Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have
to be formed by a group. The concept that the  two people are using
is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people
discussing a common concept,  connects them to the wider community.

        Edwina
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 On Fri 31/03/17  4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
  Edwina, The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is
formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps
they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg.
two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically
makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place
in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their
two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower
community-sign it is part of? Best, Helmut     31. März 2017 um
22:04 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut - you asked: 

        Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one
may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs). 

        My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus,
cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that
an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an
intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will
be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic
Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant
could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual
existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a
general. 

        Edwina
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 On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:   
List, Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce
uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or
read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot
be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation
cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical,
only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze
or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine
tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and
includes emergences, I guess. "Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me,
I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but
"effete" I accept for correct of course.   Edwina, you wrote, that a
dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for
another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final
one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).   Best, Helmut      
31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
 Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 

        Edwina, Clark, List, 
        Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote
from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better
reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand
explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in
metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be
caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that
are beyond doubt. 
        --Jeff   
            Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354      
-------------------------
 From: Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
 To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term     

        Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 
        Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
    * 

        The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.    
        The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching
in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character
different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real
points and are an evolutionist”  
        I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See
Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few: 
        “Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe,
such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual
effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550]. 
        NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot
refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

        4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world”….But as there cannot be a General without
Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “

        Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests
being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not
represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean
that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human
thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the
study of human thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in the
non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and crystals
etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long -
and it's already long enough!  
        Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the
sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can
find the reference..] 
    * 

        The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this
original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding
of the term which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but
I  understand it as will, or desire to continuity of that material
existence without the awareness of this existence;  and the nature of
this existence is, as evolutionary, open in its expression. Therefore
it is not an iconic or indexical mode of articulation which would
reject diversity and spontaneity of new forms and complexity but
symbolic in that the articulation is free and open.   
    * 

        I understand  these ‘things’ as having, necessarily FORM. The
form, which sets up a differential boundary, sets matter up in a mode
of  Secondness, which is stabilized by the habits-of-formation of
Thirdness. 
        I won’t go into the many references to Secondness in Peirce’s
work -  since there are so many – but it is obvious that matter
within a mode of Secondness MUST have a differential FORM – or it
would be unable to carry out the key action of Secondness, which is
– to interact.   
    * 

        The method of this movement from pure Mind [pure energy] to
particular Matter – is by the triadic process of the Sign, which I
understand as irreducibly triadic.   
        “I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to
those of quality and reaction. It depends on two main premises. The
first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as
meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic
relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone”. 1.345

        Now – with regard to the above, my interpretation is that pure
Mind in that mode of Firstness or potentiality – transforming to
matter is an ‘act of meaning’. And, Peirce says that such a
method of so doing is triadic. It must involve three ‘nodes’  so
to speak: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant’. Then, I am aware
that many on this list understand the semiosic action as ‘the
sign/representamen’ in a relation with the Object and the
Interpretant. I reject this interpretation for two reasons. First –
the interaction   of the Representamen-Object can be and usually is,
in a different categorical mode than the relation with the
Interpretant. Second – if one does not acknowledge this capacity
for modal differences, it reduces the interaction to ‘dyadic
relations’.   
        Therefore, I follow the graph with three tails as outlined in 1.347.
This of course enables complex networking, where a Dynamic
Interpretant in one triad can function as the Dynamic Object in
another triad. 
        I feel that these basic axioms enable one to explore the
physico-chemical and biological realms as complex semiosic processes.
 
        Edwina 
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 On Thu 30/03/17 5:42 PM , CLARK GOBLE [email protected] sent:     On
Mar 30, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:   So- given the
make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in
philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the 
non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work.     I should note that
while my own interests are primarily philosophical, my background is
actual primarily physics not philosophy. I enjoy the
non-philosophical topics quite a bit although I often don’t know
enough about the topic to say much. I’ve brought up some of the
non-philosophical topics here before too such as the relationship of
category theory in advanced physics or mathematics as it relates to
Peirce. Not that I know much about category theory, but a few others
made comments I learned from.   So I am actually pretty interesting
in the applied semiotics. Indeed while my interests are primarily
philosophical I’ve read a reasonable amount on applies semiotics in
various arenas.   I seem to remember a discussion a few months ago on
political implications of Peirce’s thought. I focused primarily on
his more conservative tendencies in his critical common sensism but
also the focus on inquiry.   Anyway, please comment on the
non-philosophical points. Even if I don’t typically comment I
frequently read them.        ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L
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