Jeff, list, Can we view "a genuine triadic relation" as a type and life and semiosis as its tokens ? If yes, then, if we know how the sign originated, we should be able to transfer that knowledge to understanding how life began, and the former may be an easier problem than the latter. Expressing the same idea using the category-theoretical language, it may be said that semiosis and life are categories that can be mapped from one to the other based on a structure-preserving mapping (i.e., a functor) here identified as "a genuine triadic relation".
With all the best. Sung _____________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Peirce makes the following suggestion: > > 6.322. For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I > have been > constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation -- that is, one > that does not > consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relations, or the negative of > such, etc. (I prefer > not to attempt a perfectly definite definition) -- which is not either an > intellectual > relation or a relation concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of > life. I > have not met with one which could not reasonably be supposed to belong to > one or > other of these two classes. ... In short, the problem of how > genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, > because more definite, > formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no > explanation has ever > been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be > no explanation, > owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital > phenomenon. In that > case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the > metaphysical sense. > > How does replacing the problem of how life first came about with the > problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose give us a more > definite formulation of the problem? > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: John Collier [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 12:50 PM > To: Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]; 'Peirce Discussion Forum' > Subject: [biosemiotics:7453] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6 > > Yes, I was thinking of activity that goes through the environment, > including through unexpected channels. That is why I used âdistributed > through the environmentâ, though I see what I said could be read as if > the environment is an agent. > > I will try to clarify the other things you are puzzled about as we move > on. However the organism brings things to the environment which the > environment either responds to favourably or not. This is also true of > lineages, which have a certain degree of autonomy (they must, because some > biological functions serve the lineage, not individual organisms). As > Frederik pointed out there is the further, in bacteria there is also no > clear distinction between organism and lineage, which strengthens the case > for lineage autonomy in this case. Lastly, it has been pretty proven that > bacteria mutate faster under harsh conditions (part of the > endobiosemiotics âleaking outâ) which enhances lineage survival. There > is a lot more. > > John > > From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: November 19, 2014 9:11 PM > To: [email protected]; 'Peirce Discussion Forum' > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6 > > Good introduction, John. I donât have much to say about your âtwo > large questionsâ, so Iâll leave those for others who are better > prepared to offer answers, and just focus on this point: > > [JC]: Frederik argues that the bacteria individually do not have semiotic > self-control, as there is not even any monitoring of the process. He > suggests there might be some degree of semiotic self-control in the > bacterial lineage over evolutionary time, but this is also limited. I > would like to note that selection requires action by the environment as > well as the organisms, so if there is any semiotic self-control through > selection it is at least in part distributed through the environment. > > [GF]: I would say that selection requires dynamic processes to be taking > place in the environment, but i would not say that it requires âaction > byâ the environment, because I donât see âthe environmentâ as > being an autonomous agent in the sense that an organism must be in order > to survive and reproduce in that environment. Perhaps you are thinking of > niche construction or something like that, which does affect selection, > but that must involve the organismâs agency, no? â and I donât see > why it must involve any other agency (though of course it may, and often > does, involve actions of other organisms). Nor do I see why the semiotic > self-control of a lineage, involving selection as well as agency, has to > be âdistributed through the environment.â Actually Iâm not even sure > what that would mean. (Likewise, I donât know what you mean when you ask > about âcomplex endobiosemioticsâ âleaking out into its umwelt.â) > > gary f. > > From: John Collier [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 18-Nov-14 3:16 AM > To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; Peirce > Discussion Forum > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6 > > Still problems with my normal email system, so I am sending this by an > alternate route. You may get further copies eventually. Sorry in advance. > > Folks, I am a bit indisposed right now due to snowballing problems > concerning visas, and also three attacks on my money accounts in Canada, > one of which was successful (all by traditional phone calls and faxes > impersonating me). I have to leave South Africa by next Friday. I will be > going to Vienna for a while and should have email there, but I will be > absent while travelling. > > > Chapter 6 deals with the evolution of semiotic self-control. I will > briefly summarize the introduction and the first two sections in this > post, which deal with the importance and centrality of dicisigns to and > for biosemiotics. These sections set the stage for the later development > of a theory and explanation of semiotic self-control grounded in biology > and later psychology and society. Semiotic self-control involves the > formation and use of dicisigns, whereas the most primitive dicisigns in > biology are innate and inflexible (except in lineages over evolutionary > time). Nonetheless they show the basic structure of more sophisticated and > flexible dicisigns in terms of connecting perception and action in the > form of an argument. Functionality is mentioned throughout as a background > condition, but the argument is not entirely clear, though it is clear that > basic biological functionality is the contribution to survival (either > individual or lineage). Something else that I find unc > lear is how far back this role for dicisigns goes (perhaps exactly as far > back as functionality, or to the origin of codes, or both). These are two > large questions I would like to see addressed. Perhaps Frederik has > something to say about them that goes further than his book (so far). > > So the sections, starting with the introduction: > The introduction argues for the pre-eminence of dicisigns in biology right > from the beginning. The alternative view from, for example Deacon, is that > biology started with icons that became coordinated to form indexes and > then only rather late in the game (perhaps only in humans) became > integrated into symbols, making humans the paradigmatic symbolic species. > Frederik argues that this view should perhaps be turned on its head. He > has two lines of argument. The first is that isolated icons and indexes > are rare, though they occur, and that Peircean semiotics does not permit > the combination of icons to form indexes and indexes to form symbols (as > in Deacon's model). The second reason is not unconnected: isolated icons > and indexes are not biologically useful (not functional, though presumable > we can find uses for them in our abstract thought). Icons are too vague to > be useful, giving pure possibilities, whereas indexes are restricted to > individual instances, unlike symbols, which > are general, and can be applied to a variety of cases. Only the latter > can be useful for guiding patterns of behaviour, and only these can be > selected. As I mentioned above, I think the question of the nature of > this usefulness, or functionality, needs further development, and there > is also the question of how far back in the origins of life we want to > go. There are some on these lists who would want to push the role of > symbols all the way back to pre-life because that is continuous in some > way with life. This position avoids, at least on the surface, the > origins issue. > > Section 6.1 fills this argument out with more detail, arguing that > dicisigns, as bearers of truth are what we need to explain the possibility > of biological adaptation and resulting evolution. Or at the very least we > need success in their use. Frederik argues that success and truth should > be connected, but points out that mistakes (falsity) is inherent in the > symbolic nature of dicisigns. This happens when normally or expected > applications misfunction. If this happens often enough, evolution will > select away and perhaps refine, a position he develops in the next section > in the discussion of E. coli. > > Section 6.2 discusses how the basic function of dicisigns in biology > applies even to very simple organisms in a very simple but basically > complete way through the perception-action cycle. (I am not happy with > "perception" here, and would prefer some like "detection" instead, but > that is a quibble in the context that is trying to connect ideas together > on a grander scale.) E. coli interacts with its environment in basically > two ways: moving up a sugar gradient and down a toxin gradient. Its umwelt > is basically made up of these gradients. (I note that internally bacteria > are immensely complex, and have very complex endobiosemiotics. How much of > this "leaks out" into its umwelt is unclear to me, but I suspect it is > rather more than the simple umwelt that Frederik focuses on.) The > possibility of detecting these gradients is innate to the bacteria and is > a general ability. Detection of a sugar gradient creates a true > proposition (though it can be fooled by artificial sweeteners, j > ust as we can). This invokes an action of following the sugar gradient, > which is also general and waiting to be made true. These two dicisigns > are thus connected together as an argument (of the deductive sort), > closing the perception-action circle. Selection maintains the > connections unless something changes in the environment (or the organism > in more complicated cases) that undermines the function. There can be > various responses to this in evolutionary time (though in fact many > bacteria have a large potential for individual internal adaptation). > Frederik argues that the bacteria individually do not have semiotic > self-control, as there is not even any monitoring of the process. He > suggests there might be some degree of semiotic self-control in the > bacterial lineage over evolutionary time, but this is also limited. I > would like to note that selection requires action by the environment as > well as the organisms, so if there is any semiotic self-control through > selection it i > s at least in part distributed through the environment. I wi! > ll retur > n > to this sort of issue in discussion of later sections of the chapter. > > There are two large questions that I think are left unanswered, as I have > mentioned above. Frederik brings function in, pretty much assuming it in > his arguments and explanations, but it seems to me that it could be better > integrated into the semiotic story (though he makes the same point that I > have been making for about five years now that biosemiosis is grounded in > survival). The other point is the question of how far back can be the > model he gives for E. coli be pushed back towards the origin of life, or > perhaps even before that. > > John > > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
