Gary F, Jeff, lists, I agree that Jeff's quotes are well worth reflecting on in connection with NP. While I know them rather well, I must admit that I hadn't seen, or at least didn't remember, the quotation you provided, hidden, as it were, in a note at the back of EP2. As you remarked, the passage emphasizes the dynamic character of the 'perfect' sign:
Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes (EP2:545). ... The entire note you quoted seems of the utmost importance for and relevance to Peirce's theory of the dicisign and Frederik's development of it. It will certainly have me reflecting on it both in that context, more specifically, in the context of item 27 in the EP which the editor's have given the title "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences." Of considerable interest is the example Peirce gives of a perfect sign in the text just preceding the note you quoted, namely, "an ordinary conversation." This passage--and the material just preceding and following it--also helps clarify, I think, Peirce's idea of semiotic determination, specifically in relation to the 'quasi-mind': A sign [. . .] just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a wonderfully perfect kind of sign functioning [note: precisely at this point we are referred to the end note you earlier quoted], one knows what information or suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed it words, when it fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions (EP2:391). I see it's time for me to give "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" another close reading. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:10 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, lists, > > > > That's an interesting collection, Jeff, all four worth pondering in the > context of *Natural Propositions* -- although the fourth dates from 1902, > prior to the introduction of Dicisigns into Peirce's classification system. > I'd like to add one more Peirce passage about "perfect signs", or rather > about *the* perfect sign, which (as Peirce says here) is necessarily > dynamical. This might be helpful for those in the habit of imagining signs > and/or their objects as static, unchanging things. > > > > [[ Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which > its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and > we may call it a *perfect* sign, in the sense that it involves the > present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of > itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well > suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a > second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are > tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a > sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we > call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes. ... > > Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action > upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its > outlines becoming more indefinite. > > On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its > object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, > which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, > but which had lain dormant. > > In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind > we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* > but not by *its* will. They are phenomena of growth. > > Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of > Existential Graphs. ... > > This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be > examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of > susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as > events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its > rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. ]] > (EP2:545, 1906) > > > > gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 8-Feb-15 8:23 PM > To: [email protected]; Peirce Discussion Forum ( > [email protected]) > Subject: [biosemiotics:8086] Re: Natural Propositions > > > > Hi Frederik, Gary F., Lists > > > > I've been thinking a bit more about Frederik's account of optimal > iconicity. One point I'd like to note is that Peirce does not appear to > use "optimal" when talking about iconicity, at least not in the CP. He > does, however, use "perfect" as a modifier of iconicity. This shouldn't be > surprising, given the fact that the tradition in logic through the medieval > period and up through philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant think of > perfection as a logical principle that can be applied to any conception. > Along these lines, I think there is only one concept of humanity in Kant's > writings on ethics and aesthetics. There is only one conception even > though he shows us how to form an ideal based on the aesthetic perfection > of the conception, the practical perfection of the conception and the > logical perfection of the conception. On my reading of Peirce's account of > iconicity, ideals such as the aesthetic ideal of humanity are quite good > examples of iconic representations that are taken to perfection. I've > collected a small number of quotes where Peirce talks about perfection > applied icons--or to the use of signs more generally. I think the passages > provide a sense of how he is applying the principle of perfection to the > the conception of the icon in mathematics, the existential graphs, and in > other (less formal) areas of inquiry. > > > > Here are three passages: > > > > For the "somethings," being indesignate, cannot be described in general > terms. It is necessary that the signs of them should be connected in fact. > No way of doing this can be more perfectly iconic than that exemplified in > Fig. 78 (CP 4.442) > > > > Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable > establishment of beliefs. Then, exact logic will be that doctrine of the > conditions of establishment of stable belief which rests upon perfectly > undoubted observations and upon mathematical, that is, upon diagrammatical, > or, iconic, thought. (CP 3.429) > > > > I may as well, at once, acknowledge that, in Existential Graphs, the > representation of Modality (possibility, necessity, etc.) lacks almost > entirely that pictorial, or Iconic, character which is so striking in the > representation in the same system of every feature of propositions de > inesse. Perhaps it is in the nature of things that it should be so in such > wise that for Modality to be iconically represented in that same > "pictorial" way in which the other features are represented would > constitute a falsity in the representation. If so, it is a perfect > vindication of the system, upon whose accusers, I suppose, the burden of > proof lies. Still, I confess I suspect there is in the heraldic > representation of modality as set forth [below] a defect capable of being > remedied. If it be not so, if the lack of "pictorialness" in the > representation of modality cannot be remedied, it is because modality has, > in truth, the nature which I opined it has (which opinion I expressed > toward the end of the footnote [to 552], and if that be the case, Modality > is not, properly speaking, conceivable at all, but the difference, for > example, between possibility and actuality is only recognizable much in the > same way as we recognize the difference between a dream and waking > experience, supposing the dream to be ever so detailed, reasonable, and > thoroughly consistent with itself and with all the rest of the dreamer's > experience. Namely, it still would not be so "vivid" as waking experience. > . . -- from "Phaneroscopy, {phan}," c.1906; part of the manuscript used in > 534n. (CP 4.553) > > > > This fourth and last passage is full of really interesting suggestions: > > > > Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to be > subject to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character of > a Sign. A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, > in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its > Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as > to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad > infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of > the perfect significant character. It is not necessary that the > Interpretant should actually exist. A being in futuro will suffice. Signs > have two degrees of Degeneracy. A Sign degenerate in the lesser degree, is > an Obsistent Sign, or Index, which is a Sign whose significance of its > Object is due to its having a genuine Relation to that Object, irrespective > of the Interpretant. Such, for example, is the exclamation "Hi!" as > indicative of present danger, or a rap at the door as indicative of a > visitor. A Sign degenerate in the greater degree is an Originalian Sign, or > Icon, which is a Sign whose significant virtue is due simply to its > Quality. Such, for example, are imaginations of how I would act under > certain circumstances, as showing me how another man would be likely to > act. We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is convincing. > So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I am led to form an > idea of the person it represents, it is an Icon. But, in fact, it is not a > pure Icon, because I am greatly influenced by knowing that it is an effect, > through the artist, caused by the original's appearance, and is thus in a > genuine Obsistent relation to that original. Besides, I know that portraits > have but the slightest resemblance to their originals, except in certain > conventional respects, and after a conventional scale of values, etc. A > Genuine Sign is a Transuasional Sign, or Symbol, which is a sign which owes > its significant virtue to a character which can only be realized by the aid > ! > > of its I > > nterpretant. Any utterance of speech is an example. If the sounds were > originally in part iconic, in part indexical, those characters have long > since lost their importance. The words only stand for the objects they do, > and signify the qualities they do, because they will determine, in the mind > of the auditor, corresponding signs. The importance of the above divisions, > although they are new, has been acknowledged by all logicians who have > seriously considered them. . . . (CP 2.92) > > > > --Jeff > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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