Hi Gary, list:
I suppose you could think of that potential population as *movement of the community* where: *“Negative to negative is not change…* *change from the negative into the positive… is generation…* *change from positive to negative is destruction…* *only the change from positive into positive is movement.”* Thus, the potential population at the end of inquiry will be those who have developed the correct understanding of Peirce; who hold a method to maintaining the opinion fated to be agreed upon, the truth. Yet, here we are, always arguing. So, who holds truth and how can we communicate a method that justifies it? For, it seems, we will not even listen to the best of us when it goes against what we wish to speak upon based on our current worldview. For instance: By abduction or retroduction he meant an "inferential step" which is "the first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it, whether as a simple interrogation or with any degree of confidence" (CP 6.525). Thus abduction consists in "studying facts and devising a theory to explain them" (CP 5.145). *The general form of this "operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis" is this*: (6) The surprising fact C is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189). *This schema shows how a hypothesis can be "abductively conjectured" if it accounts "for the facts or some of them"*. It is more general than the inference (4), since here A might be a general theory or it might include both a "Rule" and a "Case". Moreover, the conclusion is not A itself, but the assertion that "there is reason to suspect that A is true". ~ DEFENDING ABDUCTION, Ilkka Niiniluoto ________ It appears, even if this is the *only form presented in schematic form*, where a schema by definition is: 1) a representation of a plan or theory in the form of an outline or model, 2) a syllogistic figure, 3) a conception of what is common to all members of a class; a general or essential type or form. 4) describes a pattern of thought or behavior that organizes categories of information and the relationships among them; it doesn’t even matter that the *opponent cannot give their best version that defeats it* in a similar form. Nope, you can't even convince the community to agree to adopt a preamble because why proceed upon philosophical terms when no one can justify why we ought to? This illustrates why philosophers are so few; consistently, the minority. This is the problem of the vulgar and the philosopher. Vulgarity (*apeirokalia*) is lack of *experience* in things beautiful. _______ “STRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate them from the wise king. STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science? YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. STRANGER: *But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?* Best, Jerry Rhee On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Ben, Jon, list, > > The discussion today got me thinking again about Arnold Shepperson's work. > Shepperson who died prematurely and so was not able to fully develop let > alone complete his work, was perhaps South Africa's best known (he'd have > said, "only") Peirce scholar. In a special edition of the S.A. journal, > *Critical > Arts*, I wrote an article, "Cultural Pragmatism and the *Life of the > Sign,*" outlining an important principle of his approach to inquiry. > > In consideration of inquiry requiring the sampling of a population, > Shepperson argued that, for example, in his own field, JMC (journalism, > media, and communication studies) that inquiry employed hypotheses > involving not only denumerable and enumerable collections (see below), but > even more so, that it *ought *consider what Peirce termed "abnumerable > collections," that is collections of *potential populations, *changing > populations tending towards the future. Here's a short excerpt from my > article which focuses on this principle. > > > Shepperson argued strongly that the kind of sampling appropriate to most > JMC inquiry is a little understood variety *not* relying on statistical > probabilities. This alternative approach is necessary because “the persons, > collections and institutions that make up the social realm do not > constitute a collection that can be validly sampled statistically.” > > > In this model JMC inquiry is not essentially concerned with collections > whose members can be *presently counted* (e.g., a census), nor even those > which form a *partial ordering* (e.g., the generations of a given > society). Rather, he holds that, as JMC concerns itself with ever-changing > populations tending towards the future, it ought sample *potential* > populations, > what Peirce called *abnumerable collections* (as opposed to the > denumerable and enumerable collections just mentioned parenthetically > above). Shepperson noted that since the very subject matter of JMC studies, > the social realm, is itself an abnumerable collection, statistical sampling > could result in distortions, kinds of ‘freezing’ of the characters of what > are essentially ever-changing, perhaps evolving populations. > > > Furthermore, potential collections involve what Peirce refers to as > *would-bes*, or that which would occur if certain conditions were brought > about (for example, if all young people in a given society were provided > internet access) and this too relates to the ethics involved in JMC inquiry > and practice. This emphasis on potential populations does not deny that in > specific contexts and under certain conditions that statistical sampling > isn’t desirable in JMC research. But Shepperson’s argument strongly implies > that, when considering the social realm, it is not possible to “draw > necessary conclusions about the human future.” All researchers can do is to > “continually test our hypotheses against experience, correcting as we learn > from the errors that this experience reveals.” It was Shepperson’s hope > that JMC inquiry could develop exemplary methods and techniques for > sampling abnumerable collections so that its findings would tend “over the > long run to approximate to true assertions about social and human reality.” > > > Any thoughts on how the consideration of potential populations > (abnumerable collections) involving "would-be's" might inform inquiry into > those fields concerned with human behavior and institutions, such as > sociology, anthropology, etc? > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., list, >> >> I agree, a hypothesis may be uncertain yet still be helpful, although >> it's important for a contrite fallibilism in any science that the >> uncertainty, possible errors, etc., be examined and expressed. >> >> - Best, Ben >> >> On 10/1/2016 12:53 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> Ben, List, >> >> Thanks for this clarification. You wrote: Researchers need to be able to >> state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to keep >> communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry method >> that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't always >> say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" or >> "disfavored" or the like. >> >> I suppose the language of "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" seems sounder to >> me than "false;" but perhaps it amounts to the same thing. >> >> But aren't there some hypotheses which, while not fully borne out when >> tested, yet give information which is, for example, "statistically >> significant" in adding to the understanding of the question being inquired >> into such that that the direction of further inquiry may be informed by >> that, shall we say, incomplete (although not strictly 'false') result? >> This seems to me to happen, for example, in the social sciences (and other >> 'soft' sciences). >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 >> <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Gary R., list, >> >> "Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when >> applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by >> vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and >> methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference that can >> nevertheless turn out, upon testing, to conclude in a falsehood, e.g., the >> hypothesis of a detectable ether wind in the theoretical effort to save the >> Galilean transformations; the disconfirmation of the ether wind led >> eventually to the triumph of the Lorentz transformations, amid which the >> Galilean transformations survive as an approximation for things moving >> slowly in one's reference frame, and it led to the quantitative unification >> of time and space (with lightspeed as yardstick, e.g., years and >> light-years), which simply isn't there in the Galilean and >> (unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any case the hypothesis of an >> ether wind is quite dead, but it was critically and methodeutically >> justified as far as it went; it was plausible, distinctive predictions were >> deducible from it, and indeed its adoption bore fruit. Researchers need to >> be able to state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words >> to keep communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry >> method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't >> always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" >> or "disfavored" or the like. The majority of explanatory hypotheses, even >> the fruitful ones, turn out to be false; the surprising thing, as Peirce >> often pointed out, is that they aren't false much oftener. - Best, Ben >> >> On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> Ben, Jon, List, >> >> Ben, you commented: >> >> "An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the >> economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if >> it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful >> (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without >> scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a >> previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time >> and energy." >> >> I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 'falsehood' >> is the best expression to describe what happens in such a case. The >> abduction is 'good' if it is testable, even if the hypothesis is not, or >> not fully, borne out. As you suggested, information is sometimes gained >> from testing such hypotheses which, in the economy of research, is useful >> for further inquiry. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 >> <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
