Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,

John Sheriff, in *Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human
Significance*, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state
(which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard
metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in
that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in
Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of determination in any
specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then,
decidedly *not *the "nothing of negation," but rather "the germinal
nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed" (CP
6.217).

Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this in
a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
"parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer to
the Kemetic *Nun *in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; while it
should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics and may well
have been acquainted with this myth).

Jon wrote:

[M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of thought"
(CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the *possible *chalk marks and then
draws *some *of them on the blackboard, rather than the blackboard itself
as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow spontaneously appear; instead, the
blackboard represents *created *Thirdness.  However, I will tentatively
grant that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.


I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is "creat
*ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished from the
3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a word,
my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.

One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power,
alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the
infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or Time."
At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum, "which
means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of the
Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . .
distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its
original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's book, *Egyptian
Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge*, p 8, a popularization of her
grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great scholarly work in
Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as it ought to be in my
opinion).

I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in three
major ways" such that A*tum*, as *tum* in Nun, "projects" himself as Khepri
(that is, becoming, or potential). All the *neteru* ('powers' according to
S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods') will follow
from that priordial 'act'.

Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the ur-continuity
represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, in your view
that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of all three
Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would fly in the
face of Peirce own words:  "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable proper
name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452). How can one deny Peirce's own
words here?

Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for
one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A Unified
Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human Reason"),
Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this quote:"[T]he
problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the world is a
better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life came
about."(6.322)

Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim that
*everything* is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive use of
the categories throughout Peirce's *oevre *which does not pertain to
semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as you
mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic sciences,
viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this
classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned
explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much, much
else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which is not
semeiotic).

But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the
topic, *Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences*,
has a number of things to say about the categories in relation to the
classification. For example, after mentioning that one of his earliest
classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent comments: "Fearing
that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set it aside and developed
alternative schemes, only to find himself ineluctably led back. Even so, it
was some time before he conceded that the resulting divisions conformed to
his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the
same point.

Kent later remarks that regarding his final *Outline Classification of the
Sciences* (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his subsequent works
in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" as late as 1911),
that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are 'trichotomic' " (Kent,
121) in the sense of involving the three categories (much as Jon outlined
them in a recent post).

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  When you say that *some *of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear
> and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion.
>
>
> Are you claiming here that *none* of Peirce's positions are perfectly
> clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that *all* of his positions
> are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for debate?  Is there *anything
> *that you would confidently assert to be Peirce's position, without
> qualifying it as merely your interpretation or opinion?
>
> ET:   I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as
> 'creator of the three universes.
>
>
> My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as *Ens necessarium* is Really
> creator of all three Universes of Experience.  Peirce wrote, in CP 6.452,
> "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable proper name, signifying *Ens
> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
> Experience."  What is the basis for your disagreement with me about
> Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see between
> my statement of it and his own?
>
> ET:  I completely disagree with you on the above.
>
>
> My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, and
> thus must be in the universe of representations.  Peirce wrote, in CP
> 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of
> fact," which means that it can only be "in the universe of
> *representations*."  What is the basis for your disagreement with me
> about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see
> between my statement of it and his own?
>
> ET:  A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a 'quality'
> in itself.
>
>
> Are you saying that *all *qualities are *also *qualisigns--i.e., tthat
> here is no distinction between the two?  If so, do you believe that this
> was Peirce's view, as well?  If so, based on what specific passages in his
> writings?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> 1) Jon - When you say that *some* of Peirce's positions are perfectly
>> clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. I happen
>> to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as 'creator of the
>> three universes. You have your opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect
>> for you to declare that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.
>>
>> 2) Now - when you write:
>> "My example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon
>> and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at
>> least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third
>> Universe."
>>
>> I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a rhematic
>> iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and *is a sign*.
>> And does NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no such thing as a
>> single relation i.e.,the Representamen-Object,  existing on its own. The
>> triad of all three relations *is irreducible*. O-R; R-R; R-I.  None of
>> these exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a quality, a
>> feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'.
>>
>> A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something operating
>> outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a 'quality' in itself.
>> The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That between
>> the Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen in itself; that
>> between the Representamen and the Interpretant. The Representamen acts as
>> mediation - and *can be in a mode of Firstness.  *An Interpretant is not
>> an Object but is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to
>> the stimuli of the Object.
>>
>> And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have their
>> Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes the genuine
>> sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
>> And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS.  They have no Thirdness in them at
>> all.
>> See 2.227 and on.
>>
>> Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily require
>> Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes 2.227..] and ..there
>> is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed anything, functioning outside of
>> the semiosic triad.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET:  We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have the
>> right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
>>
>>
>> Those are your words, not mine; I have *never *claimed to be "one with
>> Peirce."  What I *have *claimed is that *some *of Peirce's positions are
>> perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to agree
>> with him or not.  That he believed in the Reality of God as *Ens
>> necessarium*, Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of
>> those--and I *do *happen to agree with him about that.  At the same
>> time, this is not to say that his entire "view of Mind and creation" was
>> identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not.
>>
>> ET:  I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my
>> comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
>>
>>
>> On this, we are in complete agreement.
>>
>> ET:  I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
>> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
>> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
>> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
>>
>>
>> Again, this conflates the *mode *of a sign with the Universe of
>> Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all
>> mathematical reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas.  My
>> example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon and
>> rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at least,
>> according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
>>
>> ET:  I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness -
>> has any 'active power to establish connections between different objects'
>> and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
>> 'Thirdness'.
>>
>>
>> If something does not have "active power to establish connections between
>> different objects," then it is not a *sign *at all--in this case, it is
>> merely a *quality*, rather than a *qualisign*.  The very definition of
>> what it means to *be *a sign is that it is able to connect different
>> objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
>>
>> ET:  With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds
>> of 'genuine triads'.
>>
>>
>> Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine cannot
>> be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all three
>> kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of *representations*."
>>  Again, this is not about the *mode *of the sign, which can be in any of
>> the three categories, but about the *Universe of Experience *where it
>> belongs.  Peirce then adds, "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a
>> genuine triad.  For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind,
>> outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting
>> thought.  Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general,
>> nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living."  Here we see that
>> *all* representation--i.e., all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily
>> involves a genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe precisely 
>> *because
>> *it mediates between an object and interpretant.  We also see that
>> "thought is general" and "thought is living," which is another way of
>> saying that thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought is
>> in *signs*.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong inthis,
>>> then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of Peirce - and
>>> thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way and I don't think
>>> that you have the right to self-define yourself as someone who
>>> is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to read Peirce - and -
>>> your and my comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we
>>> interpret him.
>>>
>>> For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm not
>>> sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the
>>> physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and
>>> don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'.
>>>
>>> I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
>>> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
>>> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
>>> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
>>>
>>>  So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three categories.
>>> The quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a
>>> mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
>>> Experience, as something "*whose being consists in active power to
>>> establish connections between different objects"* (CP 6.455). .....I
>>> consider that this *quote **refers to Thirdness*. And therefore - I
>>> don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any
>>> 'active power to establish connections between different objects' and
>>> therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
>>> 'Thirdness'.
>>>
>>> With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of
>>> 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in* A* quality
>>> and in* A* fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of
>>> Firstness; it is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a 
>>> *thoroughly
>>> genuine triad*' which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or
>>> Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane
>>> - but it is not the same as a *thoroughly genuine triad* which involves
>>> generality or Thirdness. So,  again, a triad in a mode of Firstness does
>>> not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the Third universe'; there is *no
>>> generality*. Firstness has no capacity to 'make connections', to
>>> mediate, to connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its isolate
>>> vividness.
>>> So- we disagree in our readings.
>>>
>>> As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it
>>> remains your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation  -
>>> is quite different from yours.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than
>>> myself, those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his
>>> writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be
>>> HIS views, as expressed in those writings.  I do not subscribe to the
>>> approach that all interpretations are equally valid; while there can
>>> certainly be legitimate differences, there are also objectively
>>> *incorrect* readings, assuming (as Gary F. once put it) that Peirce
>>> said what he meant and meant what he said.  Of course, I am (very)
>>> fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some cases.  I even
>>> conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about these particular
>>> assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head."  The
>>> overall point remains--Peirce *did not* limit the categories to
>>> semeiosis, as you apparently do.  If you are right to do so, then not only
>>> am I wrong about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>
>>> There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the word
>>> "mode."  I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
>>> [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a *mode* of
>>> representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of
>>> Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience,
>>> as something "whose being consists in active power to establish connections
>>> between different objects" (CP 6.455).  In some contexts, the categories do
>>> correspond to modes, such as possible/actual/habitual; but not always.  In
>>> any case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP
>>> 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if
>>> genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a
>>> *thoroughly* genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and
>>> exists in the universe of *representations*."  So I am not the only one
>>> claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third Universe"--Peirce did, as
>>> well.  If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>
>>> Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce
>>> believed in the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium* and Creator of all
>>> three Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452.  If I am
>>> wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, you wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  "For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function within the O-R-I
>>>> triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his architectonic
>>>> arrangement of the sciences!"
>>>>
>>>> PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of
>>>> Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' *In my [Jon Alan
>>>> Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function
>>>> within the O-R-I triad...etc etc.*
>>>>
>>>> Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that
>>>> what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had the
>>>> direct or correct view of  Peirce.
>>>>
>>>> Now - to your points -
>>>>
>>>> 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a  pure or genuine triad
>>>> in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode
>>>> of representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of
>>>> some symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it
>>>> belongs primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you
>>>> mean to Thirdness]??
>>>>
>>>> Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be in
>>>> the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
>>>> regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote
>>>> at 1.515.
>>>>
>>>> However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of
>>>> Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
>>>> Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a
>>>> complex embedded function.
>>>>
>>>> 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the
>>>> categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences
>>>> etc has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read
>>>> Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any
>>>> way or in any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it
>>>> corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284
>>>>
>>>> Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as Firstness,
>>>> philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
>>>>
>>>> I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of
>>>> studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
>>>> 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?
>>>>
>>>> But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one
>>>> can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be
>>>> loosely applied  - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of 'feeling,
>>>> quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and
>>>> deduction does have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose
>>>> description for all three are, after all, aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].
>>>>
>>>> 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator.
>>>> "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have
>>>> come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash.
>>>> Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash.
>>>> Thought time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense
>>>> after the first, because resulting from it" 1.412.
>>>>
>>>> Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens
>>>> necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you
>>>> have provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god as
>>>> an agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is
>>>> accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing,
>>>> evolving, open force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from
>>>> matter- and therefore not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in
>>>> the Reality of God - 6.489 ....
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L
>>>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> ET:  Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations
>>>> between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; all
>>>> in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I relations
>>>> specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that is
>>>> what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper.  In other words, O-R-I is not
>>>> the *only kind* of triad, even though it is probably the *paradigmatic
>>>> example *of a triad.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all *genuine *triads
>>>> belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality or
>>>> the world of fact.  These are undoubtedly what he later called the three
>>>> Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute
>>>> Actuality, and representation to Signs.  However, this is not to say that
>>>> all signs are in the *mode *of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants.  Even a
>>>> qualisign, which must be iconic and rhematic in its relations to its object
>>>> and interpretant, and thus is classified entirely in the mode of Firstness,
>>>> belongs primarily to the third Universe--its "being consists in active
>>>> power to establish connections between different objects."  However,
>>>> specifically as a *quali*sign--a quality that is a sign--it also, in
>>>> some sense, belongs to the first Universe.  Likewise, a sinsign belongs to
>>>> both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as an existent.
>>>> I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how the R-O
>>>> and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from
>>>> others on it.
>>>>
>>>> ET:  As such the categories only function within the triad - the O-R-I
>>>> triad.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes to
>>>> this subject.  For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function
>>>> within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his
>>>> architectonic arrangement of the sciences!  For sciences of discovery,
>>>> mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as
>>>> Thirdness; for philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness,
>>>> normative sciences as Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for
>>>> normative sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic
>>>> (semeiotic) as Thirdness.  Within mathematics, the categories manifest as
>>>> monads, dyads, and triads; within phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
>>>> representation; within metaphysics, as possibility, actuality, and
>>>> necessity (habituality); within logic, as speculative grammar, critic, and
>>>> methodeutic.  We might quibble about these particular assignments of the
>>>> labels, which are just off the top of my head, but the point is that
>>>> restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly contrary to Peirce's
>>>> own approach.
>>>>
>>>> ET:  I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
>>>> Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
>>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
>>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes
>>>> or universes'.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical to
>>>> an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and cosmology in
>>>> particular, rather than semeiotic.  Even if "our universe [now] requires
>>>> both Firstness and Secondness," this does not *entail *that they were
>>>> also required "before" our actual universe came into being.  While you
>>>> "reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or
>>>> universes," Peirce quite explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I
>>>> honestly do not see how any *legitimate* reading of "A Neglected
>>>> Argument" can deny this.
>>>>
>>>> CSP:  The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the 
>>>> *definable
>>>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator
>>>> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the
>>>>> Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of
>>>>> one mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These
>>>>> are only three of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or
>>>>> degenerate modes is, in my view, to provide the capacity for evolution,
>>>>> adaptation and change. That is, Firstness linked to Secondness and
>>>>> Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign
>>>>> - introduces novelty to actuality to habit. That's quite something.
>>>>>
>>>>> My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon
>>>>> considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are
>>>>> modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing
>>>>> events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function
>>>>> within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
>>>>> Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
>>>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
>>>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes
>>>>> or universes'.  That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce
>>>>> also within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this same view
>>>>> within the writings of Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>
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