Dear Dr. Benjamin Udel, Thank you for an absolutely fantastic exposition of the difference between "between a logical conception of mind and a psychological conception of mind" in Peirce! It is a perfect clarification of the existential fact that that all views of thought are artificial balancing between one view that has "some" valid aspects to its view of reality as opposed to another and opposite view of reality! In essence, you have three (3) competing views with various rational incomplete rational views, that is, the logical, the psychological, and the "balancing" between them, none of which are perfectly correct on their own! In our present society, we automatically assume the "balancing" act is the most 'correct' or 'moral' when in fact it is a political act in thinking to get the best position to view the whole pragmatically that has nothing at all to do with "correct" or "incorrect" - obvious HERE because how can you choose "logical" over "psychological" OR vice versa? - and so the 'balance' avoids - for the moment - the horns of a very serious dilemma! -x- It can be contrasted with far less obvious political balancing acts like the contrast between homosexuality, extremely obvious in Plato and to a lesser extent in Aristotle, and the value of heterosexuality advocated by both Plato and Aristotle by the law's judgment of burning homosexuals at the stake. Homosexuality made for an extremely powerful phalanx in battle demonstrated by the Spartans at Thermopylae and the Theban Band at Chaeronea, and yet the whole point of marriage between male and female in classical Greek society was to produce MALE children for the state's army. Reflective from this, is the extreme suppression of female political rights in Athenian society versus the ability of both Aristophanes and Euripides and possibly even Plato to mock this extremity by advocating the rights of women to express themselves intellectually. Or again for Socrates to portray the most rational structure for a perfectly "closed" society, tyrannous in the extreme but extremely efficient, in the REPUBLIC versus his avocation of the of the "balancing" act of law in his rejection of the murderous reign of the Thirty Tyrants, one of whom was one of his students, and his acceptance of the death penalty from the legal process of a democracy. -x- Or again in reference to the "black books" of Martin Heidegger recently posted to the Peirce List about his obvious anti-Semitism outside the context of his relationship between Plato's REPUBLIC and Hitler's nascent totalitarianism (1933) in the rector's speech where, on the one hand, if you want a perfectly unified and powerful society you want a clearly defined unity of purpose defined as a "folk" (volk) which means excluding the "cosmopolitans" (Soviet Russian euphemism for "Jews") who did NOT want a perfectly unified German society, versus on the other hand his sentimental relationship to some of his Jewish friends whom he felt gratitude towards. Heidegger's sole ideological break with Hitler was over "the night of the long knives" when the very much vicious of the anti-Semitic Nazis, Ernst Roehm, was ILLEGALLY executed - sic. Socrates versus the Thirty Tyrants. -x- Philosophy, viewed as a "society" - which the Peirce List, of course, literally 'is' - wants on the one hand to be "logically" as solid and closed as a rock, while on the other hand in absolute contradiction it wants to be open to all expressible points of view, even irrational ones, simply because they are "human. all too human" points of view - ERGO one "politically" balances between the two (at least for the moment) in a purely pragmatic desire "beyond good and evil" in order to get the best of both worlds once again. The philosopher, on the one hand, wants to accurately place each person "in" their undeniable material milieu and yet also, on the other hand, demonstrate somehow "thought" does not literally have a "material" place marked out on a material map even though "the facts-of-the-matter" clearly assumes every material human being has a literal material place in the map of the "world" when the truth of the matter is we are both in the "world" as well as of it.
Truly, Gary C. Moore On Monday, September 8, 2014 6:25 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote: Of course, John D. - sorry F Den 08/09/2014 kl. 19.25 skrev "Deely, John N." <[email protected]> : Please use “John C.” or “John D.” or perhaps the last names, so we can know which “John” is commenting or being responded to > >From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 12:23 >To: [email protected]; [email protected] >Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6698] Re: Natural Propositions > >Frederik, John, >As far as I can tell (and I've been looking around), Peirce never >distinguishes between _mind_ and _psyche_. But he does distinguish between a >logical conception of mind and a psychological conception of mind. (See for >example Memoir 11 "On the Logical Conception of Mind" >http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm in his >Carnegie Application of 1902.) >Peirce said, "[...] just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that >motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that >thoughts are in us." He's alluding by contrast to a misleading old definition >of momentum as the "quantity of motion in an object". I don't know that it was >ever current among physicists, I once read it in a book by a 20th-Century >neo-Scholastic, de Wulf I think. However, it was misleading not because there >is no motion in an object, but because the momenta within an object are just >the momenta that are "netted out" when one considers the net momentum of an >object, the amount of motion that an object is in. The object is in some of >the motion in a larger object. >At any rate, Peirce did appear to hold that thoughts do not occur _apart_ from >a mind - except that in later years he had generalized to the idea of a >quasi-mind - in crystals, in the work of bees, etc. (in "Prolegomena to an >Apology for Pragmaticism," 1906, CP 4 paragraph 551 >http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/prolegomena.htm#Paragraph551). >Earlier he had held out the idea of a representamen that does not have a >mental interpretant, and thus would be a representamen yet not a sign, a >representamen that is apart from thought - he said that an example would be a >sunflower that, by the sheer act of turning toward the sun, becomes capable of >reproducing a sunflower that also turns towards the sun and also is capable of >reproducing a further such sunflower (in "Syllabus," 1903, EP 2:272-3 >http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-s-20). > I don't know whether he later thought that such a case would fall into the class of quasi-mind phenomena. >Now, in studies of special classes of positive phenomena, all mental thought, >if not all quasi-mental thought, would be regarded as subject matter of >psychological study, so John has a point - all actual thought, the thoughts >that we do think, are psychological, in some sense of that word. As an >objective idealist, Peirce held that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits >becoming physical laws." Did he think that psychology might be more general >than physics, then? Yes, he did. In his 1904 intellectual autobiography he >said of idioscopy (the special sciences), that "It is extremely doubtful which >of its two wings should be placed first" - the two wings being physical and >psychological sciences. >All actual thinking by minds will be limited by the actual powers of the homo >sapiens or whatever it is that is thinking, and implementation will matter a >great deal, as Stan said. Implementation will certainly matter in AI. But none >of those ideas constitute psychologism or anti-anti-psychologism. >Peirce tries to address some such limits generically, and he evidently thinks >that there will always be such limits, and that thus it is proper at the >philosophical level to address their role in logic. He holds that only >inference that can be controlled by the one inferring is subject to logical >criticism, and he does inventory of cases where the one inferring cannot >control his or her inference process, one cannot doubt at the time, etc. The >result is a philosophical idea of reasoning where reasoning hardly seems >possible without such 'indubitables', perceptual judgments that serve as first >premisses. (That's in Memoir >21http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-07.htm, especially >Draft D but, if I recall correctly, he discusses other indubitables >elsewhere.) I do see how one might be less confident that some philosophical >generalizations are truly general than one is as regards many mathematical >generalizations. It would be nice if we could observe other intelligent species, E.T.'s etc, for corroboration as to what is idiosyncratic to humans and what is philosophically general. >Peirce's anti-psychologism isn't the idea that we don't depend on often >unconscious cerebral processes that we don't understand in order to reason. >For example, he regards abductive inference as guided by instinct, and regards >the plausibility or natural simplicity desirable in a hypothetical explanation >as something's seeming simple and natural in terms of one's evolved >instinctual attunement to nature, as opposed to logical simplicity, which he >regards as badly secondary. https://sites.google.com/site/cspmem/terms#simple. >Yet even here he includes a normative "ought", saying "By plausibility, I mean >the degree to which a theory ought to recommend itself to our belief >independently of any kind of evidence other than our instinct urging us to >regard it favorably." (A Letter to Paul Carus 1910, Collected Papers v. 8, see >paragraph 223.) Philosophical logic, in Peirce's view, then will be >concerned with instinct's role in abductive inference, but not with the specific evolutionary history and kind of instinct possessed by homo sapiens. >Anti-psychologism in logic is, or involves, the idea that mathematical and >philosophical theories of logic are not chapters in psychology and are not >based mathematically or logically on research findings in psychology, any more >than calculus and the math of conical refraction are based mathematically or >logically on physics or physical optics, even though questions of physical >theory inspired the development of calculus etc. and could be called a >genealogical basis for the more abstract subjects. >Best, Ben >On 9/8/2014 10:26 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: >[John Collier]>>>> He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences >that we take (fallibly in each instance) to be externally caused (an >abduction) because they surprise us. However our thought does not get outside >of the sequence of signs that are connected in our thought (or experience more >generally, if you make a distinction). >>>>[FS]>>> He does indeed claim that all thought is in signs - but I do not >>>>recall him saying those signs are "in our thought". I think he is careful >>>>not to make his concept of mind a concept of the psyche, let alone "our" >>>>psyche. >>>[JC]>> Ok, I find this idea too bizarre to contemplate seriously. We will >>>have to part company here. I think if you read carefully his papers on the >>>faculties you will see why I make the interpretation I do, even if you don't >>>agree with it. >>[FS]> I am sad to hear you offer no better argument against Peirce's p-o-v >>than that it be "bizarre". Same: I think if you read carefully his papers on >>semiotics you will see why I make the interpretation I do. >>- Q: Why do you have to re-read your own papers before teaching them in the >>classroom? >>[JC]>>>> This "sucks the world up inside the head", >>[FS]> - if the world is sucked up inside the head - where are the head then, >>not in the world presumably? - is the head then in still other heads? - and >>where are those heads? - etc. >>[JC]>>>> (Peirce thought that nothing could be established a priori.) >>>>[FS]>>> He vacillated on that, sometimes calling semiotics the a priori >>>>theory of signs. >>>[JC]>> Yeh, I know. Always sounded like wishful thinking to me. I had a >>>friend studying mathematics who, when he did not know or could not find a >>>proof, he started with what he did know led towards the conclusion, and >>>jumped over the missing parts with the justification WT for "wishful >>>thinking". Of course the conclusion is connected logically to the premises >>>and steps he did put down, so the connection is there, quite independently >>>of his own thinking. >>>In Peirce's favour, there are two senses of a priori. One, which Peirce >>>describes as problematic, depends on reason alone. The other, which may >>>apply to the theory of signs, does not depend on particular experience, but >>>we can discover that there is no alternative, no matter how the world is. I >>>don't have much problem with the latter kind, but one has to be careful >>>about failures of imagination. This can take unexpected forms, for example >>>many people think they can imagine a universe with exactly two objects of >>>identical properties (Max Black's balls). >>[FS]> Ha! >>[JC]>> However I would ask if they never interact what does it mean to say >>they are in the same universe? I am not at all convinced the supposed example >>is meaningful. Or for a more mundane case, many people would think we can >>imagine a centaur. As my mentor David Hull liked to point out, this is >>dubious -- how many hearts, lungs, or livers, for that matter, does a centaur >>have? >>[FS]> Right. Imagination leaves blank what is not explicitly presented. As I >>said in a posting a couple of days ago, I think Peirce's implicit (sometimes >>explicit) notion of the a priori comes closer to that of the Husserlian >>tradition than to Kant's: it deals with inescapable structures of reality >>which you must often consult the foundations of the special sciences in order >>to learn about. But those sciences are also not only "in the head". >>The signs we exchange in this very List conversation are distributed by >>servers to computer screens and are not confined to anybody's head. Here, I >>think common sense supports my p-o-v no less than yours. >>Best >>F ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]. To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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