This is most interesting Michael. If I were to say that language evolves would that make sense in terms of this? Or, more precisely, that progress necessitates the evolution of meanings via words? I have been working on a project which in essence looks back to what we might see as creation and what engenders evolution and I must assume that whatever else may be the whole kahuna of creation it must contain a vocal element merely to be able to relate to its evolving reality. In other words, "In the beginning was the word".
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Peirce-Listers, > > > I'm posting below some material from the second edition (currently in > progress) of my book* The Speaking Self: Language Lore and English Usage *in > case anybody is interested in a conception of language structure that > repudiates the Chomskyan model and asserts one that is strictly anchored to > Peircean pragmaticism (prominently including his semeiotic).This material > is also part of my paper "Paradox: Theme and Semiotic Variations," which > recently appeared in *Semiotics 2014: The Semiotics of Paradox*, ed. J. > Pelkey et al., 1-28. (SSA Yearbook, 2. Ottawa: Legas, 2015). I'll be glad > to send you a PDF of the latter upon request. > > Michael > > > P. S. Many years ago, in a publication I can't now remember, Chomsky > stated, when asked who his favorite philosopher was, that it was Peirce. In > my opinion, whatever reading of Peirce's rationalism there is that can be > attributed to Chomsky, none of it that can be called accurate is compatible > with generative grammar. > > *5.29 Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language* > > > > *GLOSSARY* > > > > *cortex*, n.: outer layer of neural tissue in humans and other mammals > > *postbiotic, *adj.: pertaining to the period following the appearance of > life > > *pragmaticism*, n.: the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce > > *semeiotic*, adj. < *semeiosis*, n.: the process whereby something > functions as a sign > > *teleology*, n.: a metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena and events > by final causes > > > > Readers of this book who have an interest in the conceptual > underpinnings of its vignettes may benefit from being reminded of some of > the main points in which the doctrine christened “semeiotic > neostructuralism” (in the spirit of C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism) by the > author differs fundamentally from the dominant paradigm of contemporary > linguistics, which is nominally identified with Chomsky and his > followers––regardless, nota bene, whether these latter-day practitioners > have renamed their particular enterprise (e. g., “Optimality Theory” or > “Cognitive Linguistics;” ALL linguistics is necessarily ‘cognitive’, hence > CL is a pleonasm) so as to differentiate it from what was originally called > “tranformational” or “generative” grammar. > > Chomsky has a rather mechanistic/mechanicalist view of > language, for all that he understands that the freedom to compose sentences > that are original, unpredictable, and yet intelligible is different from > the unoriginal, predictable products of strictly mechanical action. His > view is mechanistic nonetheless because he simply posits underlying > structures by which sentences are to be generated. Possibly in a wider > perspective, Chomsky is no more reductively mechanistic than a semeiotic > neostructuralist, in a wider perspective, is a phenomenalist. For he no > doubt admits (or would admit) that the linguistic universals in our brains > are not just there, period, but evolved, with the brain’s evolution, as > chance variants that were ‘selected’ by the principle of reproductive > success. Similarly, the intentions or needs or felt urgencies to speak or > to achieve certain outcomes might explain––but only in a context wider than > Chomskyan linguistics––why language’s generative mechanisms are used in > this way rather than in that. > > But if we focus simply on the linguist’s study, as diversely > conceived by Chomsky and the semeiotic neostructuralist, then there is > this difference: for the one, the teleology of language is excluded from > linguistic explanation, while for the other it is the very stuff of > explanation. For the one, linguistic phenomena conform to a describable > structure of highly abstract laws, while for the other linguistic phenomena > exhibit an intelligible if less abstract, more complicated structure. For > the one, the system is a given, and any changes in it are accidental, while > for the other development is essential to language––development is more the > reality than is any one system of rules––and that development is also > intelligible and not merely given. > > That is the conflict. The reason the semeiotic > neostructuralist approach is, if it is successful, superior is that it can > be used to explain the very evolution of the brain-mechanism or linguistic > capacities and universals that Chomsky can at best describe. That is, given > creatures somewhat sociable, exchanging signs as their way of life, then > the survival value of their communicating more elaborate and precise > diagrams would explain the retention of those fortuitous variations, say, > in brain structure that promote exactly such powers of expressible > diagrammatization. That is, the principle of this evolution will be itself > linguistic, and continuous with the principles of postbiotic, strictly > linguistic evolution. > > The thought here is not unlike that which refuses to > postulate linguistic intentions separate from the capacity to exercise > those intentions. Just as there could be no desire to speak without an > ability to speak, so also there could be no evolution of linguistic > capacities––even, or especially, at the physiological level––except among > those who, already speaking to one another, will more likely survive as a > species if they speak more effectively. Thus, instead of a > neurophysiological explanation of language, we have a linguistic > explanation of the higher cortex––and probably not just the speech centers > either, since so many of our capacities for sensation and action would be > bootless without our capacities for speech. > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
