In a few words, Peirce offers a context for his "theology" (from "Pragmatism In Retrospect - A Last Formulation." "I, for one, heartily admit that a Humanism that does not pretend to be a science, but only an instinct, like a bird's power of flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that has been made to philosophy for ages." What more need be said?
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Jun 17, 2014, at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > I wouldn't speculate that Peirce wanted God to be a 'thing-in-itself'. > There's no evidence, to my knowledge, of that. > > > Only reason I bring that up is more because of the place of God in > traditional Christian theology. My thinking was more that if Peirce did > accept a thing in itself it'd probably just be God due to *creation ex > nihilo*. I shouldn't have speculated that he actually said anything like > that. I'm not aware of anything he said pointing in that direction. You're > right that I shouldn't have said that. Or at least put some serious > qualifications on it. I was just following through the logic of the > doctrine such that his more controversial statements about God really > aren't that controversial when placed in context. > > The question I still have is Peirce's view of Christology and the persons > which just isn't at all clear to me. While I've not really read much of his > religion what I have read just hasn't gone into those issues. Doing a > little googling I did find a book that was a conference printing. C.S. > Peirce: Categories to Constantinople that delves into the issue. > > > http://www.amazon.com/Peirce-Constantinople-Proceedings-International-Philosophical/dp/9061869390 > > In that book Gérard Deledalle has a paper, "Peirce, Theologian" that > claims it's just the person of the Father to which the quote about > existence applies. > > God the Father has the reality of Firstness (he 'is' but does not exist); > while the God the Son, although also real as first, did exist as second in > the person of Jesus; as to the reality of God as thrid or organizer of the > world, it is personified in the Holy Spirit. > > To conclude this first part of my paper, I should like to insist on the > originality of Peirce's argument. It is the first argument ever founded on > the category of possibility whose argumentative *scientific* expression > is neither induction (on which all the proofs of the existence of God > rest), nor a* priori* deduction. The later is very often used by > metaphysicians since Saint Anselm and it leads to God's reality, but a > reality which implies 'existence' which is a terminological contradiction > denounced by Peirce and Duns Scotus. Rather, Peirce's argument rests on the > retroduction or abduction, the only argument which can 'show' the reality > of God without imposing on God the *haecceity* of existence. A conception > which is not incompatible with God's incarnation as second in the > historical existence of Jesus Christ, nor with the reality of God as first > through the mediation of third of the Holy Spirit. (Gérard Deledalle, ibid, > 142) > > I confess I don't see how this avoids Duns Scotus view that this problem > of *haecceity *applies to all three persons and not just the Father. But > then I'm not theologian and what theology I've read of the dual natures of > Christ never made much logical sense to me. Of course Peirce started out as > an Unitarian who saw Jesus and the Holy Spirit as first among creatures. > While he'd become Episcopalian when first married he'd always seemed to > have an idiosyncratic of it. (He often referred to the Holy Spirit as > Mother although of course one could argue about the place of Wisdom as > divine female in the pre-Christian and even early Christian era. I'm not > sure that was well understood at the time though.) > > Deledalle continues on about the controversy between the eastern and > western churches over the Trinity and suggests Peirce adopts a neoPlatonic > solution. > > The position that Peirce was to develop is closer to that of Plotinus than > that taken by the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople: the Son proceeds > from the Father out of time, but precedes him in time. He is a > *hypostasis* in the greek sense adopted by the eastern church, not a > *substance* in the latin sense of hte western church, while possessing > both a divine nature and a human nature. The *procession *moves downward: > what it gains in multiplicity, it loses in unity: the Father is first, the > Son is second, the Holy Ghost is third. (ibid 149) > > I'm not sure this solves the *haecceity *problem at all. But I'm even > less well read on the nuances of ontological difference between the eastern > and western churches than I am on Peirce's religion. And of course Scotus > was of the west. > > He ends with a quote of Peirce's though that might apply to the issue you > critiqued my speculation on. > > ...various great theologians explain that one cannot attribute *reason *to > God, nor perception (which always involves an element of surprise and of > learning what one did not know), and, in short, that "mind" is > necessarily...unlike ours [and] that it is only negatively...that we can > attach > any meaning to the Name. (CP 6.502) > > While not properly a explicit thing-in-itself this comes rather close. I > say that since it seems Peirce's main criticism of the thing-in-itself is > its unknowability. Yet if God here is known only negatively then that seems > to lead to a very similar place as the thing-in-itself. Perhaps we might > argue that negative theology really is different from what Peirce was > addressing relative to Kant. Further than negative knowledge is still > knowledge. I'm just not enough up on the nuances of the issue to be able to > weight in there. But I'd be very interested in others comments. > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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