Clark wrote: "Thus were left asking why they world seems (070614-1) so mathematical. However if we recognize the world as a system under semiosis - a system in dialog - then rather than being mysterious we see it as natural."
What if there exists a regularity in this Universe that is manifest in mathematics, physics, biology, linguistics, and semiotics and this regualrity is the IRREDUCIBLE TRIADICITY of Peirce ? Would we be justified to call it the Ultimate Principle of Nature (UPN)? This idea was motivated by my previous emails on what I elected to call the Burgin-Peirce syllogism. With all the best. Sung ____________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > (My apologies if these came through more than once. Id sent them from the > wrong email address and despite resending them didnt see them appear in > my feed) > > > On Jul 3, 2014, at 4:03 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > >> You're mixing apples and oranges, using the word 'sign' equivocally. >> Saussure's 'sign' is not Peirce's 'sign' or even Peirce's 'symbol'; >> Saussure's 'sign' is Peirce's 'linguistic symbol'. > > Even there Saussure has limits that Peirce would never countenance. Its > best to just not conflate the two. Peirce just thinks so differently that > even where you find similarity its easy to be mislead by the similarity. > > Im trying to recall a really good overview of this. I think Eco has a few > places he goes through differences, although Im not always happy with > some of Ecos presentations of semiotics. However I *think* he does relate > Peirce to other thinkers in his chapter on Symbol in Semiotics and the > Philosophy of Language. Its been 15 years since I read it last though, > and my memory was that he makes errors in various places in it. > > This appears to get at certain other aspects of the comparison > > http://www.indiana.edu/~slavicgf/e103/assignments/Chandler_ch1_pt2.pdf > > Ive only glanced through it quickly, but it seems like the author is very > good about noting certain inconsistencies of terminological use by both > Saussure and Peirce which can waylay those not as experienced with each. > The author also notes that Peirces dialogical thinking is missing from > Saussure. I should also note it tends to be missing even from a lot of > contemporary philosophy of language - leading to various types of error. > Thus the problems with say Searles approach to systematize Austins > speech acts. > > Going back to Sungchuls point, I think this is important when considering > mathematics and physics. Consider Peirces Prolegomena to an Apology for > Pragmaticism > > Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work > of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one > can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the > shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that > unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic > nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but > it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances > embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give > "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come > within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a > Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. > Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a > Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) > in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they > are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human > Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of > thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I > admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It > might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this > fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume - > and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is > only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of > diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it > be incorrect, the utmost certain effect will be a danger that our system > may not represent every variety of non-human thought. (CP 4.551) > > The place of a quasi-mind seems rather pertinent in understanding the > surprising relationship between say physics and mathematics. Again, I > suspect Peirces ontology is the most controversial part of his thought. > Most philosophers are rather disparaging to it. However it does make such > matters rather understandable. Even if one treats these only as virtual I > think it renders certain mysterious matters rather intelligible. Without > dialogical thinking so much about semiotics becomes mysterious. Thus were > left asking why they world seems so mathematical. However if we recognize > the world as a system under semiosis - a system in dialog - then rather > than being mysterious we see it as natural. > > > >
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