Thanks for your reply - which raise more questions.

1-2)You state that points 1 and 2 -'are deliberately ambiguous to allow 
inclusion of existing religions'. But this doesn't answer my question which was 
that you seem to have merged the nature of religion (and religious knowledge) 
with science (and scientific knowledge). I was differentiating them. 
Then - you added, in this most recent post: " Obviously, not all religions are 
scientific". I thought that was the point of religion - that it rests on faith 
- not objectivity and empirical evidence! I have no knowledge of a religion 
that is also 'scientific'!

How do you differentiate the two types of knowledge - assuming that both types 
have their functionality among the human societal order?

3) This also doesn't seem to answer my concern about the kinetics of sense and 
response, which ignores the reality of a force outside of kinetics.

4) Again- you are just repeating the definition which is, in my view, a 
circular one. I don't know what 'naivete' has to do with it.

5) With regard to your comment:  "If the laws of nature are subject to small 
and sustainable (and universal) arbitrary changes as Charles suggests then 
necessity is dead (and, therefore, so is science)."  But Peirce didn't say 
this; his evolutionary capacity is spontaneous not random and arbitrary. As 
I've said before - spontaneous freedom is not equivalent to randomness!
And necessity is not dead, but provides ONE force of the triad: Thirdness is 
habits, which constrain and confine - but, the reality of Firstness introduces 
novelty, and the informed capacity to change (that's spontaneity not mechanical 
randomness). BOTH forces are operative in life. 

You wrote: "lacked the religious and scientific sophistication of his brother 
and father. He certainly appears to lack the same deep sensitivity."  I 
consider this statement 'ad hominem' since it is trying to persuade us of the 
unacceptability of Ch. Peirce's analysis by declaring that aspects of his 
personality (unsophisticated, lacks deep sensitivity) form part of that 
analysis. I think there is no evidence of these assertions about  Peirce.

6) My reading of Peirce is that, indeed, Laws DO CHANGE. That's their power, 
that the habits of Thirdness can be affected by the spontaneous 'knocks' of the 
freedom of Firstness and thus, can change. Thus, we have seen the biological 
evolution of organisms from simple forms to complex forms. No - there is no 
adherence to a law until it is absolute. Certainly, Thirdness or the 
habits-of-formation can become 'hidebound' so to speak and immune to 
interaction with other forces - but I think that the basic existence of 
freedom, of spontaneity, of freedom - goes far to prevent such a doom-laden 
scenario.

I don't think that spontaneity is discovery, for that suggests that all it 
refers to is finding something already existent. Spontaneity is freedom, the 
ability to create novel forms and novel interactions - yes, constrained by the 
already existent Thirdness/habits of formation - but still, possible. And, in 
the more complex networks (CAS or complex adaptive systems),  this flexibility 
and dynamism is basic to the robust health of the CAS.

Edwina



  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith ; Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List 
  Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 4:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A System Of Analytic Mechanics


  1. and 2. are deliberately ambiguous to allow inclusion of existing 
religions. Obviously, not all religions are scientific.


  3. The definition is mine and I include the universal "basis of experience" 
(per my work) whose effects are unity in structure; i.e., the causal reason 
sense and response form, how they are unified and act together and across 
structure decisions are made.


  4. Neither Benjamin nor James, see what I referred to as "the mind of God" in 
naive terms. Take what I said as a simple definition: "the mind of God is means 
no more or less than whatever science argues, where science includes the 
explanation of what Benjamin refers to as "spirituality" or "universal will."


  5. This is really very simple. If the laws of nature are subject to small and 
sustainable (and universal) arbitrary changes as Charles suggests then 
necessity is dead (and, therefore, so is science). I certainly mean this as no 
"ad hominem" remark. This is what Charles argued, is it not? And, if it has an 
existential basis, it undermines necessity.


  I do, in fact, require necessity and I allow degrees of freedom in terms of 
"directional" forces.


  And this necessity is indeed the basis of Benjamin and James (mathematical) 
philosophy. 


  It is also a principal part of much of Charles (philosophical) work. But 
Charles is concerned with Logic. Spontaneity and evolution of law appear to be 
an open speculation by Charles and related to his doctrine of fallibilism. I 
have not read enough to draw real conclusions. However, I do wonder if he has 
not been read wrongly and by it he means only to imply the progress of science, 
not that laws change in fact but only in science. Whenever he speaks of 
spontaneity is he simply be speaking of discovery. He argues, for example, 
that, as law (science?) progresses and is naturally refined, there is a 
movement toward a greater adherence to law until a point at which law is 
absolute. This suggests that spontaneity in his view is "merely" epistemic.  
This would certainly be redeeming and I hope that this is in fact the case, 
because I can make sense of that. 



  Regards,
  Steven






  On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 6:10 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

    Steven - I have a few questions:

    1) You wrote: "religion as science or science as religion". With this 
rejection of the differentiation between religion and science - how do you 
define this new approach? My understanding of religion is that it rests on a 
priori axioms that are outside of the realm of objective experience and 
empirical proof.  My understanding of science is that its axioms are fallible, 
and must rest on objective experience and empirical proof. How do you deal with 
this conflict?

    2) You wrote: "religion as simply that set of ideas such that we cannot 
look upon the world without their consideration. But this is, in my view, a 
weak description, for it does not define the source of the validity of this 
'set of ideas'. After all, the idea that the sun goes around the earth, the 
idea that disease is caused by the anger of the recently dead - may indeed be 
religious ideas, and are claimed as valid by 'the Will of God' but can they 
also be scientific?

    3) You wrote: "universal will. I have taken this to imply, in modern terms, 
that we must scientifically consider the biophysics of sensation and response." 
 I find this an odd definition of 'universal will' - i.e., the biophysics of 
sensation and response. What do these two kinetic and mechanical forces (in 
Firstness and Secondness) have to do with Universal Will which would have to 
include some element of a force beyond kinetics?

    4) You wrote: "We must view science as "reading the mind of God" where 
"God" means no more or less than whatever this full science offers". Again, to 
equate 'mind' with 'whatever this full science offers' is a circular and 
ambiguous definition. This 'full science' which seems to me from your 
definitions, to be focused around mechanical forces doesn't seem to have a 
thing to do with 'Mind'. Or have you defined Mind as mechanics? Your tactic of 
defining something, eg, God, as X (as full science) doesn't validate either 
science or the notion of God; it's a circular and thus fallacious argument.

    5) Then, your rather ad hominem argument for rejecting Charles Peirce's 
view, is, by definition, invalid. You wrote: "It seems reasonable to argue that 
Charles lacked the religious and scientific sophistication of his brother and 
father. He certainly appears to lack the same deep sensitivity."  This is a 
conclusion without your providing any reasons. Reasonable to whom? And what are 
those reasons? So far, your above argument doesn't provide any such evidence. 
And 'religious and scientific sophistication' and 'lacks the same deep 
sensitivity' are open and thus empty assertions - for they also lack evidence.

    6) You wrote: "I argue that Charles undermines science by arguing for 
spontaneity and evolution of laws. I do not really see how this can be in 
dispute, but I am happy to listen to arguments"

    The above seems to include your definition of science, one of its axioms 
being a rejection of sponteneity and evolution of laws. As has been pointed out 
before, this suggests that your view of 'science' accepts a deterministic, 
necessitarian and mechanical view of the world. This seems to me at least, to 
be a rejection of Universal Will. And again, since your definition of science 
(and you provide us with several - and not all are equivalent) excludes 
spontaneity and evolution, then, it is beyond argumentation. It is, not a fact, 
but a dogma for you.

    Edwina



      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
      To: Jerry LR Chandler 
      Cc: Peirce List ; Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
      Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 12:01 AM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A System Of Analytic Mechanics


      Thank you for these comments Jerry. When I first came upon these works, 
they also answered many questions for me.  


      Of particular note is the strong undercurrent of what would later be 
known as positivism, written at the time of Comte and in full awareness of 
Comte's ideas. Yet they, Benjamin and James, by putting science first, and in a 
more forgiving context perhaps than Comte, did not bring on the Existential 
crisis but rather they re-conceived of religion as science or science as 
religion. I argue that this is a unique circumstance in the United States where 
the reconnection of religion was already underway (although this movement seems 
to have reversed during the twentieth century).


      If we accept religion as simply that set of ideas such that we cannot 
look upon the world without their consideration, then we begin to understand 
the approach. Benjamin, in his "Ideality of the physical sciences" goes to some 
length to argue that science must consider the whole. It is he, in this text, 
that first argues that science must not merely consider the easy. 


      He intended this to mean that we must consider the notion of universal 
will. I have taken this to imply, in modern terms, that we must scientifically 
consider the biophysics of sensation and response.  I will accept challenges on 
this point because I understand that this may come over as self-serving. I will 
note that there is more to be said on this point in the light of the disruption 
of logical incompleteness.


      It seems reasonable to argue that Charles lacked the religious and 
scientific sophistication of his brother and father. He certainly appears to 
lack the same deep sensitivity. We may also note that in his Neglected Argument 
he echoes his semeiotic triad in the context of the family's beliefs. He is 
echoing his father's view of "God" and creation in Neglected Argument. The 
"neglect" I now assume is, in fact, the neglect of his father's argument.


      No scholar should consider my remarks to be "against" Charles. I accept 
that we may differ in scholarly interpretations but I do not accept that we may 
deny the facts.


      I argue that Charles undermines science by arguing for spontaneity and 
evolution of laws. I do not really see how this can be in dispute, but I am 
happy to listen to arguments.


      Regards,
      Steven  




      On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
<[email protected]> wrote:

        Dear Steven, List: 


        Thank you for posting these files prepared by CSP's brother and father.


        These files very definitely add support to your assertions concerning 
the familial logic entailments that are often reflected in CSP texts.


        It is most unfortunate that logicians and philosophers fail to consider 
or even acknowledge the magnitude of these familial entailments on CSP's texts. 
 These entailments are readily apparent from a chemist's perspective. 


        Perhaps I will comment a bit on these these texts at a later time after 
I have digested them a bit further.


        Cheers


        Jerry




        On Mar 13, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:




          I am posting these files to enable the wider Peirce community to 
appreciate the environment and influences upon Charles. This is also an OCR'd 
searchable version of A System Of Analytic Mechanics - a treatise by Charles' 
father, Benjamin Peirce, and taught at Harvard. Prepared by me in the past few 
years.


          You will note in this text many of the ideas that you have come to 
attribute to Charles and you will note, while Peirce does not use the term 
"covariance" that this is precisely what he describes, anticipating Einstein's 
claims for the epistemic power of general covariance. 


          The context of the work is Newtonian mechanics and recall that Peirce 
spent a good deal of time with the Celestial Mechanics of LaPlace, playing a 
major role in the translation by his mentor Nathaniel Bowditch.  


          ​
           Benjamin Peirce - 1855 - A System Of Analytic Mechanics.pdf​



          Regards,
          Steven




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