List,
I've been pottering around intermittently for a while in classifying
unscientific methods of inquiry, using Peirce's outline of such methods
as a starting point.
Willful attitudes as unscientific methods of inquiry.
Peirce called the method of persistence in a first opinion "the method
of tenacity," a comparatively neutral characterization like the others
in "The Fixation of Belief" (method of authority, method of the a
priori). In drafts, on the other hand, he had called the method of
authority the method of despotism. Years later he called the method of
tenacity the method of "willful belief" and, most pejoratively,
"self-mendacity" (CP 5.564, circa 1906, see end of this post). Here I
call the method of tenacity somewhat pejoratively the method of
"pertinacity," in keeping with some kindred methods' names. There is
something a bit solipsistic in this set of methods, insofar as they all
involve ignoring contrary evidence or views, as if truth were private,
not public, as Peirce said of the method of tenacity in "The Fixation of
Belief."
I use a distinction sometimes made between prejudice (pre-judgment) and
bias. In this distinction, bias reflects partialness or incompleteness
of evidence or experience. In these methods, prejudice and bias are
adopted or maintained against contrary views and evidences.
*Impetuousness.* Too (pro-)active and forceful. Forms a prejudice about
what certain evidence verges on showing.
*Pertinacity.* Too patient and enduring. Holds a prejudice about what
certain evidence will come to show.
*Impulsiveness.* Too reactive and energetic. Forms a bias from what
certain evidence newly shows.
*Hideboundness.* Too settled and formed. Holds a bias based on what
certain evidence showed in the past.
One cannot resolve doubt and suspicions by pertinaciously persisting in
a first opinion if one does not already have an opinion on the given
subject. Impetuousness involves adopting a weak guess as one's first
opinion. Impulsiveness and hideboundness involve forming or holding not
a first opinion, but a latest or actual final opinion (not the final
opinion that sufficient investigation _/would/_ reach).
But these are not all the methods of inquiry by prejudice, bias,
inclination, some sort of distortion. The method of authority involves
an inclination imposed by extraneous considerations of power,
intimidation, coercion, etc. In the past I've considered how wealth,
glamour, and status can likewise do wrongs (corrupt, manipulate,
deceive), and called them methods of authority, but it makes better
sense to call all of them *unscientific methods of inquiry by contest
and ascendancy*, the idea that might makes right generalized to the idea
that ascendancy makes right. They can be regarded as methods of
imposing, or succumbing to, conformity based on extraneous benefit
gained, or extraneous cost avoided, by choice of opinion, because of who
holds the opinion.
Then there is what Peirce called the method of the a priori. The idea of
this method seems a little harder for people to pin down. Jon Awbrey has
called it the method of "plausibility (a priori pleasingness)"
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.misc.inquiry/3779 , and Gary Furhman
the method of consensus
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00474.html . The
method of the a priori consists in letting inclinations of thought
develop in their interplay, working out their conclusions in comparisons
and discussions of perspectives in terms of what is "agreeable to
reason," the method thereby depending on taste and fashion in
intellectual paradigms and thus going in circles over long enough times.
As Jeff Doward pointed out, this is the unscientific method of inquiry
in which, nevertheless, the content of the opinion matters, not just
that it is one's own opinion or that it is a common authority's opinion.
But in the method of the a priori, that content inclines one by some
benefit that would be gained, or cost that would be avoided, if the
opinion were true. So it is a method of something like wishful thinking.
Unscientific methods of inquiry on the basis of the appeal of the
opinion's claimed facts
Those below are cruder than the method of the a priori, its
fermentation, etc. The appeal may consist in various things:
The claimed facts' *advancing or promoting* one's will, efforts, cause,
etc. (or avoidance of defeat). This can be used deliberately in
coercion, too.
The claimed facts' *convenientness* or avoidance of inconvenientness
("sure, it's a short walk, don't need the car"). This can be used
deliberately in corruption, too.
The claimed facts' *pleasantness* or pain avoidance ("all dogs go to
heaven"). Or provoking desires, raising hopes, etc. Or even provoking
fear, anger, etc., if such are what makes one's psychological engine go.
This can be used deliberately in (emotional) manipulation, too.
The claimed facts' *recognizability*, i.e., their assuringness or
corroborativeness. Method of confirmation bias. This can be used
deliberately in deception, too.
I got to thinking about contrarianism and conformism as unscientific
methods of inquiry. Peirce's method of authority is a particularly
conformist method. I came up with this:
Unscientific methods of inquiry based on agreement and/or
disagreement with others (whose opinions matter to one on the
subject).
This classification is nice because its logically systematic
underpinnings are pretty apparent.
*Contrarianism *
I'll be correct mainly by disagreeing with the others.
I'll be correct since, among the others whose opinions matter on the
subject, *there are * *not the correct but the incorrect.* **
*Partisanism *
I'll be correct mainly by agreeing with some of the others and
disagreeing with the rest.
I'll be correct since, among others whose opinions matter on the
subject, *there are * *the correct and the incorrect.* **
*Quasi-solipsism*
I'll be correct mainly by there being nobody else (whose opinion matters).
I'll be correct since, among others whose opinions matter on the
subject, *there are * *neither the correct nor the incorrect* (i.e., no
others' opinions than mine matter on the subject).
*Conformism*
I'll be correct mainly by agreeing with the others.
I'll be correct since, among others whose opinions matter on the
subject, *there are * *the correct and not the incorrect.*
Peirce-relevant conclusion: It is possible to generalize, or extrapolate
from, some of Peirce's ideas of unscientific inquiry methods and come up
with many more. A separate question is that of whether Peirce's three
are the main ones in a pragmatic, bigger-picture view.
CP 5.564, circa 1906, QUOTE PEIRCE] My paper of November 1877,
setting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question
ceases when satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief,
and then only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth
gradually develops from that principle under the action of
experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity, the
most degraded of all intellectual conditions; thence rising to the
imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society; then to
the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation
of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwhelmingly
forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent
reality. [END QUOTE]
Best, Ben
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