Interesting you mention Searle. I tangled a bit with him, using my alter-ego fictional character Adam Panflick to have the following conversation with him back in 2008.
Adam Panflick Converses With John Searle | Stephen C. Rose http://buff.ly/1pLecpZ *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Oct 2, 2014, at 8:28 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > It's ten years later that he writes about Derrida and the symbol in *On > Grammatologie*. > > > Whoops. An other typo - my apologies. Doing this quickly as I do some > work. Obviously I meant Peirce there, not Derrida. > > I should have added to that previous post that Pettigrew's paper is a > pretty good explanation of how Derrida is using Peirce. It doesn't really > get into the various criticisms. So the icon and index issues aren't > brought forth. But he gets at correctly that Derrida's *différance *is > really about Peirce's notion that there's always mediation. > > Several pages were missing in Google's Books digitization unfortunately. > It's still worth checking out. > > > http://books.google.com/books?id=5J3BcJPHrdoC&pg=PA365&lpg=PA365#v=onepage&q&f=false > > He gets at how the real issue is how we have only mediated access to the > subject of a proposition. He also gets at quite well that the very notion > of "self" is a sign in this sense. (This becomes very important in *Limited > Inc* among other places - although I think Derrida is unnecessarily > unkind to Searle there and is in part what causes the huge backlash to him > in philosophy departments) > > Quoting from Pettigrew (371) on last time where he addresses to mention of > Peirce in *On Grammatology *to explain how Peirce goes farthest in what > he's trying to explain. > > Perhaps we can reflect better now on the citation with which we began the > paper. When Derrida states that Peirce goes far in the direction of the > deconstruction of the transcendental signified, he seems to be thinking of > it as a deconstruction in at least two senses. The first is in the sense > that interactive triadicity of signs deconstructs the transcendal signified > as a master-sign or touch-stone of originary meaning. The second is that > insofar as the process of semiosis constitutes the subject, its > conditional, futural, and communal properties deconstruct the solipsistic, > simple substance and self-certainty which the philosophical tradition has > associated with the Cartesian cogito. > > Derrida's thematic of différance is similarly a disruption of meaning as > well as of the Cartesian cogito. Indeed, although Derrida is often > criticized for his excessive preoccupation with the sign, the rupture of > which his thinking takes account calls into question the relations *between > *signs that Peirce's project requires. This is indeed a point of > divergence. In spite of the co-problematic with respect to a disruption of > metaphysics which is being suggested here, there is a notion of continuity > fundamental to Peirce's project which is not present in Derrida's work. The > continuity of signs and the attendant growth of meaning are part of > Peirce's reading of the continuity of lived experience. "Personality is not > apprehended in an instance," he wrote. "It has to be lived in time..." (CP > 6.155) But Derrida's gaze, as we have seen, is directed rather at the gap > produced by a disruption which metaphysics has tried to repress. His > project takes account of the manifestations of the repression of the > absence of presence. (371-2) > > I'm not sure that's quite as big a difference as Pettigrew makes out. It's > also similar to the difference between Derrida and Heidegger over joining > and dis-jointing. My sense (which I know not everyone agrees with) is that > both movements are always in play and Derrida's just focusing in on the one > that was neglected. The better criticism is that in a proposition - the > dicisign - there's always an index. > > But again I don't want to go too far down a tangent. Originally I'd more > brought up Derrida and Heidegger relative to chapter 3 on propositions. I > think though that Derrida's critique of the transcendental signified is > simply those who say it's an end to semiosis here and now rather than an > eternal "in the long run." We have truth when we have our belief in this > proposition selected in a way that would match this ideal sign. But it's > not the same as the ideal sign, unlike in various genealogies of > philosophical thought leading back to Descartes. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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