Joseph, Stan, Lists This matter of how Peirce conceives of time is a difficult and somewhat controversial one. Henri Bergson wrote an entire book, translated into English as *Time and Free Will,* trying to get across his concept of *durée* (Peirce is generally, although not completely, in agreement with Bergson, yet found his analysis "overly complicated").
Suffice it to say for now that Peirce views the 'instant' as a mathematical abstraction and the 'moment' (the experience of the continuity of the passing of time == Bergson's *durée*) as the minimum of at least conscious time. While there are some interesting discussions of this in relation to, for example, velocity and acceleration, here's a well-known analysis strictly in terms of 'consciousness'. (I have broken up the second paragraph for better readability. The last segment below takes up a possible objection to this view of the moment). . . . [C]onsciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time. CP 6.110 This is all that is requisite. For, in this infinitesimal interval, not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense, that is, considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration, but also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is ipso facto continuous. *In fact, this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness is a direct feeling of its contents as spread out *(emphasis added). This will be further elucidated below. In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end -- not, of course, in the way of recognition, for recognition is only of the past, but in the way of immediate feeling. *Now upon this interval follows another, whose beginning is the middle of the former, and whose middle is the end of the former *(emphasis added). Here, we have an immediate perception of the temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end, or say of the second, third, and fourth instants (note: I and others have attempted to diagram this overlap*)*. *From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a mediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants. This mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented, spread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject of duration, it is completely embraced in the second moment * *(The reader will observe that I use the word instant to mean a point of time, and moment to mean an infinitesimal duration.) *(emphasis added) If it is objected that, upon the theory proposed, we must have more than a mediate perception of the succession of the four instants, I grant it; for the sum of the two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal, so that it is immediately perceived. It is immediately perceived in the whole interval, but only mediately perceived in the last two-thirds of the interval. Now, let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception, and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite succession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time, and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment. In this last moment, the whole series will be recognized, or known as known before, except only the last moment, which of course will be absolutely unrecognizable to itself. Indeed, even this last moment will be recognized like the rest, or, at least, be just beginning to be so. CP 6.111 Peirce's discussion of the moment in terms of velocity and acceleration are somewhat more complex. I hope this addresses your question at least in part, Joseph. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 10:46 AM, [email protected] < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary and Stan, > > If I may ask, how is the notion of simultaneity vs. succession handled in > this view of a minimum (I assume quantity) of time? > > If it (the minimum) is tripartite, what is the contribution of each part? > > Thank you, > > Joseph > > ----Message d'origine---- > De : [email protected] > Date : 25/04/2015 - 06:39 (PST) > À : [email protected] > Objet : [biosemiotics:8441] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. > > > Gary -- Regarding: > > That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have > *mediate* consciousness of same. > > S: Here again I see the necessity of social construction. Mediation > generally arrives via language, and languages are many and differ among > themselves. So Thirdness would differ from language group to language group > and therefore is not 'real' in the realist sense. > > STAN > > On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have >> *mediate* consciousness of same. This is one of the principal reasons >> why I consider Peirce's idea of the tripartite/tricategorial minimum of >> time being the *moment* (cf. Bergson's duree) versus the (abstract) >> *instant* to be so important. >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 6:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote. >>> >>> There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct >>> experience of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual >>> *judgments*; that is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness, >>> (and I include physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is >>> grounded in the experience of perception. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> *To:* [email protected] >>> *Cc:* peirce-l at list.iupui.edu <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM >>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. >>> >>> "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of >>> generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience >>> of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon >>> us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it >>> depends on necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, >>> turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP >>> 5.150) >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then. >>>> However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, >>>> but you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree >>>> that "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't >>>> directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a >>>> separate existentiality." >>>> >>>> But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our >>>> direct empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is >>>> the whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in >>>> 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its >>>> limit case, the formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because >>>> there is no self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always >>>> valid about the percept. >>>> >>>> Yours, >>>> >>>> -tommi >>>> >>>> >>>> Edwina wrote: >>>> Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are >>>> Thirdness, are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce >>>> is following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our >>>> direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is >>>> irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the >>>> 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences, we can, by >>>> 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand generals. This is >>>> not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then, they are a 'matter of >>>> thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 'relations of reason' (1.365) and >>>> not of fact (sensual experience of Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or >>>> reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine' 1.366. >>>> >>>> We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience >>>> via our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - >>>> but we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general >>>> is not a separate existentiality. >>>> >>>> Dear Edwina >>>> >>>> That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements >>>> of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his >>>> Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to): >>>> >>>> A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible >>>> fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without >>>> recognizing these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which >>>> are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all >>>> our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in >>>> order to maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that >>>> perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is >>>> directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to >>>> recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets >>>> of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in >>>> its highest perfection we call perception." >>>> >>>> Yours, >>>> >>>> -Tommi >>>> >>>> On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear Frederik >>>>>> >>>>>> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) >>>>>> conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. >>>>>> could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as >>>>>> formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: >>>>>> >>>>>> "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate >>>>>> of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and >>>>>> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be >>>>>> arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) >>>>>> >>>>>> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that >>>>>> there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics >>>>>> included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how >>>>>> Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could >>>>>> change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether >>>>>> real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. >>>>>> >>>>>> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor >>>>>> the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical >>>>>> role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing >>>>>> practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you >>>>>> think >>>>>> that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature >>>>>> view would be compatible? >>>>>> >>>>>> This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the >>>>>> scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) >>>>>> metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yours, >>>>>> >>>>>> -Tommi >>>>>> >>>>>> You wrote as a response to Howard: >>>>>> FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the >>>>>> categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are >>>>>> nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. >>>>>> >>>>>> HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori >>>>>> categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that >>>>>> your >>>>>> realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food >>>>>> is >>>>>> logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). >>>>>> >>>>>> So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever >>>>>> organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms >>>>>> survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal >>>>>> categories >>>>>> explain anything more? >>>>>> >>>>>> FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as >>>>>> whatever organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It >>>>>> does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, >>>>>> protocol >>>>>> sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism >>>>>> should >>>>>> be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It >>>>>> is >>>>>> no stranger than that. >>>>>> >>>>>> So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence >>>>>> of the universals you yourself are using. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ******************************************************************* >>>>>> >>>>>> "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" >>>>>> - Donald T. Campbell >>>>>> >>>>>> ******************************************************************* >>>>>> >>>>>> University of Tampere >>>>>> School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy >>>>>> Tommi Vehkavaara >>>>>> FI-33014 University of Tampere >>>>>> Finland >>>>>> >>>>>> Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) >>>>>> e-mail:[email protected] >>>>>> homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove >>>>>> https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara >>>>>> >>>>>> ******************************************************************* >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>>> "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" >>>> - Donald T. Campbell >>>> >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>>> University of Tampere >>>> School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy >>>> Tommi Vehkavaara >>>> FI-33014 University of Tampere >>>> Finland >>>> >>>> Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) >>>> e-mail: [email protected] >>>> homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove >>>> https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara >>>> >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > >
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