Dear Jon, Sung, List,
Sung, you have asked,, whether logic is only human or also cosmological. But the cosmos, I think, has been working according to logic before life and humans had been there. On the other hand you, Jon, wrote, that logic is a special kind of ethics, and ethics is is a special kind of aesthetics. So the most general thing of this triad is aesthetics. On the other hand, aesthetics is an iconical matter, that can only be perceived by a mind eg. based on a nervous system, a brain, that can iconize, depict. Now how to bring this together? Evolution: Does it go from the general to the special or vice versa, is it a generalization or a specialization? Or both? I assume, it is both. According to this assumption, all three: Aesthetics, ethics and logic, should have beeen existing from the beginning. Just like any other irreducible triad. So, at a time when there had not been nervous animals, aesthetics should have required another form of mind. This mind I suppose to be the mind of the evolution: Evolution can cheat, eg. by orchid flowers that look like a female wasp. So, if I say, cheating is an action of a mind, I have to suppose that evolution has a mind. Now, there also was a time before evolution of life. Where were ethics and aesthetics then? Been a property of inanimate cosmos, not yet unfolded by partly being handed over to organisms (ethics, indexical), and nervous animals (aesthetics, iconical)? This view makes sense to me. But it is against the view of firstness (iconicity) having been first. I think, symbolicity (inanimate natural laws) have been first, then indexicality (ethics, organisnms), and then iconicity (nervous animals) have evolved. But next, the at first merely iconical mind of primitive nervous animals has evoluted again towards indexicality (altersense, consciousness), and symbolicity (medisense, thinking). Next, medisense, thinking, has developed three modes again, so now we can have symbols for symbols. And evolution goes on unfolding itself, complexity increases, but the three modes first-, second-, thirdness, or aesthetics, ethics, logic, or (my proposal) event, entity, relation, have all been there from the very beginning.
Happy Christmas and happy New Year!
Helmut
"Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Jon,
Thanks for these posts of yours, from which I learned for the first time
the relation among semiotics (logic), ethics, and esthetics.
It seems to me that this view of logic is mostly anthropocentric. Is
there any role for the universe in the phenomenon of logical processes ?
In other words, what is the origin of logic ? Is it entirely human or at
least in part cosmological ?
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Peircers,
>
> Jeff's remarks on the normative sciences reminded me of a section from one
> of my old dissertation
> proposals that I think I've shared on this list and elsewhere several
> times, but maybe not lately,
> so here it is again.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> | Document History
> |
> | Subject: Inquiry Driven Systems : An Inquiry Into Inquiry
> | Contact: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@oakland.edu>
> | Version: Draft 8.75
> | Created: 23 Jun 1996
> | Revised: 10 Jun 2002
> | Advisor: M.A. Zohdy
> | Setting: Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
> | Excerpt: Section 3.2.10 (The Pragmatic Cosmos)
> |
> | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
>
> 3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> This Section outlines the general idea of a "priorism of normative
> sciences" (PONS)
> and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the "pragmatic
> cosmos".
> This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best
> accords with
> the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing
> the order
> of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this
> work.
> From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further
> qualification,
> it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean
> to
> invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its
> underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying
> out of its live interpretation.
>
> Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are
> exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences,
> the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called "aesthetics",
> the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods
> is called "ethics", and the study of signs that indicate these actions
> is called "logic". Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration
> and the analysis of signs with regard to their "truth", a property that
> only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the
> objects that are desired. In other words, logic evaluates signs with
> regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and
> this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit
> in a mediate relationship to their objects. As an appreciative study,
> logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the
> scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that
> permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most
> likely to lead agents toward their objects.
>
> From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics,
> one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special
> case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct.
> Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the "good" of
> anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications
> that lead to it. An action that leads to the good is a good action,
> and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics,
> as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions. A sign that indicates
> a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts
> the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics. Moreover,
> thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs,
> and this makes thinking a special kind of action. In sum, the questions
> that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are
> properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations.
>
> The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of
> ethics,
> which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each
> realm
> from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch
> over
> all of the domains that it is set within. In sum, the image is that of
> three
> cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to
> a
> succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the
> lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes
> their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone
> that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be,
> whether
> imaginary or real, rational or transcendental.
>
> Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics,
> while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.
> By way of definition, a "monitory function" is a duty, a role, or a task
> that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline,
> checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations,
> evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions,
> and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity
> of its acts in accord with its aims. A definite attitude and particular
> perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role
> with any hope or measure of success. The necessary station arises from
> the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once,
> and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature
> within a finite creation. Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty
> needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor
> it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher
> considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and
> finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.
>
> To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS):
>
> Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of
> their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true,
> the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether
> they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more
> species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a
> divergent
> conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to
> the
> other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is,
> unless
> their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be
> supplied by
> competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are
> willing
> to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders
> that are
> demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines,
> namely,
> those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the
> good
> of aims in themselves. In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic,
> ethics,
> and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one
> another that
> each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own
> proper
> monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.
>
> Why do things have to be this way? Why is it necessary to impose
> a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests?
> If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time
> seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and
> the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary? Its necessity is
> apparently relative to a certain contigency affecting the typical agent,
> namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature. Perhaps
> from a "God's Eye View" (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to
> a single Good, the only Good there is. But the imperfect creature is
> not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its
> vision within the "point of view" (POV) that is proper to it. Even
> if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what
> it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization
> measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason
> and reflection at all.
>
> The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice,
> and seeming truth. Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity
> can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective
> world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of
> the insouciance of the agent in question. It happens like this: Among
> the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances,
> one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike. Seeming beauty
> is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its
> own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what
> it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.
>
> Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions,
> on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether
> the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand
> becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects
> are exculpatory or recriminatory. In the midst of these extremes, that
> is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to
> distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work
> toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it
> with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process
> of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and
> that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction,
> even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this
> class of moderate measures is aptly known as "advisory functions" (AF's).
>
> In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible,
> and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions,
> an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible,
> to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions
> to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt
> and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful. If this
> is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident.
> As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for
> "abductive simile" or the faculty of "abductive synthesis" (AS)
> first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation
> and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of
> inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the "quasi" ability
> to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and
> to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.
>
> In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp
> as to how the "abductive bearing" (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be
> bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states
> that the mind can ever know. To my way of thinking, this derivation of
> AB's from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos
> of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord
> with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry,
> and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words
> of Wm. Shakespeare: "Where is fancy bred?" Beyond the responsibility
> to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the
> fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on
> the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties
> of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of
> amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry
> all but constantly finds me in.
>
> The anchoring or the inauguration of an "abductive bearing" (AB) within
> the operations of an "advisory function" (AF), and the enscouncement or
> the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,
> within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that
> watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience
> with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at
> once -- this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS
> ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges
> on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that
> one does.
>
> In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard
> to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values.
> On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of
> perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to
> a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in
> the flow of its current passions. By rising above this plain immersion
> in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the
> status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid
> being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from
> being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind.
> By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey
> the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in
> the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it
> becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable
> of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Thanks for these posts of yours, from which I learned for the first time
the relation among semiotics (logic), ethics, and esthetics.
It seems to me that this view of logic is mostly anthropocentric. Is
there any role for the universe in the phenomenon of logical processes ?
In other words, what is the origin of logic ? Is it entirely human or at
least in part cosmological ?
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Peircers,
>
> Jeff's remarks on the normative sciences reminded me of a section from one
> of my old dissertation
> proposals that I think I've shared on this list and elsewhere several
> times, but maybe not lately,
> so here it is again.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> | Document History
> |
> | Subject: Inquiry Driven Systems : An Inquiry Into Inquiry
> | Contact: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@oakland.edu>
> | Version: Draft 8.75
> | Created: 23 Jun 1996
> | Revised: 10 Jun 2002
> | Advisor: M.A. Zohdy
> | Setting: Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
> | Excerpt: Section 3.2.10 (The Pragmatic Cosmos)
> |
> | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
>
> 3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> This Section outlines the general idea of a "priorism of normative
> sciences" (PONS)
> and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the "pragmatic
> cosmos".
> This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best
> accords with
> the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing
> the order
> of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this
> work.
> From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further
> qualification,
> it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean
> to
> invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its
> underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying
> out of its live interpretation.
>
> Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are
> exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences,
> the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called "aesthetics",
> the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods
> is called "ethics", and the study of signs that indicate these actions
> is called "logic". Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration
> and the analysis of signs with regard to their "truth", a property that
> only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the
> objects that are desired. In other words, logic evaluates signs with
> regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and
> this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit
> in a mediate relationship to their objects. As an appreciative study,
> logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the
> scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that
> permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most
> likely to lead agents toward their objects.
>
> From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics,
> one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special
> case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct.
> Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the "good" of
> anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications
> that lead to it. An action that leads to the good is a good action,
> and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics,
> as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions. A sign that indicates
> a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts
> the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics. Moreover,
> thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs,
> and this makes thinking a special kind of action. In sum, the questions
> that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are
> properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations.
>
> The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of
> ethics,
> which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each
> realm
> from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch
> over
> all of the domains that it is set within. In sum, the image is that of
> three
> cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to
> a
> succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the
> lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes
> their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone
> that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be,
> whether
> imaginary or real, rational or transcendental.
>
> Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics,
> while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.
> By way of definition, a "monitory function" is a duty, a role, or a task
> that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline,
> checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations,
> evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions,
> and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity
> of its acts in accord with its aims. A definite attitude and particular
> perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role
> with any hope or measure of success. The necessary station arises from
> the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once,
> and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature
> within a finite creation. Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty
> needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor
> it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher
> considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and
> finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.
>
> To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS):
>
> Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of
> their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true,
> the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether
> they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more
> species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a
> divergent
> conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to
> the
> other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is,
> unless
> their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be
> supplied by
> competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are
> willing
> to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders
> that are
> demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines,
> namely,
> those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the
> good
> of aims in themselves. In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic,
> ethics,
> and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one
> another that
> each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own
> proper
> monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.
>
> Why do things have to be this way? Why is it necessary to impose
> a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests?
> If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time
> seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and
> the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary? Its necessity is
> apparently relative to a certain contigency affecting the typical agent,
> namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature. Perhaps
> from a "God's Eye View" (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to
> a single Good, the only Good there is. But the imperfect creature is
> not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its
> vision within the "point of view" (POV) that is proper to it. Even
> if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what
> it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization
> measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason
> and reflection at all.
>
> The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice,
> and seeming truth. Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity
> can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective
> world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of
> the insouciance of the agent in question. It happens like this: Among
> the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances,
> one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike. Seeming beauty
> is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its
> own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what
> it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.
>
> Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions,
> on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether
> the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand
> becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects
> are exculpatory or recriminatory. In the midst of these extremes, that
> is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to
> distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work
> toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it
> with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process
> of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and
> that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction,
> even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this
> class of moderate measures is aptly known as "advisory functions" (AF's).
>
> In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible,
> and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions,
> an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible,
> to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions
> to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt
> and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful. If this
> is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident.
> As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for
> "abductive simile" or the faculty of "abductive synthesis" (AS)
> first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation
> and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of
> inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the "quasi" ability
> to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and
> to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.
>
> In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp
> as to how the "abductive bearing" (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be
> bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states
> that the mind can ever know. To my way of thinking, this derivation of
> AB's from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos
> of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord
> with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry,
> and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words
> of Wm. Shakespeare: "Where is fancy bred?" Beyond the responsibility
> to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the
> fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on
> the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties
> of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of
> amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry
> all but constantly finds me in.
>
> The anchoring or the inauguration of an "abductive bearing" (AB) within
> the operations of an "advisory function" (AF), and the enscouncement or
> the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,
> within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that
> watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience
> with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at
> once -- this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS
> ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges
> on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that
> one does.
>
> In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard
> to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values.
> On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of
> perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to
> a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in
> the flow of its current passions. By rising above this plain immersion
> in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the
> status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid
> being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from
> being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind.
> By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey
> the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in
> the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it
> becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable
> of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
