Lists,

 

Here we are at the end of January, and Cathy Legg will shortly be
launching a discussion of Chapter 9 of Natural Propositions. So if there
are other questions left over from the previous chapters of NP, now is a
good time to raise them.

 

As for Howard's question here, whole books could be and have been
written about it, and we've been through it on the list recently,
apparently to no effect as far as Howard is concerned; beyond what Gary
R has cogently said, I have nothing to add.

 

gary f.

 

} Two diverse descriptions are always better than one. [G. Bateson] {

www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Howard Pattee [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 31-Jan-15 8:49 PM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:8074] Re: Triadic Relations

 

At 08:24 PM 1/31/2015, Howard Pattee wrote:

>My point is that we cannot equate the determinism of Nature with the 

>conceptual determinism of how the symbolic laws come about. That would 

>be confusing the map from the territory. As many physicists have 

>pointed out, without respecting this epistemic cut, none of our models 

>would make sense.

 

This reminded me that I have a question. Frederik says Peirce "is
inimical to the hypostatic dualisms pervading the cognitive field: 

subject/object," etc. (NP p. 6). Later, he says Peirce "dispenses with
the subject-object dichotomy" and he quotes Peirce: "I do not make any
contrast between subject and object, far less about 'subjective and
objective' . . ." (p.194).

 

What does this mean? I can not see any way of dispensing with this
epistemic distinction, except perhaps as an enlightened mystic.

 

Howard

 

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