If nobody minds, I would like spend some time on this passage in chapter two:
"regarding empiricism: the belief in nothing but singular empirical propositions bars it from even defending its own principles because it rejects the important possibility of reaching mediate knowledge from immediate knowledge. It thus confuses the origin of knowledge with its legitimation..." (Friederik 2014: 19). My sense is that there are two important distinctions here. 1) Mediate knowledge vs. Immediate knowledge and 2) the distinction between the origin of knowledge and its legitimation. I believe the second distinction has huge implication, especially in how we are usually taught epistemology in analytic philosophy classes -- my hunch is there is often some ambiguity concept of 'justified belief' that smuggles in many issues arise that when this distinction is ignored -- but before we get ahead of ourselves I would like to roll back the tape a bit and ask for some clarification on the first distinction. What are our references for 'mediate' and 'immediate' knowledge? and do these categories have analogues in Peircean terminology? How is distinction (1) related to distinction (2)/what is our account for how mediate knowledge is reached from immediate knowledge? best, Ulysses On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 10:40 PM, Kasser,Jeff <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff D. and lists: > > I'm all for the discussion you initiate below, Jeff. It's closer to my > heart than the stuff about reducibility is. And I'll let Frederik speak for > himself, but I didn't read him as focusing on reduction in his > characterization of psychologism. He does seem to make it central to his > characterization of the classical dispute about psychologism, but it seems > to me that he emphasizes on p. 16 that the contemporary discussions of > psychologism that interest him aren't concerned with reductions. I'm not > certain that reduction looms any larger than, say, circularity or > relativism in the classic discussions, and Frederik doesn't explain how > important the claim about reduction is to his characterization. But, as I > tried to indicate in my introductory post, I would love to hear more about > how Frederik and others see the connection between the classic discussions > and the treatment of contemporary views like Barsalou's. Your invocation of > Mill below might provide a promising link between Frederik's two > discussions. > > Best, > > Jeff K. > ________________________________________ > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]] > Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 7:15 PM > To: [email protected]; Peirce-L > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 > > Lists, > > In a summary statement of what "anti-psychologism" in logic is largely > about, Frederik focuses on the claim that the concepts in the theory of > logic can't be reduced to the concepts in the empirical science of > psychology. While matters of reduction may be relevant to understanding > some of Peirce’s arguments for an unpsychological approach to logic, I > would rather focus attention on questions concerning the different kinds of > observations and methods that should and shouldn’t be used in logic. > > Consider the arguments Peirce mounts in the Minute Logic §3 where he > discusses the different methods that have been used in logic. (CP 2.18-78) > He considers quite a range of approaches to questions in logic that have > been used by philosophers ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and > Hegel. Along the way, he criticizes those that will fail to serve our > purposes insofar as we are inquirers in logic. Here are four points in his > arguments against psychologism in logic that stand out. > > 1) “The logicians of the period from Descartes to Kant cannot be much > blamed for seeing little distinction between psychology and logic, inasmuch > as the psychology of their days, whether rational or empirical, consisted > in little else than a logical analysis of the products of thought, as every > psychologist of our day will admit. Even the pupils of James Mill, for all > the power of his extraordinary Analysis of the Human Mind [1829] were far > from understanding psychology as it is now understood.” (CP, 2.41) > > 2) “Modern psychology has made an admirable beginning. Every student of > exact science who is in a situation to judge of what has been accomplished > in this department must applaud it with his whole heart. Yet that it is > only a beginning is shown by its present tendency to turn upon its axis, > without making any great advance. Matters of brain-physiology and matters > of consciousness elbow one another in unsympathetic juxtaposition, in a way > which can only be transitional, and is a sign for us, as well as we can > look forward to conceptions not yet attained, that psychologists do not yet > understand what mind is, nor what it does. I am not at all prepared to > clear the matter up; but I dimly discern, I think, that the physiological > view has not sufficiently affected the introspective aspect; and possibly > the converse is true, also. Perhaps the introspection is mainly illusion > due to quasi-logical interpretations.” (CP, 2.42) > > 3) “It is J. S. Mill who insists that how we ought to think can be > ascertained in no other way than by reflection upon those psychological > laws which teach us how we must needs think.” (CP, 2.47) > > 4) “Other authors, indeed, a large majority of logicians, without citing > results of scientific psychology in support of the principles of logic, yet > incessantly refer to data of psychology--or to what would ordinarily be so > considered, apparent self-observations that we think so and so--as showing > what the truths of logic are. All this is beside the purpose. Logic is not > the science of how we do think; but, in such sense as it can be said to > deal with thinking at all, it only determines how we ought to think; nor > how we ought to think in conformity with usage, but how we ought to think > in order to think what is true. That a premiss should be pertinent to such > a conclusion, it is requisite that it should relate, not to how we think, > but to the necessary connections of different sorts of fact.” (CP, 2.52) > > This seems to give us pretty good textual reasons for thinking that > questions concerning the kinds of evidence and methods we should use in > logic are important for understanding his objections to psychologism. What > is more, I think that we can learn a lot from comparing Peirce’s and Mill’s > approaches. Mill gives us a nice clear target—and one that supplies us > with a developed account of the role of different kinds of representations > in reasoning and the nature of both deductive and inductive inference. > Mill says considerably less about abductive inference. > > I wonder: does Mill’s limited account of hypothesis take the shape that > it does because of his assumptions about the nature of the evidence we can > use in developing a logical theory? Does his explanation of hypothesis > take the shape that it does because of some of his assumptions about the > character of the representations that function in logical inference? As > far as I can see, Peirce is keenly interested in the question of what is > driving philosophers like Mill to overlook what needs to be explained in an > account of the relationship between perceptual judgments, observations and > abductive inferences. After all, we can learn much of the mistakes of > others. > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Kasser,Jeff [[email protected]] > Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2014 11:58 PM > To: [email protected]; Peirce-L > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 > > Welcome to our discussion of Chapter 2 of *Natural Propositions*. My job > as threadleader for this chapter has been somewhat preempted; I can't very > well initiate a discussion that has already started without me. And > Frederik has been, not merely diligent, but rather clearly heroic in his > responsiveness to questions and comments, so he hardly seems to need me to > fulfill the other function of a threadleader, viz. keeping the discussion > going. I will nonetheless proceed in fairly typical threadleader fashion, > since I don't want to disrupt any of the exchanges about anti-psychologism > and its discontents that have already begun. > > The content of Chapter 2 includes a good bit of history and a good bit of > very contemporary discussion. The history of the rise of anti-psychologism > should matter to Peirceans for several reasons, not least of which is the > centrality of anti-psychologism to the origin stories of analytic > philosophy and phenomenology. Much of what Peirce says about "psychological > conceptions of logic" seems quite similar to better-known statements from > Frege and Husserl, and it seems to many Peirceans unfortunate and avoidable > that Peirce has not insinuated himself into standard narratives about > philosophy's sense of itself during the period when it became an academic > discipline among others, and had to distinguish itself, especially from > psychology. Frege and Husserl were responding to what they regarded as an > excessively naturalistic approach to the subject matter of philosophy. > Peirce and Stjernfelt share many of their arguments and many of their > motivations, but their anti-psychologism is not an anti-naturalism (as the > title of Frederik's book makes clear). So one thing to keep in mind, I > suggest, is that the exemplary anti-psychologisms of the period are > ambitiously anti-naturalistic, while Peirce and Stjernfelt hold out a hope > for reconciling something worth calling naturalism with anti-psychologism's > hostility to relativism, excessive empiricism, skepticism about meaning, > etc. The historically minded among us will find a lot to discuss at pp. > 33-34, where Frederik sketches the main differences among the > anti-psychologisms of Peirce, Frege, and Husserl. I will throw out one > discussion-starter here. Frederik points out that Husserl saw Peirce's > insistence on the diagrammatic nature of logical and mathematical reasoning > as a regression to psychologism. Frederik also points out that Husserl > makes signs dependent on conscious subjectivity, while Peirce reverses this > dependence relation. Frederik does not (unless I missed it) claim that > Peirce would have seen this Husserlian insistence on the explanatory > centrality of conscious intentionality as itself a reversion to > psychologism. I take it to be uncontroversial that Peirce would have > rejected Husserl's direction of explanation, but it is an interesting > question, I think, whether he would have rejected it as psychologistic. > > I think that Frederik is right that our philosophical circumstances > resemble those of Peirce, Frege, and Husserl, with an aggressive and > somewhat scientistic naturalism often locking horns unproductively with > excessively smug a prioristic philosophical tendencies (I hasten to add > that Frederik is more diplomatic in his descriptions than I am, and that a > more nuanced picture will emerge below). Frederik's examples tend to come > from cognitive science and semiotics; people with training more like mine > will easily find examples from analytic epistemology, experimental > philosophy, and the like. Frederik's story is usefully compared, I think, > with Philip Kitcher's well-known (in some circles) essay "The Naturalists > Return." > > Psychologism has often been identified almost entirely by its vices (e.g. > relativism, insufficient normative resources, circularity, etc.). > Epistemologists tend to focus on its excessive normative modesty regarding > justification, while philosophers of mind or language usually have in mind > rather different worries about identity of thoughts, about multiple > realizability, or about the normativity of meaning. I both applaud and > regard with suspicion Frederik's suspicion of "academic parsing" (p. 7). I > take it that something ambitiously hostile to academic parsing underlies > the somewhat odd title of the first section of Chapter 2, viz. "The Actual > Relevance of Anti-Psychologism." To my ear, this is missing a term. For > instance, when I wrote about Peirce's anti-psychologism some years ago, I > wrote about its relevance to the doubt-belief theory of inquiry, which > stands at the center of my Peircean interests. I take it that Frederik does > not intend that section heading to be as ambitious as "The Actual Relevance > of Anti-Psychologism to Everything that has Ever Concerned Anyone about > Psychologism." That seems a large task, despite the many fascinating things > Frederik offers in this chapter. So another cluster of issues to consider > about this refreshingly interdisciplinary work concerns the scope of its > ambitions, and what problems get foregrounded as others get highlighted. > Might something worth calling psychologistic (especially if it were > diplomatically labeled something more like a kind of naturalized > epistemology) be acceptable in an account of *good* thinking (this is what > epistemologists tend to hear these debates as centering on) even if it were > not acceptable in an account of *thinking* (this is what philosophers of > mind tend to have in mind) or vice versa? > > I'll close by trying to make explicit something intriguing that I found > implicit in this chapter. Psychologism is usually characterized in terms of > its sins of comission, as noted above. But Frederik's discussion of > Barsalou in Section 4 tends to focus on the sins of omission involved in > the "perceptual symbol" theory. I am not familiar with Barsalou, but > Frederik's discussion of his work makes no mention of grand reductive > statements of the sort that can make psychologism seem absurdly ambitions > (e.g. "the brain exudes thought in the same way that the kidneys exude > urine"). Instead, Frederik focuses on the explanatory insufficiency of > Barsalou's view. I wonder whether this provides part of the answer to the > question I raised in the paragraph just preceding this one. Among the > reasons that anti-psychologism is both enduringly and newly relevant is > that it's not mainly hyper-aggressive naturalists of the "philosophy > departments should go out of business" sort who present the danger of > psychologism these days. Do we think that stealthier and more modest > instantiations of psychologism are less easily addressed by the old direct > arguments that Peirce, Frege, and Husserl have bequeathed to us? In > particular, do they require the development of positive proposals that > compete with psychologism rather than attempting to refute it? Is Frederik > offering, in the final section of the chapter, an updated version of an > old-fashioned demolition-of-anything-worth-calling-psychologism argument, > or is he doing something importantly different? > > Finally, I'd like to apologize to the members of the biosemiotics list for > what is really an academic philosopher's post. I acknowledge this as a > limitation of my time, talent and training. I certainly hope that my > weaknesses as a threadleader will not have any tendency to limit the > discussion to matters narrowly philosophical. > > Best to all, and with special thanks to Frederik and Gary F. > > Jeff Kasser > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Ulysses
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