Very interesting, Gary F. Damasio's view of the mapping of body states are already loaded with interpretation and, as you suggest, underlie self-control. First, they are indexes of particular physiological states that can be influenced by further action in the environment. For example, blood sugar levels can be influenced by successfully finding food, or unsuccessfully doing so, resulting in even lower levels of blood sugar. Only those body states that can be so influenced are indexed. Next, the intensity of the affective response to the body map is an icon of the underlying body state. The intensity of the affective response primes the physiological responses and motivates their priority. Thus, the meaning of a body state is partially the action which the body is prepared to take to resolve the divergence from the homeostatic "norm". The exteroceptive actions of the organism are in search of immediate objects whose interpretants help identify them as having the right functional tone for the satisfaction of the internal need.
I wonder whether we can considered the body map level of internal signs a feature of Innenwelt or just endosemiosis. The "core self", one of the hierarchy of selves referred to in the title of his book, importantly refers to the interoceptive changes in the body maps that correlate to exteroceptive events. The coordination of subject to object within the organism is a function of the selfhood of organisms for Damasio. Here are some excerpts from *Self Comes to Mind *that describe some key aspects of the nested hierarchy of self*:* “Changes in the protoself inaugurate the momentary creation of the core self and initiate a chain of events. The first event in the chain is a transformation in the primordial feeling that results in a 'feeling of knowing the object,' a feeling that differentiates the object from other objects of the moment. The second event in the chain is a consequence of the feeling of knowing. It is a generation of 'saliency' for the engaging object, a process generally subsumed by the term *attention*, a drawing in of processing resources toward one particular object more than others. The core self, then is created by linking the modified protoself to the object that caused the modification, an object that has now been hallmarked by feeling and enhanced by attention. At the end of this cycle, the mind includes images regarding a simple and very common sequence of events: an object engaged the body when that object was looked at, touched, or heard, from a specific perspective; the engagement caused the body to change; the presence of the object was felt; the object was made salient” (Damasio 2010: 203). A few paragraphs later: "What is being added to the plain mind process and is thus producing a conscious mind is a series of images, namely, an *image* of the organism (provided by the modified protoself proxy); the *image* of an object-related emotional response (that is, a feeling); and an *image* of the momentarily enhanced causative object. *The self comes to mind in the form of images, relentlessly telling a story of such engagements*." (Damasio 2010: 2013, emphasis in original). Now, Damasio's emphasis here is on the processes that create a protagonist of perception-action sequences for species with higher level cognitive functions. What's really interesting for our purposes in Chapter 5, though, is how the as-if body loop helps anticipate and actively prepare for upcoming physiological responsiveness. From my master's thesis on the topic of Peirce, Umwelt theory, and Damasio: The changes that emotional images can affect on the body “[...] uses both > humoral signals (chemical messages conveyed via the bloodstream) and neural > signals (electrochemical messages conveyed via nerve pathways). As a result > of both types of signal, the body maps is changed and is subsequently > represented in somatosensory structures of the central nervous system, from > the brain stem up” (Damasio 2000: 80). Thus, the perceptual image of the > state of the Umwelt and the functional cycle invoked is accompanied by a > coordination of impulses and the framework (that is, the physiological > state of the body) to accommodate that functional cycle. The series of > images and effectors of physiological changes is named by Damasio the 'body > loop'. > Moreover, Damasio has in mind an additional mechanism by which > affect can generate a change in the physiological state of the body. He > calls this the 'as-if body loop': “[T]he representation of body-related > changes is created directly in sensory body maps, under the control of > other neural sites, for instance, the prefrontal cortices. It is 'as if' > the body had been really changed but it was not” (Damasio 2000: 80). This > mechanism allows affective states to arise that are not indexically related > to the body state itself. It also allows the plasticity in the perceptual > and operational organs, which enables the Innenwelt of the subject to > represent perceptual and operational cues that are not immediately present > in the Umwelt, to exert an influence on the affective state of the > organism. This change in the affective state – via emotional images – then > acts according on the actual body loop to effect a change in the > physiological state of the organism. Perception should be envisioned as an process by an active agent who is perceiving to achieve goals (so to speak) and who is exercising control in attending to some objects and relatively ignoring others. Perception really cannot be envisioned as a reactive, passive sponge of information that is "out there", although Hurford and others seem to think of dynamic objects "other there" as a starting point for perception instead of the world "in here". Perhaps it is due to some implicit presumption of the world/universe as primary, more stable, and simply populated with organisms? Mara Woods PS: I did this in a bit of hurry so please expect some gaps in explanation. On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 3:54 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Lists, > > > > Two quotations, one from NP and one from Damasio’s *Self Comes to Mind*, > which I think make an interesting juxtaposition: > > > > Minds are a subtle, flowing combination of actual images and recalled > images, in ever-changing proportions. The mind’s images tend to be > logically interrelated, certainly when they correspond to events in the > external world or in the body, which are, in and of themselves, governed by > laws of physics and biology that define what we regard as logical. (Damasio > 2010, 75) > > > > Logic is not an early piece of sketchy psychology only — rather, it > addresses some of the prerequisites of how any cognitive system must be > constructed in order to address *Umwelt* facts. And therefore, it becomes > of seminal interest to chart how the possibilities for instantiating logic > evolved biologically. (Stjernfelt 2014, 140) > > > > It struck me immediately that the two authors here were looking through > the lens of logic from opposite sides. On reflection, though, I think they > can easily be combined into a single consistent account, which goes > something like this: > > > > “To address *Umwelt* facts” is, most basically, to survive in one’s > environment; for any organism capable of acting at all, that means acting > appropriately for its “purposes” (survival, homeostasis, reproduction) *in > its current situation*. A more complex organism will require more complex > action habits, which will contitute an internal system of mediating between > sensing and acting — an *Innenwelt*, a cognitive system. Its “logic” is > knowing the right thing to do, which entails that it must *instantiate* a > logic which is also semiotic (mediative). This instantiation is of course > constrained by laws of physics and biology (i.e. the embodiment of a > semiotic process must be physically and biologically possible). > > > > But what *governs* the evolution and development of such systems, > constrained as it is by natural selection, is the more general logical and > semiotic requirement for the *Innenwelt* or self-guidance system to > address *Umwelt* facts. And as it becomes more complex, this *internal* > system must increasingly monitor *itself* as well as its current > situation, in order to adapt its own habits dynamically. Regardless of how > it is physically instantiated, it also needs to dynamically project > internalizations of *Umwelt* facts into the future. It becomes what > Robert Rosen called an “anticipatory system.” > > > > In more complex organisms, those internalized *Umwelt* facts are grounded > in brain mappings of body states. Maps are, of course, iconic; but a map is > useless if you have no clue what it’s a map of. Connections between a > dynamic mapping and a dynamic object are made indexically; but > increasingly, they are generalized beyond the here and now, to become a map > of the conceivable future. And thus we have what Frederik calls, in the > title of Chapter 6, the evolution of semiotic self-control. > > > > The question for Chapter 5 is how the ventral-dorsal split (in the visual > systems of animal brains) fits into this picture. A perfect fit is probably > too much to expect, as neither Peircean semiotic analysis nor our knowledge > of how the brain works has been perfected yet. But I do think that, as > Frederik says at the end of Chapter 5, it “opens the door to extending the > Dicisign doctrine much further into biology” — how much further, we’ll see > in the next chapter. For now, the point is not that “laws of physics and > biology define what we regard as logical” (Damasio) — although there is > some truth to that — but that a semiotic logic (which was at work long > before we humans were) governs the tendency of the evolutionary process to > instantiate that logic in cognitive systems. Human reasoning is only one > product of that process, although it is a major extension of self-control. > > > > gary f. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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