PART 4: NOTES (as I read along) on Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”, “Item 1” of JSP Cognition Series, from THE ESSENTIAL PIERCE, Volume 1, PP. 11-27, & CRONOLOGICAL EDITION, Volume 2, pp. 162-211**12 June 2014 4:34 pm CST - READ ON YOUR OWN & REVISE [CE, page 166] <> 3º Each age pushes back the boundary of reasoning and shows that what had been taken as premises were in reality conclusions. 4º If we really can by mere self-contemplation distinguish premises from inferences , let me ask any man not acquainted with physiology whether in looking with one eye, he has at each instant a sensation of a continuous and unbroken space nearly circular or whether this space has the form of a ring. We know as a fact that there is a blind spot near the middle of the retina so continuity of space we ‘see’ at each instant must be a matter of inference, combining in thought impressions from other times. Who would discover this by intuition? 5º The same with pitch of sound is the relation of impressions conveyed at different times to the mind where the sensation of pitch depends upon the apprehension of this relation in a confused manner. Therefore sensation of pitch arises from the conjunction of previous impressions, [page 167] determined by previous representations and is not something immediately from the mind.¶ -x- This pretended power of “intuition fails altogether when put to the test. If it existed, either the subjective elements of consciousness are per se objects of consciousness or immediately contemplated. In the first case, we could not be conscious of any object without absolutely certain knowledge of whether it be inferential or otherwise which cannot possibly be maintained. The second is impossible because before turning from the objective to the subjective comportment of mind the object would cease to be present. Hoc loquor inde est (This is what I say). -x- Question 2: It appears from what has been said that we cannot decide with tolerable certainty by mere introspection whether a cognition is determined by previous cognitions or IMMEDIATELY BY AN EXTERNAL THING, and that our decision on this question must be an inference. We must examine the facts in each case and see whether there is reason to believe that the cognition can be accounted for or not (for to say that it is immediately produced by something is not cognized before and therefore not known except by the cognition in question is to say that THE LATTER CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR). I now propose the question whether consciousness or our knowledge of ourselves can be accounted for by the known action of inference or whether it is necessary to suppose a peculiar power of immediate self-consciousness?¶
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