Jerry, I took this to be about an omission in Peirce's metaphysics regarding ens a se and ens ab alio. A lot of the stuff on universal rhetoric, semiotics and trichotomy went right by me. I don't understand how you want the latin distinction to work there. I could, however, just as easily ask you where the omission is. The suggestion that "being in itself" (aseity) has no existence (or necessary existence) or existence conferring properties upon itself or another is not a fault of Peirce, but rather a choice of interpretation. I recalled what P says about firstness and secondness. Given that the question of existence (and essence) is central to the latin terms, I asked myself, where does 'existence' fit into P's categories? (metaphysical/phenomenological) I never thought of his theory of signs as a place to look for a deficiency. It strikes me that they remain mute on those sorts of questions. Jim W Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A metaphysical omission of the trichot omy: ens a se and ens ab alio From: [email protected] Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2015 19:11:06 -0500 CC: [email protected] To: [email protected]
List, Jim: Jim, you seemed to have missed the point of my post. Please point me toward a passage from CSP that you think indicates the categorical distinction betweenens a se and ens ab alio, as Latin phrases in the since of Suarez. I made no mention of "existential relations." Where does this thought come from? This sentence " I doubt that a discussion of medads (or satsified, 0-place relations) or rhemes/propositions solely within the logic will help, since it is a modern epistemological (phenomenological) approach that is decisive for existence." makes no sense to me. Cheaply put, experience and science replaces theology with respect to ens ab alio. Huh?I made no mention of theology. Why do you introduce it? Does the concept of a whole and parts of whole organized into a collection of propositions influence your views of theology? If so, how? Perhaps you are opposed to mereology for a specific reason? The central issue, at least to me, is how does the trichotomy relate to diagrams and other forms of generating a coherent set of propositions such that an argument is formed? Cheers Jerry On Aug 2, 2015, at 5:57 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:Hello Jerry. How can you say that P ignores the distinction? There is a lot of distinguishing between being-in-itself and existential relations. I doubt that a discussion of medads (or satsified, 0-place relations) or rhemes/propositions solely within the logic will help, since it is a modern epistemological (phenomenological) approach that is decisive for existence. Cheaply put, experience and science replaces theology with respect to ens ab alio. Jim W From: [email protected] Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2015 13:36:06 -0500 To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] A metaphysical omission of the trichotomy: ens a se and ens ab alio List: CSP proposed the trichotomy as a universal logic, such that the rhetorical terms can be used to generate an argument which is decidable - that is, is either true or false. The binding of the 8 rhetorical terms that serve to ground the propositions of the trichotomy to one-another is unclear (to me, at least). Although, the rhetoric is somehow related his view of the incompleteness of the blanks of a sentence and filling those blanks with terms such the meaning of the medad is a proposition. (This notion of a completed medad can (and should) be contrasted with the Aristotelian chaining of sorites, the chaining of chemical elements into compounds and the concatenation of variables in linear algebra by presupposing a common Cartesian axis of representation. And, of course, the corresponding diagrams of logical objects.) This background of CSP's attempt to construct a universal form for argumentation ignores the distinctions betweenens a se and ens ab alio, metaphysical terms of the influential philosopher Suarez, 1548-1617. Chemical argumentation, which certainly is a part of universal argumentation, distinguishes between ens a se and ens ab alio at the fundamental level of the meaning of an atom. The sin-sign of an atom necessarily represents a name that represents the predicates of the form. In this respect, the index of the sinsign is a single unit, it is being that is from itself, that is, ens a se. Chemical argumentation is extended from atoms to molecules. The sinsign of a molecule necessarily represents a compound of atoms. The number of atoms in a molecule is indexed on the elements present in the entity. In this respect, the index must be complete with respect to the parts of the whole, the atomic units that give form to the molecule. That is, an index of the sinsign must be based on ens ab alio, being that is from others. The ordering of concepts from ens a se to ens ab alio is the basis of the logical conjunction of material inference that form icons. CSP then argues these material inferences are components of the medad and beget the contribution of the rhema to the universal argument. While a sinsign may have many indices, the ens a se to ens ab alio is essential to forming propositions related to CSP's notion of medads within the trichotomy. This suggests we need to re-think the ordering of concepts that are implicit to the terminology of the trichotomy. Cheers Jerry Suárez made an important investigation of being, its properties and division in Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597), which influenced the further development of theology within Catholicism. In the second part of the book, disputations 28-53, Suárez fixes the distinction between ens infinitum (God) and ens finitum (created beings). The first division of being is that between ens infinitum and ens finitum. Instead of dividing being into infinite and finite, it can also be divided into ens a seand ens ab alio, i.e., being that is from itself and being that is from another. A second distinction corresponding to this one:ens necessarium and ens contingens, i.e., necessary being and contingent being. Still another formulation of the distinction is between ens per essentiam and ens per participationem, i.e., being that exists by reason of its essence and being that exists only by participation in a being that exists on its own (eigentlich). A further distinction is between ens increatum and ens creatum, i.e., uncreated being and created, or creaturely, being. A final distinction is between being asactus purus and being as ens potentiale, i.e., being as pure actuality and being as potential being. Suárez decided in favor of the first classification of the being into ens infinitum and ens finitum as the most fundamental, in connection with which he accords the other classifications their due. In the last disputation 54 Suárez deals with entia rationis (beings of reason), which are impossible intentional objects, i.e. objects that are created by our minds but cannot exist in actual reality.[7] ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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