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Jon, list - with regard to this section of what you wrote [I agree
with the rest of the TLS commentary]"This leads to my suggestion that
every Sign has an Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant that are
real possibilities internal to it, thus forming a triad; but a Sign
may or may not have a Dynamic Object and a Dynamic Interpretant that
are actualities external to it, as three correlates of a triadic
relation. Again, what do you think?"
I accept that every Sign [I presume you mean what I refer to as the
Representamen?] or do you mean the triad ?.... has an Immediate
Object, but I'm not sure that it must also have an Immediate
Interpretant. The semiosic process might for some odd reason simply
stop and never get to any 'consciousness' so to speak, or even
'feeling of'...
As to a Sign not having a Dynamic Object - I find that puzzling. How
could it even operate as a sign without that stimuli - even if the
stimuli was not 'now' but was 'in the past'?
Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 5:49 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Clark, List:
I tracked down the passage in Short's book that I was only dimly
remembering when we had this exchange a few days ago in the thread on
"Pragmatic Theory of Truth."
TLS: ‘[E]ach Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability’,
Peirce said. He did not mean that the interpretability is peculiar to
the sign (i.e., shared by no other sign), which would be false, but
that the sign (using the word opaquely) has only that one
interpretability. A different immediate interpretant would constitute
a different sign. It follows that something, X, having diverse
immediate interpretants,Ri1, Ri2, ... , is that many distinct signs,
S1, S2, ... That fits the way we ordinarily count signs. Suppose that
in nineteenth-century Arizona a rancher observes some puffs of smoke
on the horizon: they are a sign of fire; they are also a sign that
the Apaches are on the warpath. We count these as two signs, albeit
they are the same smoke ... Any dynamic interpretant of a given sign
must actualize that sign’s immediate interpretant, in one way or
another; otherwise, it would not be an interpretant of that sign.
And, yet, dynamic interpretants of the same sign will differ from one
another: ‘My Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in
each act of Interpretation and is different in each from that of any
other’. (pp. 188-189)
It turns out that Short "counts" different Signs based on different
Immediate Interpretants, but not based on different Dynamic
Interpretants. This makes sense, given that the Immediate
Interpretant is internal to the Sign, while the Dynamic Interpretant
is external to it; especially since each occurrence of the latter is
distinct, even for the same Sign. So I wonder--does this "counting"
principle also apply to Immediate (internal) vs. Dynamic (external)
Objects? Maybe so; in Short's example, the puffs of smoke would seem
to constitute the same Dynamic Object, but have different Immediate
Objects as a Sign of fire vs. a Sign of Apaches on the warpath.
This leads to my suggestion that every Sign has an Immediate Object
and Immediate Interpretant that are real possibilities internal to
it, thus forming a triad; but a Sign may or may not have a Dynamic
Object and a Dynamic Interpretant that are actualities external to
it, as three correlates of a triadic relation. Again, what do you
think?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 9:29 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:On Mar 28,
2017, at 6:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
CG: Don’t we here have to distinguish between the mark and the
sign?
I know what you mean, but I am not sure that "mark" is the right
word here, especially since Peirce used that term in some later
writings as a synonym for "qualisign." I just had in mind the
"thing" (also not the best word for it) that acts as a sign. Yeah,
the terminology can get tricky. Especially since it’s signs all the
way down.CG: Two signs can’t be the same sign unless they also have
the same interpretant and object, can they?
I seem to recall that T. L. Short took this position in Peirce's
Theory of Signs, but consistent with that book's reputation overall,
I do not know whether it truly reflects Peirce's view or just his
own. Besides, given that semeiosis is continuous, is it even
legitimate to "count" signs as distinct individuals at all?I don’t
think it’s just Short’s. I’m not sure how else to conceive of
equating signs. In some sense we must be able to do so. CG: Does
the icon have its character really or merely as interpreted? That’s
the very question that divides nominalism from realism.
Yes, and I think that the icon really has its character regardless;
but the question is whether merely having that character makes it an
icon, apart from anyone or anything interpreting it as such. Again,
is it sufficient for something to have only an Immediate
Interpretant--"its peculiar interpretability"--in order to "qualify"
as a sign, or is that "status" only achieved once it has a Dynamic
Interpretant?
Hopefully my later post clarified that a bit. I confess I’m
reaching for proper language because most terms are ambiguous about
the distinction I’m trying to raise. Realism vs. nominalism is
probably the best way to think of it I’ve decided.
Links:
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[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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