oops, forgot this paragraph: "We produced the above working hypothesis by stating the topic, contrast-class and relevance relation [21] <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0021> explicitly. The logarithmic spiral played different roles during the procedural stages of scientific explanation: (1) it served as a single numerical description for the observation, which rooted the abduction; (2) it served as the relevance relation by which to judge the quality of deductions from among the contrast class of models, which embodies the context [25] <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0025> during inference to the best explanation. Our work serves as a concise example of scientific reasoning during early stages of inquiry and illustrates dependence of induction on abduction, and the serial manner by which different forms of hypothesis partition the process (CP 7.218)."
Best, Jerry On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Gary f and list! > > Here are some quotes direct from Promoting convergence: the phi spiral in > abduction of mouse corneal behaviors: > > “Sufficient explanations are three-term relations between a topic, a > contrast-class, and a relevance relation, which “specifies what sort of > thing is being requested as answer” for a given context [21] > <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0021> > . > > > > The PA differs from other statements of abduction (cf., [24] > <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0024>) > in that it draws special attention to the important role cognitive > processes play in organizing and advancing scientific theories. That is, it > guides transformation of our attitudes toward mental models [25] > <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0025> > from surprise (other than expected) -> suspect (relevance relation) -> > matter of course (belief/habit). > > > > Therefore, admissibility of the FEM model as a potential explanation > depends on the likelihood that generation of a logarithmic curve is a > veridical statement that the phenomenon is present and whether further > modifications to the model reflecting finer measurements can affect > tightening of curvature to 17°. > > > > That is, we choose the working hypothesis (*ϕ*, FEM model), in contrast > to rest of contrast-class X (i.e., Netlogo model), because A (deduction of > logarithmic spiral, relevance relation) [21] > <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562/full#cplx21562-bib-0021> > .” > > > > > > :) > J > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:31 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> A post from my blog *aftersigns,* >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/02/relevance-in-context/: >> >> >> >> Sperber and Wilson (1995, 142) suggest that the goal of the comprehension >> process is >> >> [[ to maximize the relevance of any information being processed. … people >> hope that the assumption being processed is relevant (or else they would >> not bother to process it at all), and they try to select a context which >> will justify that hope: a context which will maximize relevance. In verbal >> comprehension in particular, it is relevance which is treated as given, and >> context which is treated as a variable. ]] >> >> >> >> This is another perspective on the process of ‘context construction’ >> described in Chapter 15 <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm#conster>. But >> *context* being holarchic, that process itself has a context. *Relevance* >> involves some relation to the known (or presupposed), but also some >> novelty; if i tell you what you already take for granted, that is not >> relevant. Relevance itself, then, is determined by context, i.e. by the >> ‘state of information’ (Peirce) in which the communication or ‘processing’ >> is situated – or in Peircean terms, in which the sign determines an >> interpretant. >> >> >> >> Peirce in a 1906 text identified three kinds of interpretant: >> >> [[ In all cases, it includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a >> sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than >> mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something >> besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought.” I term >> these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional,” the “energetic,” and the >> “logical” interpretants. ]] —EP2:409 >> >> >> >> Naturally it is the ‘logical interpretant, the conveyed thought’ >> (EP2:410) which is most crucial for a sign involved in a process of dialog >> or inquiry; and ‘the essence of the logical interpretant’ (EP2:412) is the >> *habit* which is established or modified by that semiosic process. Not >> all signs can have a *logical interpretant*, and even a sign which >> *would* have one if the semiotic process were completed may not produce >> it in an actual semiotic process, depending on the timing: >> >> >> >> [[ It is not to be supposed that upon every presentation of a sign >> capable of producing a logical interpretant, such interpretant is actually >> produced. The occasion may either be too early or too late. If it is too >> early, the semiosis will not be carried so far, the other interpretants >> sufficing for the rude functions for which the sign is used. On the other >> hand, the occasion will come too late if the interpreter be already >> familiar with the logical interpretant, since then it will be recalled to >> his mind by a process which affords no hint of how it was originally >> produced. Moreover, the great majority of instances in which formations of >> logical interpretants do take place are very unsuitable to serve as >> illustrations of the process, because in them the essentials of this >> semiosis are buried in masses of accidental and hardly relevant semioses >> that are mixed with the former. ]] — EP2:414 >> >> >> >> What makes a semiosis ‘relevant’ or essential (rather than accidental) to >> the formation of a logical interpretant? To deal with this question, Peirce >> constructs a scenario of an inquiry process and conducts a >> thought-experiment to investigate how it works. >> >> >> >> [[ The best way that I have been able to hit upon for simplifying the >> illustrative example which is to serve as our matter upon which to >> experiment and observe is to suppose a man already skillful in handling a >> given sign (that has a logical interpretant) to begin now before our inner >> gaze for the first time, seriously to inquire what that interpretant is. It >> will be necessary to amplify this hypothesis by a specification of what his >> *interest* in the question is supposed to be.… unless our hypothesis be >> rendered specific as to that interest, it will be impossible to trace out >> its logical consequences, since the way the interpreter will conduct the >> inquiry will greatly depend upon the nature of his interest in it. ]] — >> EP2:414 >> >> >> >> The inquirer’s ‘interest’ is part of the *context* of the inquiry – not >> the ‘context which is treated as a variable’ according to Sperber and >> Wilson, but the situational context which determines what is essential and >> what is irrelevant in the text. >> >> >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> } You are unique, just like everyone else. { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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