My own view, in answer to your first question,
First, what are the other key developments in Peirce’s normative science of
semiotics that—in addition to a deeper appreciation of the role of diagrams
in deductive reasoning--are driving this rearticulation of the cognitive
field?
is-
first: the function of mediation within semiotics, changing informational
processing from linear and dyadic to a transformational 'cognitive'
process, with mediation operating in any one of the three categories - but
above all, within that generalizing, evolving, exploring, mode of Thirdness;
and
second: the three categories themselves - which moved reality and existence
out of an unbridgeable binarism; and degraded novelty to either accident or
theistic intention - into a process where the two are functionally
transforming each other and where novelty is a basic component.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, September 06, 2014 1:32 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions seminar
Lists,
One of the claims made in the first chapter of Natural Propositions that
caught my eye is that “Peirce’s redefinition of propositions under the
generalized notion of “Dicisign”, however, forms but one node in a vast
redefinition of the whole field of cognition . . . .” (NP, 2)
I’d like to ask a couple of questions about how we should think aboutthis
redefinition of the field. Let’s take a closer look at the way Frederik
introduces this line of thought. He says: “At the core of Peirce’s
rearticulation of the cognitive field, then, is a daring generalization.”
There are two parts to this generalization:
1) “all of mathematics is developed by diagrammatical reasoning.”
2) “all deductive reasoning is undertaken by such diagrammatical reasoning”
(NP, 3)
He then offers a long quote from MS 634 that sums up the ambitions involved
in rearticulating the cognitive field. After giving a short overview of how
the chapters fit together, he concludes by saying that the most important
offering of Peirce’s semiotics is “a renewed outlook of the whole of the
‘cognitive field,’ enabling us to envision the exploration of routes not
taken, both in terms of further conceptual development and experimental
investigations.”
I agree with Frederik’s claim that Peirce is dramatically reconceiving the
boundaries of logic as semiotic. Having said that, here are two questions I’d
like to think about a little more as we prepare to head into chapters 2 and
then 3:
First, what are the other key developments in Peirce’s normative science of
semiotics that—in addition to a deeper appreciation of the role of diagrams
in deductive reasoning--are driving this rearticulation of the cognitive
field?
Second, if the normative science of semiotics is being broadened, how might
we understand the boundaries of this science? That is, where does normative
science of semiotics stop and special science of biology or psychology
start?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2014 7:52 AM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions seminar
Greetings all,
Next Monday, Sept. 1, we’ll be starting our online seminar based on Frederik
Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions. Frederik will make the introductory post
to both lists, with the subject line "Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 1,
Introduction". Anyone on either list can reply, but the whole process will
work best if the following general rules are followed:
1. Don’t change the subject line of your reply unless you DON’T want
your reply to be included in the seminar thread.
2. Always check the address(es) that your reply is going to. It should
go to the list(s) that you are subscribed to, and not to any individual list
member. You may need to delete some addresses from the address field in your
message window before you send — especially if you are on the peirce-l list,
which automatically sends your reply to the original poster unless you
delete his or her address before sending.
3. Also before you send, note that prior messages in the thread may be
automatically included in your reply, and delete these “trailers” unless
your reply refers to them directly.
As each new chapter thread begins, the threadleader will start it off with a
new subject line in the same format as the previous. (See attached
schedule — I’m trying to insert it below, but not sure if it will display
properly.) Previous threads can continue (under their own subject line, of
course) after the new one begins.
Chapter
Natural Propositions
Threadleader(s)
Start date
1
Introduction
Frederik Stjernfelt
1 Sep
2
anti-psychologism
Jeff Kasser
8 Sep
3.1-7
dicisigns I
Gary Fuhrman
22 Sep
3.8-14
dicisigns II
Jeff Downard
6 Oct
4
Naturalization
Tyler Bennett
20 Oct
5
Cognition
Mara Woods
3 Nov
6
Evolution
John Collier
17 Nov
7
beyond language
1 Dec
8
Iconicities
Gary Richmond
15 Dec
9
diagrams I
29 Dec
10
diagrams II
5 Jan
11-12
Enlightenment
Yogi Hendlin
12 Jan
I’ll be happy to take any questions on this, on or offlist.
gary f.
} Any living cell carries with it the experiences of a billion years of
experimentation by its ancestors. [Max Delbruck] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm<http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm> }{ gnoxics
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
[email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
.
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
