Note to Managers: Marcuu's messages don't seem to be
making it through to the list. I think they have the
right address in the cc list. I will reply-to-all on
this last one as a test. -- Jon
On 8/4/2015 11:40 PM, marccu s wrote:
Do you mean that our capacity for language has nothing to do with our ability
to create cognitive representations?
Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti
Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey
Lähetetty: tiistai, 4. elokuuta 2015 23:45
Vast.ott: Sungchul Ji
Kopio: Thomas, [email protected]
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16893
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16894
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16895
MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898
TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16900
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16908
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16909
Sung, List,
General terms are terms like "man", "woman", "child", etc.,
each of which applies to many individuals, in other words,
has a general denotation or a plural extension. Generally
speaking, a general term is treated as bearing an accessory
reference, indirect denotation, or other form of association
to a general property like man-ness, woman-ness, child-ness,
etc. and to a set of individuals like men, women, children, etc.
But a strict nominalist would hold that we have no need of these
properties or sets, that all we need are the individual terms that
denote individuals individually together with the general terms that
denote individuals in a general way.
Regards,
Jon
On 8/4/2015 6:20 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
Hi Jon,
* In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies
to many individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property,
or universal *
Can you provide one or two concrete examples illustrating the point you are
making ?
Thanks.
Sung
On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
Tom, List,
Let me back up, refresh my memory, and try to remember what I had in mind.
Nominalism takes its name from the idea that "generals are only names",
and it goes by the maxims: "Do not take a general name for the name of
a general" and "Do not multiply entities beyond necessity". In other
words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many
individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or
universal, as those are dispensable in favor of individual entities.
As far as the advice against confusing signs with objects and different
types or uses of signs with each other, and even the advice to economize
our budgets of entities to some degree, if not to the extreme of absolute
austerity, pragmatism can go a long ways with that. The fork in the road
comes with the degree to which general entities can be eliminated, wholly
or not so wholly.
I will have to break for dinner here ...
Jon
On 8/1/2015 11:52 AM, Thomas wrote:
Jon, List ~
Here is how I interpreted Markku's comment: Because a semiotics
process underlies the logical thinking of people, animals and plants,
then the logic/thoughts that are the subject of a philosopher's
investigation/analysis are not themselves nominalistic.
They are (intended to be) pragmatic.
The nominalism label in the poem must, perforce, apply to the thinking
of a confused philosopher. His/her analytical approach is the Object
of "nominal" (a Sign) in the poem. The poem is a critique of (some)
philosophers.
Instead of a simple verse, I sense that Peirce's preferred poetic form
would be a limerick comprised of palindromes.
Regards, Tom Wyrick
On Jul 31, 2015, at 10:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
Marccu, List,
I sometimes use “nominal thinking” as another name for nominalism
even as I use “pragmatic thinking” as another name for pragmatism.
Now there is a punny bit of ribbing in that, as a nominal thinker
is a “thinker in name only”, but how could a nominalist object to
a general name without giving up the ghost of nominal philosophy?
Regards,
Jon
On 7/30/2015 5:50 PM, marccu s wrote:
I do not understand how ‘thinking’ could be nominal?
I suppose there are not such a phenomenon as ‘nominal thinking’.
Misunderstanding and understanding (results of thinking) etc are
both based on information formation within society in relation to
other subjects and objects etc.
kindly, markku
Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti
Lähettäjä: Jon Awbrey
Lähetetty: torstai, 30. heinäkuuta 2015 18:10
Vast.ott: [email protected]
Post : Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07/30/zeroth-law-of-semiotics/
Date : July 30, 2015 at 10:00 am
Peircers,
New (if not exactly novel) discussions of the so-called "Liar Paradox"
have broken out at several places on the web in recent weeks and these
always bring to my mind at least a number of critical ways in which
the Peircean paradigm of logic as semiotics differs from the fallback
paradigm that bedevils the thinking of those who have yet to see by
Peirce's lights.
And that brings to my mind at least the following oldie
but still goodie that articulates what I take to be the
issue at the root of this and many other pseudo-problems.
(I have revised the title a bit for this edition.)
Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
=======================
Meaning is a privilege not a right.
Not all pictures depict.
Not all signs denote.
Never confuse a property of a sign,
just for instance, existence,
with a sign of a property,
for instance, existence.
Taking a property of a sign
for a sign of a property
is the zeroth sign of
nominal thinking
and the first
mistake.
Also Sprach 0*
2002 October 09
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=32824
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