Clark,
There is a deep problem involved with attepts to give any just
epistemological explanations of CSP's views on doubt. He states, for
example, that you should not pretend to doubt anythinf you do not doubt
in your heart. (This is, of course,pointed against Descartes.) - But
'heart' here does not act here as a MERE figure of speech.
The more poignant issue here is, that the very division ontology -
epistemology is a modern invention, establised as a dichotomy, and used
as a dichotomy.
If matter is viewed as effeminate mind, no such dichotomy applies (but
to a limited degree).
I agree in that CSP took up 'epistemological' issues in Neglegted
Argument.
But to my view a soul should not be viewed as an individual entity, it
its essence. - If a person is (essentially) a bundle of habits
(according to CSP), then these habits do not die, not at least
altogether and suddenly, when somobodys bodilily functions, like
heartbeat, cease.
Being has to do with consistent effects, individual existence is a
different issue.
Best, Kirsti
Clark Goble kirjoitti 28.6.2016 22:46:
The Being thread didn’t really go as far as I expected, although I
know many people are out of town right now. (And I will be next week)
I thought I’d raise a different topic.
At various times people have been discussing Peirce and religion.
I’ll confess I’ve not followed such exchanges closely. My interest
in the Neglected Argument tends to be towards how it illuminates
abduction rather than God.
It’s always struck me that while Peirce considers himself Christian
his beliefs are much closer to an odd mix of Buddhism and deism. An
example of this is the writing on miracles and in particular
immortality. Say for example CP 6.553:
Besides, scientific studies have taught us that human testimony,
when not hedged about with elaborate checks, is a weak kind of
evidence. In short, the utter unlikeness of an immortal soul to
anything we cannot doubt, and the slightness of all the old
arguments of its existence, appear to me to have tremendous weight.
The question I’d ask is less about Peirce’s religious beliefs
than his more epistemological stances. Let’s say he has a recurring
encounter with a ghost (or pick any other entity we don’t have
compelling scientific evidence for like aliens to avoid the religious
connotations). At what point does he think that it’s true there is a
ghost present?
My sense is that Peirce’s epistemology more or less boils down to we
have to believe what we can’t doubt. While in various places he does
distinguish this from epistemology proper, it seems that what can’t
be doubted after sufficient inquiry is justified belief. So Peirce
writes for instance,
Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must regard as
infallible, absolute truth. (“What Pragmatism Is” CP 5.416)
The argument against this as epistemology is that we can draw a
fairly clear distinction between being unable to doubt and being
justified in ones beliefs. That is Peirce’s focus is the state of
our mind with doubt. But justification in epistemology is much more
about ethics and whether one _should_ doubt. The old ought vs is
distinction would seem to apply here.
One solution is that the ethics is not tied to some static conception
of justification but having done ones duty in terms of inquiry. The
other, more common, view is to apply to Peirce an externalist
epistemology. (Maybe not the same as Alston’s or Plantinga’s but
in the same general area) One sort of externalism is to tie
epistemology not to the individual but to the community (as Peirce
does in his Critical Common Sensism)
The problem with more traditional epistemology of the “justified
true belief” sort is that elements of justification could only be
such if the knower knew them. But to know them entails some connection
with doubt. Once we make that move it seems justification doesn’t
add anything not already encompassed by conditions of doubt. That is
we get an context-sensitive epistemology where the context sensitivity
is to knowledge of the very conditions of knowledge.
My sense is that that which we don’t doubt is to be considered
epistemologically justified but not infallible. This from Peirce’s
famous statement “It is possible that two plus two is not equal to
four, but we do not doubt it for a moment. Mathematical reasoning is
beyond all doubt, but fallible." (CP 2.197) Of course this is
uncontroversial in epistemology where conditions of justification
typically don’t guarantee truth in non-foundationalist
epistemologies. (Which these days is nearly all epistemology)
This takes me back to the immortality statement. Peirce might be
having it both ways there. It’s one thing to acknowledge human
witnesses are untrustworthy. But of course the individual themselves
typically can’t doubt their own testimony which is their beliefs.
How is this to be reconciled?
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