Dear Clark, lists - Peirce certainly was an early speech act theorist (just like the Husserl scholar Adolf Reinach with his notion of "social acts" a bit later). To Peirce, propositions may be put to use in different utterances - assertions, acts of assent, questions, imperatives, etc., - so he actually has the core of a speech act theory. I do not cover this in extenso in the book, merely note it in the passing. Not much has been written about this. Pietarinen and Bellucci, by the way, have a paper in the pipeline documenting how the young Grice was deeply inspired by Peirce.
Best F Den 11/09/2014 kl. 04.42 skrev Clark Goble <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>: On Sep 10, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: But my book is not or only marginally about propositional logic. It is about the physiology, meaning, reference and semiotic instantiation of propositions (which may appear, btw, in other speech acts than assertions …). Again, apologies for a slight tangent. (Amazon tells me your book should arrive Friday - so hopefully I can say more then) It always struck me that Peirce had some similarities with speech acts. Of course Grice’s “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” was one of the early papers that moved phil language towards a speech act approach - culminating in Searle’s work. I’ve long noticed Peirce’s work in semiotics, especially in his letters to Lady Webly and the parallels and perhaps more important differences from Grice. I wonder if you would agree with Searle regarding the breakdown of illocutionary force, perlocutionary force and so forth and how you’d map that onto Peirce. (If this is explicit in your book, apologies. I can wait for the book to arrive and reformulate the question better over the weekend) The reason I ask is because while I have some deep problems with Searle (primarily due to certain static unities his analysis presupposes rather than processes) I do think that we get an idea of propositions precisely because we recognize something is the same through these various linguistic forces. Searle wants something static and present to analysis whereas it seems to me that Peirce is a little more sophisticated here. Yet I think the same general approach could be made.
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