Lists, Let me say a little bit about the argumentative structure of "Sundry Logical Conceptions" in the hopes of getting a bit clearer--at least in my own mind--about how the arguments in the Syllabus for his account of the dicisign are supposed to hang together.
>From the surface of the text, this essay appears to follow the same basic >approach that was adopted in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," "Some >Consequences of Four Incapacities," and "Further Consequences." That is, >Peirce starts with some observations drawn from our common experience. He is >particularly interested in those phenomena that do not fit with the >philosophical theories that have been developed up to his point in time. In >order to support an abductive inference to an explanatory hypothesis, Peirce >provides a careful analysis of the key phenomena. The aim is to articulate >exactly what needs to be explained so that we will be able to avoid the >mistakes of postulating more than is needed or less than is needed to account >for the phenomena. The analysis is guided by a phenomenological theory of the >universal categories. It is clear that Peirce is working from this starting point in "Sundry Logical Conceptions," because the first section of this essay consists of an explanation of the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. After reviewing the account of the universal categories, he says that "in order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them in the different conceptions with which logic deals.” (EP, vol. 2, 270) Before moving any further into the argument of this essay, let me see if the view I'm attributing to Peirce fits with what he says about his procedure in his earlier works. For the sake of taking an example, I'll consider his arguments concerning the dicisign in the "Regernated Logic." He explains the starting point in his analysis of an assertion in the following way: Namely, it is that speculative grammar, or analysis of the nature of assertion, which rests upon observations, indeed, but upon observations of the rudest kind, open to the eye of every attentive person who is familiar with the use of language, and which, we may be sure, no rational being, able to converse at all with his fellows, and so to express a doubt of anything, will ever have any doubt. Now, proof does not consist in giving superfluous and superpossible certainty to that which nobody ever did or ever will doubt, but in removing doubts which do, or at least might at some time, arise. A man first comes to the study of logic with an immense multitude of opinions upon a vast variety of topics; and they are held with a degree of confidence, upon which, after he has studied logic, he comes to look back with no little amusement. There remains, however, a small minority of opinions that logic never shakes; and among these are certain observations about assertions. The student would never have had a desire to learn logic if he had not paid some little attention to assertion, so as at least to attach a definite signification to assertion. So that, if he has not thought more accurately about assertions, he must at least be conscious, in some out-of-focus fashion, of certain properties of assertion. When he comes to the study, if he has a good teacher, these already dimly recognized facts will be placed before him in accurate formulation, and will be accepted as soon as he can clearly apprehend their statements. (CP, 3.432) Let us see what some of these observations and dimly recognized facts are. Here are some points made in the following paragraphs. As far as I can see, they are all observations drawn from common experience of what is involved in the making of an assertion: 1. When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. 2. Some of these signs (or at least one of them) are supposed to excite in the mind of the receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we might almost say, dreams -- that is, reminiscences of sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or other sensations, now quite detached from the original circumstances of their first occurrence, so that they are free to be attached to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call up these images at will (with more or less effort) in his own mind; and he supposes the receiver can do the same. 3. Not only is the outward significant word or mark a sign, but the image which it is expected to excite in the mind of the receiver will likewise be a sign -- a sign by resemblance, or, as we say, an icon -- of the similar image in the mind of the deliverer, and through that also a sign of the real quality of the thing. This icon is called the predicate of the assertion. But instead of a single icon, or sign by resemblance of a familiar image or "dream," evocable at will, there may be a complexus of such icons, forming a composite image of which the whole is not familiar. But though the whole is not familiar, yet not only are the parts familiar images, but there will also be a familiar image of its mode of composition. 4. In fact, two types of complication will be sufficient. For example, one may be conjunctive and the other disjunctive combination. Conjunctive combination is when two images are both to be used at once; and disjunctive when one or other is to be used. (This is not the most scientific selection of types; but it will answer the present purpose.) The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it be such that it can convey any positive information, being applicable to some things but not to others, is called a first intention. The idea embodied by an icon which cannot of itself convey any information, being applicable to everything or to nothing, but which may, nevertheless, be useful in modifying other icons, is called a second intention. 5. The assertion which the deliverer seeks to convey to the mind of the receiver relates to some object or objects which have forced themselves upon his attention; and he will miss his mark altogether unless he can succeed in forcing those very same objects upon the attention of the receiver. No icon can accomplish this, because an icon does not relate to any particular thing; nor does its idea strenuously force itself upon the mind, but often requires an effort to call it up. Some such sign as the word this, or that, or hullo, or hi, which awakens and directs attention must be employed. A sign which denotes a thing by forcing it upon the attention is called an index. An index does not describe the qualities of its object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, having thisness, and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called a hecceity. A hecceity in its relation to the assertion is a subject thereof. An assertion may have a multitude of subjects; but to that we shall return presently. 6. Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an assertion. The assertion represents a compulsion which experience, meaning the course of life, brings upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to the subjects as a sign of them taken in a particular way. This compulsion strikes him at a certain instant; and he remains under it forever after. It is, therefore, different from the temporary force which the hecceities exert upon his attention. This new compulsion may pass out of mind for the time being; but it continues just the same, and will act whenever the occasion arises, that is, whenever those particular hecceities and that first intention are called to mind together. It is, therefore, a permanent conditional force, or law. The deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which shall signify a law that to objects of indices an icon appertains as sign of them in a given way. Such a sign has been called a symbol. It is the copula of the assertion. 7. Returning to the subjects, it is to be remarked that the assertion may contain the suggestion, or request, that the receiver do something with them. For instance, it may be that he is first to take any one, no matter what, and apply it in a certain way to the icon, that he is then to take another, perhaps this time a suitably chosen one, and apply that to the icon, etc. … This is forced upon the deliverer by experience; and it is by no idiosyncrasy of his; so that it will be forced equally upon the receiver. As far as I can tell, these are some of the same key points the Peirce is analyzing in "Sundry Logical Conceptions" and other parts of the Syllabus. So, the starting point of Peirce's arguments concerning the nature of the dicisign seems to be an analysis of the observations, and we can see that he is already correcting for observational errors made by other philosophers. Other philosophers have failed to notice, for instance, that "neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an assertion." In failing to notice this, they have failed to see that there is a kind of compulsion involved in making an assertion--and that the compulsion is of a particular sort. Supposing that this is on the right track, how does his analysis of the observations fit with the deductions he makes from his key definitions--such as the definition of the sign? These are two parts of his argumentative strategy, but I'm not yet clear on how they fit together. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]] Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 12:41 AM To: Peirce List; [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9 Lists, It looks to me like Frederik has provided a fairly comprehensive explanation of Peirce's doctrine of the dicisign in chapter 3. In addition to sorting through many of the individual trees in Peirce's account, he provides a view of the larger forest. As I step back and look at the chapter as a whole, I'm wondering if we might be able to say more about Peirce's arguments for this position. Over the course of the chapter, Frederik considers a number of the arguments Peirce makes, but I wanted to ask a question about how the arguments might hang together. For instance, in section 3.7, he consider Bellucci's explanation of Peirce's aims in the Syllabus. Bellucci says that Peirce intends to "deduce the propositions structure from its basic conception as 'bearer of truth values'." (NP, 71). On this account, the deduction takes three steps: 1) an initial definition of Dicisigns with the emphasis on Truth; 2) the argument that this definition requires Dicisigns to possess a specific double structure; 3) the detailed description of these two parts. Consider the arguments in "Sundry Logical Conceptions." I tend to think that Peirce is offering a more developed argumentative strategy than we have seen thus far in NP. What is the larger strategy? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 9:19 PM To: Peirce List; [email protected] Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9 Lists, Several comments have been made about our contemporary use of the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation'. It might help if we keep in mind that Peirce thought Mill's (mis)use of these terms would likely lead to confusion. As far as I can tell, Peirce was on the mark in his comments about Mill's use of these terms. Peirce insists on using the term 'reference' from the very beginning of his writings. As several people have pointed out, he makes a distinction between logical breadth and depth and then, using those conceptions, he provides an account of information. We might try to draw on Peirce's terminology to sort out some of the confusions that might arise when we talk about denotation and connotation, but my hunch is that this will be an uphill battle. For those who would like to persist in this venture--if only because they are comfortable talking about denotation and connotation, it might be good to try to translate the points into the conceptions of logical breadth and depth in the hopes of getting things on a better track. When we consider examples and then try to spell out the logical depth and breadth of some kind of sign relation, it will probably be worth our time to spell out whether we're talking about the depth and breadth of a rheme, a dicisign or an argument. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Tom Gollier [[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 4:57 PM To: Peirce List; [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9 I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as: "If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia] Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that? Tom On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi everyone, I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3. Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy. Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact. Cheers, Cathy From: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m. To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists, I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903. I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying: In considering the proposition (dicisign): [the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents a real fact in some world of experience. In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it. The co-localization of the elements of the dicisign: [Subject](Predicate) (Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.) This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7? Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS) Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks! Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
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