and it cannot, therefore, in its own nature, be investigated scientifically > and/or formulated more precisely in words or signs. It is too vague. There > can therefore be no self-evident dogmas about God. He insisted, "The > endless variety in the world has not been created by law. It is not of the > nature of uniformity to originate variation, nor of law to beget > circumstance. When we gaze upon the multifariousness of nature we are > looking straight into the face of a living spontaneity." (CP 6.553). In > this basis one can now characterize an important aspect of God as a living > spontaneity or as a Firstness, which is a real, but not an actual! Peirce > reveals that he is influenced by the so-called "Concord transcendentalism" > of Emerson (CP 6.102). > > For Peirce then evolutionary love corresponds to natural habit-taking, > which in turn corresponds to what Peirce calls "the social principle," > which is the Thirdness, habit or patterns to which the individuals are > subjected. Thus Peirce connects evolutionary love law to natural > habit-taking, logic and understanding, as the aim of logical analysis is to > understand the true character of the object in question, not to pass moral > judgment. Love is thus in Peirce's conception related to the recognition > and understanding of the law. Thus, the importance of love to fuel the > evolutionary growth of knowledge and the concept is therefore essential for > Pierce's theory of science! Therefore his emphasis on feeling and emotion > as being central to all "rational" thought. Peirce shows that an ontology > of the world as a closed mechanism deterministically run by universal laws > is inadequate as a framework for at theory of meaningful knowledge. Thus in > Peirce's understanding God is also a constant process of creation. Creation > is not deterministic. Man's self is a developing symbol. > > In this process philosophy God is necessary for any kind of developing the > world through evolution. Without God, the world would be nothing more than > a static, unchanging existence. Thus the world has to be present in God and > God present in it, in order for the possibilities that lead to development > to manifest and influences God. As God is present to the world then the > world will influence God. Logic to Peirce is the thus the intersubjective > product of a social ethical striving for common rationality and the Summum > Bonum, which is how he ideally viewed science. > > Steven Ericsson-Zenith on the Peirce list points out that the movement, > marked by early Unitarianism from Salem and Boston of the 18th and 19th > century involved a mature attempt to reconceive the notion of "God". The > Peirce family represents a century of intellectual excellence and > enlightenment at Harvard that appears to have been overrun by the religious > conservatism. Peirce was the beacon of a period of American Enlightenment > that has been oppressed by religious conservatism and is mostly forgotten. > > > > His theory therefore has a deep concern for existential matters and the > discussion of what Enlightenment is. In some aspect it goes further than > Horkheimer and Marcuse's critique of the mythologisation of the technical > aspects of rationality in the Enlightenment movement in their book *Dialectic > of Enlightenment*. This mythologisation is also seen in many of the > present so called scientific world views and many of the present attempts > to naturalize all of philosophy of knowledge and its evolution for > instance as computation (info-computationalism). Peirce goes further than > the Frankfurt School critique in showing a constructive way out other than > art because they lack Peirce's foundation in a combination of pure > mathematics, phaneroscophy, aesthetics and ethics. > > > > For Peirce then the sciences can then be considered a systems of > rationalized expectations in social commitment. These rationalized > expectations are carried by collectives and their scholarly discourses are > a special kind of communication systems that leads to a collective > impersonal, still fallible knowledge. As a consequence of this view, both > science and religion are fallible and therefore cooperation between science > and religion is seen as highly necessary in the pursuit of knowledge and > meaning. As such, I see Peirce as delivering a possible cultural paradigm > for a new improved discursive enlightenment in a global culture by way of > his pragmaticist semiotic philosophy. > > *References* > > > > Cohen, M. R. (Ed.). (1923).* Chance, love and logic: Philosophical essays > by the late Charles S. Peirce*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & > Co., Ltd. > > > > DeMarco, J. (1972). God, religion, and community in the philosophy of C. > S. Peirce. *The Modern Schoolman, **XLIX, *(May), 331-347. > > > > Kant, I. (1990). *Critique of pure reason *(J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Trans.). > Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. (Originally published in 1781) > > > > Kultgen, J. K. (1959-1960). The "future metaphysics" of Peirce and > Whitehead. *Kant-Studien,* 5, 285-293. > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > Søren Brier > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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