Frances to Sung and all listers---
Allow me to start a new topic culled from the old topic on those supersign
interpretant effects called terms and propositions and arguments.
************
Sung recently on the biosemiotics list roughly wrote in effect the following
muse with my liberal edits.
Sung states that logics involves thinking; and normal humans think only in
signs; hence logics must be a tern, because all signs are irreducibly
trichotomic. Furthermore for Sung if logics belongs to the world of structures
that is coexistent with two other words, the physical and the mental, it seems
to me that logics cannot be separated from the physical nor from the mental,
assuming that reality is irreducibly trichotomic. I am tempted to express these
ideas crudely as follows, which seems to fit the phenomenal categories of
Peirceanism as well:
Physical World ----------> World of Structures ----------> Mental World
(Firstness) (Secondness) (Thirdness)
Cosmogenesis Biogenesis
-------------------- Information Parameter ---------------
This tridential model of the world above has for Sung three relational nodes
that may of course be postulated with other labels in other ways, depending on
the "information parameter" the author adopts, so that the configuration or the
structure of the three directional nodes will remain invariant, because they
represent the irreducible trichotomic relation of semiotics and semiosis.
************
Sung may be wholly or partly wrong in his guess about the world of configured
structures as he calls them. It is agreed that thoughtful logics is an
objective tern along with its vast beings and things and objects of address,
which stuff including logics seems to be independent of mind but whose sensed
reality seems related to mind. To be categorially consistent it is my realist
probe that this distant stuff of the world must be felt as hazy phenomenal
beings and things and objects, which indirectly represents the inaccessible
stuff that is merely guessed in the thought of mind, via phenomenal objects
acting as signs, to be at most a real true fact.
The phenomenal categories of signed objects that seemingly represent the whole
wide world of say thingness should likely be structured under the class holder
of zeroness as:
(0) Phenomenal or natural as mystical and material and mental;
(1) Phanerical or mystical as phantasmal and magical;
(2) Physical and material as existential; and
(3) Psychical and mental as emotional and intellectual and reasonable.
These classes of signed phenomena might also be related to the phaneros of its
ontos and cosmos and epistemos. The cosmos or universe of nature would
presumably hold at least the telos and bios and nomos.
Note that it is likely for ideal realists to hold that the mind is in thought
so that the thought is not in the mind, rather the thought is in the sign,
which sign however may be in the mind or in the gest or in the talk or in the
text or in any viable medium that is used as a vehicular agent to carry the
signed thought.
Note that it is my realist guess for Peirceanism to hold that objective logics,
as represented phenomenally to be an objective sign system, is accidently
discovered or coincidentally found by mind, and not arbitrarily invented or
deliberately made by mind, although the mind must be in a sensible relation
with signs and logics for those signs and logics to be made real by sense in
mind, so that the felt reality of stuff is only as real as sense. If for
example a communal group of expert minds should tentatively agree by a
consensus of opinion that a signed mental object of logic is true, then that
rational abstraction now becomes a real objective fact, regardless of what any
individual mind in the group might think of it. For realism the mind itself is
an objective phenomenal fact, so that even matter is in effect effete or weak
mind engaged in pseudo or quasi thought.
Corrections to my many ongoing guesses are invited and welcome.
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