Helmut, lists, (*1*) I agree, Helmut, the *phaneron-body-mind *triad is indeed a sign.
(*2*) To me, this sign asserts (or argues) that 'body' acts as the representamen referring to phaneron as its object and determines an interpretant which assumes the same relation to the object as the body itself does. (*3*) Phaneron is the first-person experience, hence the interpreter of this sign must be the person whose body experiences the phaneron and whose mind conceptualizes and symbolizes a part of the phaneron for the purpose of communicating it to others. (*4*) Although, as Edwina already pointed out, any of the three nodes -- object, representamen and interpretant -- can be in the modes of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thus giving rise to 3^3 = 27 possible triadic signs, only 10 of these are thought to exist according to Peirce. I described the rules selecting these 10 triadic signs out of 27 in [biosemioitcs:46] posted on December 26, 2012. (*5*) The '*phaneron-body-mind*' sign depicted in Figure 2 is a *sign* referring to *my theory of mind and body*. Hence, it is an *argument* written in *symbols*. If this theory turns out to be true, then it would be a *legisign. *So I would say that the *phaneron-body-mind* scheme in Figure 2 has the potential of being an *argument-symbolic-legisign* or Class 10 sign. (*6*) It is interesting to point out that, if the phaneron-body-mind (PBM) sign contains elementary signs other than *symbol* such as *index* and *icon*, to that extent, the PBM sign may be considered violating the Peircean selection rule described in [1] and necessitates admitting such non-Peircean signs as "arguement-iconic-legisign" and "argument-indexical-legisign". With all the berst. Sung On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 at 2:30 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Sung, lists, > Edwina, indeed, I had forgotten that Sungs triad (phaneron-body-mind) is a > Sign. Maybe the difference is in the question, for whom it is a Sign: Is it > a Sign for an outside observer, then the observer sees, what happens with > the body. Therefore the body is the source of representamens. If it is a > Sign for the person, whose body it is, then it is different: The phaneron > is the source of representamens. The latter case would be a > self-referential sign: Is this the same as "system"? > Best, > Helmut > 19. September 2015 um 14:49 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut - ALL three aspects of the triadic Sign, the Object, Representamen > and the Interpretant, can be in any of the three modal categories of: > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Check out the ten classes of Signs > 2.256 - and you'll see this and see how the categories work together to > function as the Sign. > > And 'first' is not the same as Firstness; 'second' is not the same as > Secondness.... > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <http://[email protected]> > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* PEIRCE-L <http://[email protected]> > *Sent:* Saturday, September 19, 2015 8:15 AM > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8892] Re: The problem with > > Dear Sung, lists, > I like your diagram: > f > g > * Phaneron *------------->* Body * > --------------> > > * Mind (Firstness) > (Secondness) (Thirdness) > [Object] [Representamen] [Interpretant]* > | > ^ > | > | > |__________________________________| > h > > But I am confused about the assignments of object and representamen. I see > arguments for assigning them as you do, and I also see arguments for > assigning them the other way around. For arguments for your version I see, > that the phaneron in this case is environment or "Umwelt" (Uexküll), which > contains the objects, and that the body produces reactions to these > objects, which reactions are representamens. For arguments to do the > assignment the other way I see: The body consists of permanent entities, > and permanence is a trait of objects. From the phaneron there come events, > that meet the senses, and are representamens. I am just as confused, as I > have been when I first had read the Peirce quote: "A sign is a first....", > in which I have not understood until today, what Peirce means by "first" > and "second". That was, why I later have made up my own interpretation, > that representamens are events, and objects are entities. Is this wrong? If > so, I will delete and rewrite my blog again. > > Very best, > Helmut > > "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Kristina, Stephen, Helmut, Edwina, list members, > > The heated debate between Edwina and Kristina reminds me of the Republican > debate we saw on TV last night. Let us not fight against each other but > focus on defeating the Democrats of the challenging problems in > contemporary science and philosophy. > > One possible way to resolve the perennial mind-body problem in philosophy > may be to utilize the principles of *supplementarity* and > *complementarity* introduced into philosophy by Niels Bohr in the first > decades of the last century [1]: > > > " . . . Within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic > properties of a given object can in principle be ascertained by > a single experimental arrangement, although in practice various > arrangements are often convenient for the study of different aspects > of the phenomenon. In fact, data obtained in such a way simply > supplement each other and *can be combined *into a consistent picture > of the behavior of the object under investigation. In quantum > mechanics, however, evidence about atomic objects obtained by > different experimental arrangements exhibits a novel kind of > *complementary relationship*. > Indeed, it must be recognized that such evidence which appears > contradictory when combination into a single picture is attempted, > exhausts all conceivable knowledge about the object. Far from > restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of > experiments, the notion of *complementarity* simply characterizes > the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenever *the interaction * > *between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an* *integral * > *part of the phenomenon*. . . . (my italics) [2]" > > In 2012 [3], I proposed a possible solution to the mind-body conundrum > based on the principles of *supplementarity* and *complementarity *defined > above and two more ingredients -- (i) the so-called the > *Structure-Information-Matter-Energy > (SIME) Square *of Burgin [4] (see below) and (ii) the *modeling relation* > of Rosen [5]. First, SIME Square: > > > ". . . information is not of the same kind as knowledge and data, which > are structures. > Actually, if we take that *matter* is the name for all substances as > opposed to *energy* > and the *vacuum*, we have the relation that is represented by the > following diagram called > the Structure-Information-Matter-Energy (SIME) Square: > > > similar > * Energy * ~ > * Information* > ^ > ^ > | > | > *contains * | > | *contains* > | > | > | > | > * Matter * ~ > *Structures > *(also called *Knowledge *[4, p. 116]) > > Figure 1. The Structure-Information-Matter-Energy (SIME) > Square. Reproduced from [3]. > > > I presented a possible solution to the mind-body problem in a diagram [3, > p. 636] which is reproduced below: > > > > * S Natural System (N) <- - - - - -> Formal System > (F) * > * U ^ > ^* > * P | > |* > * L v > v* > * E Energy <- - - - - - - - - - - - -> > Information 'LIFORMATION'* > * M MATTERGY | | > | | or* > * E Matter <- - - - - - - - - - - - -> > Knowledge/Life 'INFOKNOWLEDGE'* > > > * N ^ > ^ T | > | A** > v v* > > * R Body <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > -> Mind I ^ > ^* > * T * | > | > *Y* |____________ _____________| > *COMPLEMENTARITY* > > > *Figure 1.* A schematic representation of the postulate that the *mind* and > the *body* are the complementary aspects of the *ultimate reality*. (If > the figure is distorted in your email, please see the original figure > available on line at http://www.conformon.net [3]. > > > The following points deserve emphasis in Figure 1: > > (*1*) There are two vectors; the Body-Matter-Energy-Natural System > (BMEN) vector on the left and the Mind-Knowledge-Information-Formal system > (MKIF) vector on the right. For convenience we may refer to these vectors > as the N (Natural System) and F (formal System) vectors, borrowing the > terms used by Rosen [5]. There is an unmistakable family resemblance among > the components of the N vector which are connected one to the other by the > Principle of Supplementarity as exemplified the the additive (i.e., > supplementary) relation between *matter* and *energy* as established by > Einstein's E = mc^2. The components of the F vector also exhibit > unmistakable family resemblance, as exemplified perhaps by Shannon's famous > equation, H = log_2 W, where H can be interpreted as *Information* and W > as our *Knowledge* or *Mind* knowing or counting W. > > (*2*) The key postulate of Figure 1 is that the N and F vectors are > complementary to each other. In other words the N and F vectors are the > complementary aspects of a third entity which I identify with the *Ultimate > Reality* or the *Firstness* of Peirce. > > (*3*) Combining (*1*) and (*2*) leads to the following diagram that > connects the mind-body problem to Peircean (metaphysics) and [semiotics]: > > f > g > * Phaneron *------------->* Body * > --------------> > > * Mind (Firstness) > (Secondness) (Thirdness) > [Object] [Representamen] [Interpretant]* > | > ^ > | > | > |__________________________________| > h > > *Figure 2.* The postulate that the phaneron-body-mind as an > irreducible triadic relation (ITR). > f = perception/consciousness (?); g = > conceptualization (?); and > h = correspondence or grounding (?) > > > If you have any questions, suggestions or corrections, let me know. > > All the best. > > Sung > ____________________________________ > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > Associate Professor > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Rutgers University > Piscatawy, N.J. > > [1] Bohr, N. (1958). Quantum Physics and Philosophy - Causality and > Complementarity, *in * *Philosophy in the Mid-Century,* R. > Klibansky (ed.), La Nouva Editrice, Florence. > > > [2] Ji, S. (2012). Complementarity. > <http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Excerpts_Chapters_2_complementarity_08192012.pdf> > In: *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular > Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications.* Springer, New York. Section > 2.3, pp. 24-50. PDF at http://www.conformon.net. > [3] Ji, S. (2012). Towards a Category Theory of Everything > <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=993> (cTOE). In: Molecular > Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical > Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 633-642. PDF at > http://www.conformon.net > [4] Burgin, M. (2010). *Theory of Information: Fundamentality, > Diversity and Unification.* World Scientific, Singapore. P. 117. > [5] Rosen, R. (1991). *Life Itself*, Columbia University Press, New > York. > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 3:09 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Stephen, I don't think adding "unity" helps. Unity is already implied in >> the form of the 'mind-body'. - The problem lies deeper than in wordings. >> The mind-body problem needs to be solved. Which is not easy. Right now I'm >> quite busy writing down the solution I have arrived at, using both Peirce >> and Foucault. (Which will yet take a month or two...). After I've finished >> my work, I'll be happy to discuss it with you & other listers. >> >> Kirsti >> >> Stephen Jarosek kirjoitti 16.9.2015 16:56: >>> >>> Kirsti, you make a sensible observation. Speaking for myself, it looks >>> like I have become a bit sloppy in my wording... I used to write >>> "mind-body unity" but have become lazy, shortening it to "mind-body", >>> assuming that people will take the "unity" part for granted. But is >>> there an alternative to writing "mind-body unity" every time? I like >>> Ken Wilber's use of the word "holon", but not everybody knows what >>> that means. I suppose the word "entity" is an alternative to "holon" >>> and I've seen that used in the past. >>> Cheers >>> sj >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] >>> Sent: Wednesday, 16 September 2015 3:23 PM >>> To: Clark Goble >>> Cc: PEIRCE-L >>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem >>> with instinct - it's a category >>> >>> Dear list, >>> >>> I sincerely do find talk about "mind-bodies" basically twisted. A >>> modern division, a split, is thereby taken for granted, taken as the >>> starting-point. - A being, be it a human being, or a bee, should >>> remain as the starting point. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Kirsti >>> >>> Clark Goble kirjoitti 15.9.2015 21:13: >>>> >>>> Apologies - I just found out I’d sent this to the old Peirce list >>>> rather than the new one. My apologies for the problem. Apple Mail >>>> appears to autosuggest based upon what emails you have archived. >>>> Sometimes this leads to the old list getting picked up. Unfortunately >>>> Mail’s UI also doesn’t display the full email unless you click on it. >>>> So unless I click on the Peirce-L name I occasionally get the wrong >>>> email. When I’m posting regularly I always remember. When I’m posting >>>> infrequently (as has of late been the case) then I can forget. Once >>>> again my apologies again. >>>> >>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 1:36 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Stephen, >>>>> you wrote: "The axiomatic principles of cognition (Peirce’s >>>>> categories) will establish how mind-bodies define the things that >>>>> matter." >>>>> Again, I think that we have different concepts of the term "know" or >>>>> "cognition". In my understanding, cognition does not appear in the >>>>> three categories from the start, but is a matter of subcategories. I >>>>> agree, that everything underlies the three categories >>>>> possibility/quality, actuality/relation, representation/continuity. >>>>> Secondness has two modes, and thirdness has three modes. These modes, >>>>> or subcategories, again have submodes, or subcategories as before. I >>>>> think, that knowledge is a matter of eg. thirdness of thirdness of >>>>> thirdness, or something like that. >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me Peirce adopts a position where things are more >>>>> mind-like or more matter-like as a matter of degree rather than kind. >>>>> I’m not sure it relates directly to the categories beyond the idea of >>>>> consciousness seems tied to firstness in certain ways. >>>>> Yet the categories are always at play in an irreducible way. >>>>> >>>>> At times Peirce appears to see the more mind-like as what is less >>>>> constrained. So evolution is leading to the development of substance >>>>> as a kind of permanence. Up to that time there is more “swerve” >>>>> and that swerve, when seen from the inside, is likely traditional >>>>> phenomenal mind. >>>>> >>>>> This ontology of Peirce is probably the most controversial aspect of >>>>> his thought but it does lead to all sorts of interesting >>>>> considerations. An analogy someone else brought up recently was >>>>> Richard Feynman’s QED really being thinking what it must be like to >>>>> be an electron. In this conception there’s always an inside and >>>>> outside and Peirce isn’t quite so divorced from Kant as people >>>>> assume. Yet in taking this inner view we don’t have the thing in >>>>> itself in quite the same fashion. If only because Peirce lets >>>>> firstness create a sign. Indeed remembering our experience of a >>>>> phenomena is always a sign (thirdness) in response to firstness. >>>>> >>>>> That may be what you mean by modes or subcategories though. (Forgive >>>>> me - haven’t yet caught up on my reading of the list) >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bees are conscious in accordance with the same principles that we are >>>>> conscious. This is one important aspect of the axiomatic framework >>>>> that I base my thinking on. That is to say, Peirce’s categories apply >>>>> to _all_organisms, even cells. >>>>> >>>>> Pierce says bees have mind. I’m not sure he means by that they are >>>>> conscious in any strong way. It seems a matter of degree for Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; >>>>>> and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the >>>>>> colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. >>>>>> Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be >>>>>> driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte’s. >>>>>> Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. >>>>>> But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so >>>>>> there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give “Sign” a >>>>>> very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within >>>>>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a >>>>>> Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated >>>>>> sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a >>>>>> Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at >>>>>> one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless >>>>>> be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. >>>>>> Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a >>>>>> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should >>>>>> be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit >>>>>> that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >>>>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part >>>>>> of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would >>>>>> require a volume - and an uninviting one; and in the second place, >>>>>> what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight >>>>>> determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will only >>>>>> slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost certain >>>>>> effect will be a danger that our system may not represent every >>>>>> variety of non-human thought. (“Prolegomena to an Apology for >>>>>> Pragmaticism CP 4.551) >>>>> >>>>> Whenever you have signs, even physical signs, you have a quasi-mind. >>>>> So of course thirdness applies to them the same as it does us. The >>>>> question of feeling or firstness seems a bit more tricky. >>>>> >>>>> As I recall to the degree he talks about consciousness it’s the inner >>>>> aspect of the “swerve” or chaos. In other places he says we have >>>>> consciousness to the degree we have self-control. I think this aspect >>>>> of his ontology is among the most controversial of his views. I think >>>>> one can adopt most of his system without adopting this particular >>>>> thread. (Which I think comes out of the remnant of Kant’s “in-itself” >>>>> that survives no external thing-in-itself) >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> …whatever is First is _ipso facto _sentient. If I make atoms swerve >>>>>> - as I do - I make them swerve but very very little, because I >>>>>> conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I do not mean >>>>>> exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the materialists >>>>>> hold them to be, only with a small dose of sentiency superadded. For >>>>>> that, I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I mean is, that all >>>>>> there IS, is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; Third, Habits - all >>>>>> of which are more familiar to us on their psychical side than on >>>>>> their physical side; and that dead matter would be merely the final >>>>>> result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of >>>>>> feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death (CP >>>>>> 6.201) >>>>>> >>>>>> What further is needed to clear the sign of its mental associations >>>>>> is furnished by generalizations too facile to arrest attention here, >>>>>> since nothing but feeling is exclusively mental. >>>>>> But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard >>>>>> consciousness as a mere “epiphenomenon”; though I heartily grant >>>>>> that the hypothesis that it is so has done good service to science. >>>>>> To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries >>>>>> of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in >>>>>> intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer >>>>>> world,— the world of those causes that are exceedingly compulsive >>>>>> upon the modes of consciousness, with general disturbance sometimes >>>>>> amounting to shock, and are acted upon only slightly, and only by a >>>>>> special kind of effort, muscular effort,— and of the inner world, >>>>>> apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to direct effort of >>>>>> various kinds with feeble reactions, the interaction of these two >>>>>> worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world upon >>>>>> the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer >>>>>> through the operation of habits. If this be a correct account of >>>>>> consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me >>>>>> that it exercises a real function in self-control, since without it, >>>>>> or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the resolves >>>>>> and exercises of the inner world could not affect the real >>>>>> determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that these >>>>>> belong to the outer world because they are not mere fantasies but >>>>>> are real agencies. (Pierce, Pragmatism EP 2.418-419) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As I said this is controversial. At the time it put Peirce quite at >>>>> odds with the mechanistic determinacy that was taken for granted in >>>>> physics. Today we allow chance or swerve, yet it seems a kind of >>>>> deterministic probability that still is at odds with Peirce’s notion >>>>> of control. >>>>> >>>>> It would seem that Peirce would allow sentiency to even an electron >>>>> in some degree yet it seems the ability to control ones behavior and >>>>> form habits that makes for the degree of consciousness. >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > ------------------------------ > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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