Dear Sung,
Thank you! I think you are showing a way for even me to eventually understand the ten classes of signs. I havent yet looked at the DOCX files, because my computer is too old, I will look at them in an internet cafe. Now I have the idea, but will have to think about it some more, that the relations (eg. dicent, symbol, legisign) might be a function of which system part is concerned: Example: "Money is a value-exchange medium":
Interpretant relation (dicent): An object (secondness) of the interpreter is addressed (a memory content, a "what is there" in the interpreter)
Object relation (symbol): Ontologically, objectively, materially, the statement is a part of the social systems structure (thirdness).
In the case of a syllogism, the interpretant relation would be an addressment of the interpreters thirdness (his or her mind, structure), therefore an argument.
A rheme would address a coming-to-perception, that is a part of the interpreters firstness (what is happening with him or her). So maybe one can say, that the interpretant relation says which system part of the interpreter is concerned, the object relation addresses the part of the system the sign is ontologically part of, and the sign relation says what kind of sign the sign is by itself, by looking at it without relating to any system. Maybe I will understand the sign classes still in this life.
Very best,
Helmut
Von: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Helmut,
Thank you for your thought-provoking analysis.
(1) To me, your sentence
"Money is a value-exchange-medium." (061814-1)
is an example of Peirce's "dicent symbolic legisign" (see S_233 in the
table attached).
(2) All signs can be classified into one of the ten classes listed in
the attached table, each denoted as S_ijk, where S = sign, and the indexes
specify the FORMAL aspects of S; i = the placeholder for intepretant, j =
the placeholder for object, and k = the placeholder for representamen.
Each one of these three placeholders can assume (or occupied by) one of
the three numerical values, 1, 2 and 3, obeying what I called the
“Peircean rule of composite signs (PRCS)” stating that i ≤ j
≤ k , where “A ≤ B” reads “A is less than or equal to B” or
“A cannot be greater than B”.
(3) Just as three fundamental particles called “quarks” constitute a
composite particle called a “baryon” (or heavy particle such as protons
and neutrons) in particle physics, so I suggested in the so-called the
“quark model of the Peircean sign” (see Item (3) in the email attached)
that three components called “elementary signs” constitute a “composite
sign”. (Please note that these “elementary signs” refer to “sign
relations”, e.g., “icon” = the relation between a representamen and its
object being similarity; “index” = the relation between the representamen
and its object being causal, etc.) This suggestion is consistent with the
Peircean sign being represented by S_ijk, with the indexes obeying the
Peircean rule of composite sign described in (2).
(4) It seems to me that Proposition (061814-1) has two complementary
aspects -- the FORMAL aspect as indicated by its semiotic structure being
“dicent symbolic legisign”, i.e., S_233, and the MATERIAL aspect
identifiable with some specific effect (obeying the laws of physics) felt
by, or exerted on, the mind of some interpreter or non-human agents. It
may be that the formal aspect of a sign reflects its general/global
property and the material aspect its specific/local properties.
(5) These considerations lead the following conclusion:
“The formal/material complementarity of the sign may be (061814-2)
essential for the sign’s role in enabling communication
among intelligent beings: Without the formal aspect, no
sign may be recognized/intelligible; without the material
aspect, no information may be transmitted/communicated.”
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> <html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size:
> 12.0px;"><div>
> <div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px
> 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word;
> -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
> <div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;">Supplement: When I wrote "the actual
> (secondness) reaction", I meant: Secondness is the being-called of
> the reaction (representamen, firstness, coin) by the memory content
> (secondness). The reaction "I might have a use for this coin" is
> already thirdness, interpretation.</div>
>
> <div name="quoted-content">
> <div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;">
> <div>
> <div>Dear Sung, Jerry, List,</div>
>
> <div>is it ok to interpret Sungs statement as follows?</div>
>
> <div>"Formally" means "in its role as an object", and
> "ontologically" means: What it is (as an entity) in possible
> other contexts. One example: The agreement, that money is a value-exchange
> medium. "Money is a value-exchange-medium" is a sentence, that
> is eg. a memory content of a person. Memory contents belong to secondness
> of a person, example: Somebody is being shown a coin. This is a
> representamen, that may (possibly, firstness) arouse reactions of this
> person. If this person has the memory content "money is a
> value-exchange-medium" stored, the actual (secondness) reaction:
> "Oh, I might have a use for this coin" will be called. So the
> spoken of memory content provides actuality (secondness) within the
> person, i.e. the interpreting system. So one might say, it is secondness.
> Now, in a social system "money is a value-exchange medium" is a
> social agreement, an expectation and an expectation of an expectation
> (Luhmann. Instead of "expectation", "Erwartung" may
> also be translated with "anticipation".), therefore a part of
> the structure (thirdness) of the social system. So the sentence
> "Money is a value..." by itself, as an entity i.e.
> ontologically, is thirdness in the social system, but when it occurs in
> the role of an object in a person, it is secondness. But I see some
> tautology in this chain of thoughts: An object is secondness, when that,
> what is playing the role of an object, is doing so. But that, what is
> playing the role of an object, in other contexts can be thirdness, but
> there it is not playing the role of an object. So I can just say: "An
> object is secondness".</div>
>
> <div>Best,</div>
>
> <div>Helmut</div>
>
> <div>
> <div style="margin: 10.0px 5.0px 5.0px 10.0px;padding: 10.0px 0 10.0px
> 10.0px;border-left: 2.0px solid rgb(195,217,229);">
> <div style="margin: 0 0 10.0px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b> Montag, 16. Juni
> 2014 um 03:45 Uhr<br/>
> <b>Von:</b> "Jerry LR Chandler"
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com><br/>
> <b>An:</b> Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu><br/>
> <b>Cc:</b> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu><br/>
> <b>Betreff:</b> Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis</div>
>
> <div>
> <div>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Sung:</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>
> <div>On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:</div>
>
>
> <blockquote>(1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be
> Firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness,
> Secondness<br/>
> or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thridness ontologically.</blockquote>
>
> <div> </div>
> This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing.</div>
>
> <div>CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and
> interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You
> also omit the term relation.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and
> secondness by being a difference in "mode of being".</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>CSP uses the concept of "Mode of being" to indicate and
> index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not see any possibility of the concept of "mode of
> being" being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is
> merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, "God
> the father" and "God the son"</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be be the abstract notion of a form of
> matter as either a gas and as a liquid.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be firstness as Hydrogen and secondness
> as Gold.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The meaning of the term "relation" is different in each of
> the three cases and addresses the question of HOW we choose to associate
> any two modes of being.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not understand either how or why you would seek to extend
> the conceptualization to mathematics. Mathematical category theory
> requires THREE separate and independent CONTINUOUS variables, (as modes of
> being?), in order to have a DIRECTED graph with the three domains and
> three edges NECESSARY for the closure (of triangular form) in the
> definition of an algebraic category. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>If you wish to compare your personal mathematical interpretation of
> "category theory" with a well-respected mathematician's
> application of category theory to biology, see the book by Andree
> Ehresmann, Memory Evolutive Systems. In particular, you could test
> your numerous hypotheses about categories with demonstrations of the
> categorical co-limit operations within your framework of thought.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Cheers</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Jerry <br/>
> </div>
>
> <div> </div>
> <br/>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
> PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
> a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at <a
> href=""> > target="_blank">http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm</a> .</div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
> PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
> a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at <a
> href=""> > target="_blank">http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm</a> .</div>
> </div>
> </div></div></body></html>
>
> <html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size:
> 12.0px;"><div>
> <div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px
> 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word;
> -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
> <div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;">Supplement: When I wrote "the actual
> (secondness) reaction", I meant: Secondness is the being-called of
> the reaction (representamen, firstness, coin) by the memory content
> (secondness). The reaction "I might have a use for this coin" is
> already thirdness, interpretation.</div>
>
> <div name="quoted-content">
> <div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;">
> <div>
> <div>Dear Sung, Jerry, List,</div>
>
> <div>is it ok to interpret Sungs statement as follows?</div>
>
> <div>"Formally" means "in its role as an object", and
> "ontologically" means: What it is (as an entity) in possible
> other contexts. One example: The agreement, that money is a value-exchange
> medium. "Money is a value-exchange-medium" is a sentence, that
> is eg. a memory content of a person. Memory contents belong to secondness
> of a person, example: Somebody is being shown a coin. This is a
> representamen, that may (possibly, firstness) arouse reactions of this
> person. If this person has the memory content "money is a
> value-exchange-medium" stored, the actual (secondness) reaction:
> "Oh, I might have a use for this coin" will be called. So the
> spoken of memory content provides actuality (secondness) within the
> person, i.e. the interpreting system. So one might say, it is secondness.
> Now, in a social system "money is a value-exchange medium" is a
> social agreement, an expectation and an expectation of an expectation
> (Luhmann. Instead of "expectation", "Erwartung" may
> also be translated with "anticipation".), therefore a part of
> the structure (thirdness) of the social system. So the sentence
> "Money is a value..." by itself, as an entity i.e.
> ontologically, is thirdness in the social system, but when it occurs in
> the role of an object in a person, it is secondness. But I see some
> tautology in this chain of thoughts: An object is secondness, when that,
> what is playing the role of an object, is doing so. But that, what is
> playing the role of an object, in other contexts can be thirdness, but
> there it is not playing the role of an object. So I can just say: "An
> object is secondness".</div>
>
> <div>Best,</div>
>
> <div>Helmut</div>
>
> <div>
> <div style="margin: 10.0px 5.0px 5.0px 10.0px;padding: 10.0px 0 10.0px
> 10.0px;border-left: 2.0px solid rgb(195,217,229);">
> <div style="margin: 0 0 10.0px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b> Montag, 16. Juni
> 2014 um 03:45 Uhr<br/>
> <b>Von:</b> "Jerry LR Chandler"
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com><br/>
> <b>An:</b> Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu><br/>
> <b>Cc:</b> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu><br/>
> <b>Betreff:</b> Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis</div>
>
> <div>
> <div>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Sung:</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>
> <div>On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:</div>
>
>
> <blockquote>(1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be
> Firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness,
> Secondness<br/>
> or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thridness ontologically.</blockquote>
>
> <div> </div>
> This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing.</div>
>
> <div>CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and
> interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You
> also omit the term relation.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and
> secondness by being a difference in "mode of being".</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>CSP uses the concept of "Mode of being" to indicate and
> index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not see any possibility of the concept of "mode of
> being" being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is
> merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, "God
> the father" and "God the son"</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be be the abstract notion of a form of
> matter as either a gas and as a liquid.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be firstness as Hydrogen and secondness
> as Gold.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The meaning of the term "relation" is different in each of
> the three cases and addresses the question of HOW we choose to associate
> any two modes of being.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not understand either how or why you would seek to extend
> the conceptualization to mathematics. Mathematical category theory
> requires THREE separate and independent CONTINUOUS variables, (as modes of
> being?), in order to have a DIRECTED graph with the three domains and
> three edges NECESSARY for the closure (of triangular form) in the
> definition of an algebraic category. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>If you wish to compare your personal mathematical interpretation of
> "category theory" with a well-respected mathematician's
> application of category theory to biology, see the book by Andree
> Ehresmann, Memory Evolutive Systems. In particular, you could test
> your numerous hypotheses about categories with demonstrations of the
> categorical co-limit operations within your framework of thought.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Cheers</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Jerry <br/>
> </div>
>
> <div> </div>
> <br/>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
> PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
> a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at <a
> href=""> > target="_blank">http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm</a> .</div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
> PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
> a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at <a
> href=""> > target="_blank">http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm</a> .</div>
> </div>
> </div></div></body></html>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Thank you for your thought-provoking analysis.
(1) To me, your sentence
"Money is a value-exchange-medium." (061814-1)
is an example of Peirce's "dicent symbolic legisign" (see S_233 in the
table attached).
(2) All signs can be classified into one of the ten classes listed in
the attached table, each denoted as S_ijk, where S = sign, and the indexes
specify the FORMAL aspects of S; i = the placeholder for intepretant, j =
the placeholder for object, and k = the placeholder for representamen.
Each one of these three placeholders can assume (or occupied by) one of
the three numerical values, 1, 2 and 3, obeying what I called the
“Peircean rule of composite signs (PRCS)” stating that i ≤ j
≤ k , where “A ≤ B” reads “A is less than or equal to B” or
“A cannot be greater than B”.
(3) Just as three fundamental particles called “quarks” constitute a
composite particle called a “baryon” (or heavy particle such as protons
and neutrons) in particle physics, so I suggested in the so-called the
“quark model of the Peircean sign” (see Item (3) in the email attached)
that three components called “elementary signs” constitute a “composite
sign”. (Please note that these “elementary signs” refer to “sign
relations”, e.g., “icon” = the relation between a representamen and its
object being similarity; “index” = the relation between the representamen
and its object being causal, etc.) This suggestion is consistent with the
Peircean sign being represented by S_ijk, with the indexes obeying the
Peircean rule of composite sign described in (2).
(4) It seems to me that Proposition (061814-1) has two complementary
aspects -- the FORMAL aspect as indicated by its semiotic structure being
“dicent symbolic legisign”, i.e., S_233, and the MATERIAL aspect
identifiable with some specific effect (obeying the laws of physics) felt
by, or exerted on, the mind of some interpreter or non-human agents. It
may be that the formal aspect of a sign reflects its general/global
property and the material aspect its specific/local properties.
(5) These considerations lead the following conclusion:
“The formal/material complementarity of the sign may be (061814-2)
essential for the sign’s role in enabling communication
among intelligent beings: Without the formal aspect, no
sign may be recognized/intelligible; without the material
aspect, no information may be transmitted/communicated.”
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> <html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size:
> 12.0px;"><div>
> <div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px
> 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word;
> -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
> <div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;">Supplement: When I wrote "the actual
> (secondness) reaction", I meant: Secondness is the being-called of
> the reaction (representamen, firstness, coin) by the memory content
> (secondness). The reaction "I might have a use for this coin" is
> already thirdness, interpretation.</div>
>
> <div name="quoted-content">
> <div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;">
> <div>
> <div>Dear Sung, Jerry, List,</div>
>
> <div>is it ok to interpret Sungs statement as follows?</div>
>
> <div>"Formally" means "in its role as an object", and
> "ontologically" means: What it is (as an entity) in possible
> other contexts. One example: The agreement, that money is a value-exchange
> medium. "Money is a value-exchange-medium" is a sentence, that
> is eg. a memory content of a person. Memory contents belong to secondness
> of a person, example: Somebody is being shown a coin. This is a
> representamen, that may (possibly, firstness) arouse reactions of this
> person. If this person has the memory content "money is a
> value-exchange-medium" stored, the actual (secondness) reaction:
> "Oh, I might have a use for this coin" will be called. So the
> spoken of memory content provides actuality (secondness) within the
> person, i.e. the interpreting system. So one might say, it is secondness.
> Now, in a social system "money is a value-exchange medium" is a
> social agreement, an expectation and an expectation of an expectation
> (Luhmann. Instead of "expectation", "Erwartung" may
> also be translated with "anticipation".), therefore a part of
> the structure (thirdness) of the social system. So the sentence
> "Money is a value..." by itself, as an entity i.e.
> ontologically, is thirdness in the social system, but when it occurs in
> the role of an object in a person, it is secondness. But I see some
> tautology in this chain of thoughts: An object is secondness, when that,
> what is playing the role of an object, is doing so. But that, what is
> playing the role of an object, in other contexts can be thirdness, but
> there it is not playing the role of an object. So I can just say: "An
> object is secondness".</div>
>
> <div>Best,</div>
>
> <div>Helmut</div>
>
> <div>
> <div style="margin: 10.0px 5.0px 5.0px 10.0px;padding: 10.0px 0 10.0px
> 10.0px;border-left: 2.0px solid rgb(195,217,229);">
> <div style="margin: 0 0 10.0px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b> Montag, 16. Juni
> 2014 um 03:45 Uhr<br/>
> <b>Von:</b> "Jerry LR Chandler"
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com><br/>
> <b>An:</b> Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu><br/>
> <b>Cc:</b> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu><br/>
> <b>Betreff:</b> Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis</div>
>
> <div>
> <div>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Sung:</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>
> <div>On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:</div>
>
>
> <blockquote>(1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be
> Firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness,
> Secondness<br/>
> or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thridness ontologically.</blockquote>
>
> <div> </div>
> This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing.</div>
>
> <div>CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and
> interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You
> also omit the term relation.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and
> secondness by being a difference in "mode of being".</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>CSP uses the concept of "Mode of being" to indicate and
> index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not see any possibility of the concept of "mode of
> being" being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is
> merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, "God
> the father" and "God the son"</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be be the abstract notion of a form of
> matter as either a gas and as a liquid.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be firstness as Hydrogen and secondness
> as Gold.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The meaning of the term "relation" is different in each of
> the three cases and addresses the question of HOW we choose to associate
> any two modes of being.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not understand either how or why you would seek to extend
> the conceptualization to mathematics. Mathematical category theory
> requires THREE separate and independent CONTINUOUS variables, (as modes of
> being?), in order to have a DIRECTED graph with the three domains and
> three edges NECESSARY for the closure (of triangular form) in the
> definition of an algebraic category. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>If you wish to compare your personal mathematical interpretation of
> "category theory" with a well-respected mathematician's
> application of category theory to biology, see the book by Andree
> Ehresmann, Memory Evolutive Systems. In particular, you could test
> your numerous hypotheses about categories with demonstrations of the
> categorical co-limit operations within your framework of thought.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Cheers</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Jerry <br/>
> </div>
>
> <div> </div>
> <br/>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.
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> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
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> </div>
> </div></div></body></html>
>
> <html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size:
> 12.0px;"><div>
> <div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px
> 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word;
> -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
> <div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;">Supplement: When I wrote "the actual
> (secondness) reaction", I meant: Secondness is the being-called of
> the reaction (representamen, firstness, coin) by the memory content
> (secondness). The reaction "I might have a use for this coin" is
> already thirdness, interpretation.</div>
>
> <div name="quoted-content">
> <div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;">
> <div>
> <div>Dear Sung, Jerry, List,</div>
>
> <div>is it ok to interpret Sungs statement as follows?</div>
>
> <div>"Formally" means "in its role as an object", and
> "ontologically" means: What it is (as an entity) in possible
> other contexts. One example: The agreement, that money is a value-exchange
> medium. "Money is a value-exchange-medium" is a sentence, that
> is eg. a memory content of a person. Memory contents belong to secondness
> of a person, example: Somebody is being shown a coin. This is a
> representamen, that may (possibly, firstness) arouse reactions of this
> person. If this person has the memory content "money is a
> value-exchange-medium" stored, the actual (secondness) reaction:
> "Oh, I might have a use for this coin" will be called. So the
> spoken of memory content provides actuality (secondness) within the
> person, i.e. the interpreting system. So one might say, it is secondness.
> Now, in a social system "money is a value-exchange medium" is a
> social agreement, an expectation and an expectation of an expectation
> (Luhmann. Instead of "expectation", "Erwartung" may
> also be translated with "anticipation".), therefore a part of
> the structure (thirdness) of the social system. So the sentence
> "Money is a value..." by itself, as an entity i.e.
> ontologically, is thirdness in the social system, but when it occurs in
> the role of an object in a person, it is secondness. But I see some
> tautology in this chain of thoughts: An object is secondness, when that,
> what is playing the role of an object, is doing so. But that, what is
> playing the role of an object, in other contexts can be thirdness, but
> there it is not playing the role of an object. So I can just say: "An
> object is secondness".</div>
>
> <div>Best,</div>
>
> <div>Helmut</div>
>
> <div>
> <div style="margin: 10.0px 5.0px 5.0px 10.0px;padding: 10.0px 0 10.0px
> 10.0px;border-left: 2.0px solid rgb(195,217,229);">
> <div style="margin: 0 0 10.0px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b> Montag, 16. Juni
> 2014 um 03:45 Uhr<br/>
> <b>Von:</b> "Jerry LR Chandler"
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com><br/>
> <b>An:</b> Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu><br/>
> <b>Cc:</b> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu><br/>
> <b>Betreff:</b> Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis</div>
>
> <div>
> <div>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Sung:</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>
> <div>On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:</div>
>
>
> <blockquote>(1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be
> Firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness,
> Secondness<br/>
> or Thirdness ontologically.<br/>
> (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness,<br/>
> Secondness or Thridness ontologically.</blockquote>
>
> <div> </div>
> This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing.</div>
>
> <div>CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and
> interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You
> also omit the term relation.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and
> secondness by being a difference in "mode of being".</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>CSP uses the concept of "Mode of being" to indicate and
> index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not see any possibility of the concept of "mode of
> being" being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is
> merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, "God
> the father" and "God the son"</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be be the abstract notion of a form of
> matter as either a gas and as a liquid.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Another interpretation could be firstness as Hydrogen and secondness
> as Gold.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>The meaning of the term "relation" is different in each of
> the three cases and addresses the question of HOW we choose to associate
> any two modes of being.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>I do not understand either how or why you would seek to extend
> the conceptualization to mathematics. Mathematical category theory
> requires THREE separate and independent CONTINUOUS variables, (as modes of
> being?), in order to have a DIRECTED graph with the three domains and
> three edges NECESSARY for the closure (of triangular form) in the
> definition of an algebraic category. </div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>If you wish to compare your personal mathematical interpretation of
> "category theory" with a well-respected mathematician's
> application of category theory to biology, see the book by Andree
> Ehresmann, Memory Evolutive Systems. In particular, you could test
> your numerous hypotheses about categories with demonstrations of the
> categorical co-limit operations within your framework of thought.</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Cheers</div>
>
> <div> </div>
>
> <div>Jerry <br/>
> </div>
>
> <div> </div>
> <br/>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
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> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> </div>
> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
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> </div>
> </div></div></body></html>
>
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