Copying this thread to the Peirce list, as it seems relevant to NP 6:
It seems to me that for a nervous system, the “something missing” would be some part of a habitual action sequence, or rather interaction sequence (involving action-perception cycles), in which the usual next step can’t be taken in the current situation. Then the system has to try something new, change its routine in order to carry it forward. In this case no exchange of “material constituents” need be involved; that is, the constituents of the process are events rather than things, although of course there must be a material substrate. gary f. From: Koichiro Matsuno [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 27-Nov-14 7:01 AM To: [email protected] Subject: [biosemiotics:7559] Re: Natural Propositions 6 At 11:55 AM 11/27/2014, Kalevi Kull wrote: But what is universal for life, are just needs - the recognition of absence of something. While, note, this is more than the feature of autocatalytic (nonequilibrium) processes - because it assumes 'recognition', which assumes at least some sort of memory. More specifically, what is required is the capacity of experiencing something missing and of extending the affinity toward that something unavailable immediately here and now. Prerequisite to being missing is the act of something leaving there. Of course, a remaining big question is how such an affinity to being missing could be implemented exclusively in material terms. Furthermore, if that material body in charge of experiencing something missing is constantly exchanging the material constituents in the process, the incumbent elements, though remaining in that body only temporarily, may serve as a form of memory to a limited extent. Koichiro
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