Peircers, I see that some earlier discussions along these lines have slid off the edge of the web into remoter memory. If I did not have a nagging sense that characteristic features of Peirce's thought still slip by us without due notice I might let them go, but the nagging sense persists, and so I will take some pains to recover it.
Here is the earliest notice I found, back in the days when we cross-posted at will across many interrelated discussions hither and yon on the web: http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virtual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html ¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤ 'A Simple Desultory Philippic' | In reference to the doctrine of individuals, two | distinctions should be borne in mind. The logical | atom, or term not capable of logical division, must | be one of which every predicate may be universally | affirmed or denied. For, let A be such a term. | Then, if it is neither true that all A is X nor | that no A is X, it must be true that some A is X | and some A is not X; and therefore A may be divided | into A that is X and A that is not X, which is contrary | to its nature as a logical atom. Such a term can be | realized neither in thought nor in sense. Not in sense, | because our organs of sense are special -- the eye, for | example, not immediately informing us of taste, so that | an image on the retina is indeterminate in respect to | sweetness and non-sweetness. When I see a thing, I do not | see that it is not sweet, nor do I see that it is sweet; | and therefore what I see is capable of logical division | into the sweet and the not sweet. It is customary to | assume that visual images are absolutely determinate | in respect to color, but even this may be doubted. | I know of no facts which prove that there is never | the least vagueness in the immediate sensation. | In thought, an absolutely determinate term cannot | be realized, because, not being given by sense, | such a concept would have to be formed by synthesis, | and there would be no end to the synthesis because | there is no limit to the number of possible predicates. | A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve | for its precise determination an endless process. We can | only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate, | may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be | made absolutely determinate. Such a term as "the second | Philip of Macedon" is still capable of logical division -- | into Philip drunk and Philip sober, for example; but | we call it individual because that which is denoted | by it is in only one place at one time. It is a term | not 'absolutely' indivisible, but indivisible as long | as we neglect differences of time and the differences | which accompany them. Such differences we habitually | disregard in the logical division of substances. | In the division of relations, etc., we do not, | of course, disregard these differences, but we | disregard some others. There is nothing to prevent | almost any sort of difference from being conventionally | neglected in some discourse, and if 'I' be a term which | in consequence of such neglect becomes indivisible in that | discourse, we have in that discourse, | | ['I'] = 1. | | [ Note. Previously in this text, Peirce writes (CP 3.65): | | | | | I propose to denote the number of a logical term by | | | enclosing the term in square brackets, thus, ['t']. | | | | The number of an absolute term, as in the case of 'I', | | is just the number of individuals that it denotes. | ] | | This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and | that which is one in number from a particular point of view | is shadowed forth in the two words 'individual' ('to atomon') | and 'singular' ('to kath ekaston'); but as those who have | used the word 'individual' have not been aware that absolute | individuality is merely ideal, it has come to be used in | a more general sense. (CP 3.93; CE 2, 389-390). | | Charles Sanders Peirce, | "Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of | Boole's Calculus of Logic", | 'Memoirs of the American Academy', Vol. 9, pp. 317-378, 26 January 1870; | 'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149); 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429). -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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