Gary F, Jon, John S, List, I've limited time today as the USA Memorial Day 3 day holiday has me somewhat behind schedule. But to help keep the ball rolling (as I hope it will), I'll just briefly comment on a few excerpts from your message today and your "Rhematics" blog post. As you know I think that post would be an excellent place to springboard into a conversation on its topic. As I began my comment on your blog:
GR: This succinct, yet also rich and complex analysis of the relationship of Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomy of rheme/dicisign/argument to Aristotle’s pioneering work, and in particular how “there is a kind of continuity with Aristotle’s usage of rhema for a ‘verb’ as distinguished from a ‘noun’ ” ought to be reflected on by anyone doing work in . . . semeiotics, And a major part of this "complexity" for me concerns the tricategoriality involved. So, again, I'd encourage list members to read that blog entry (which you've linked to in what I've quoted below). You concluded today by writing: GF: . . . logicians err in separating the copula from the predicate in their analysis of propositions – and the error seems to arise from a psycholinguistic prejudice which prevents them seeing the primacy of verbs over common nouns. You continued with a quotation from EP2:285 which ends: . . . almost every family of man thinks of general words as parts of verbs. This seems to refute the logicians' psychology. This made me think of a passage where Peirce illustrates this principle: Whenever I speak of a term I always mean a rhema. The difference is that a term is the equivalent of a common noun and cannot form the predicate of a proposition unless a verb is inserted, while a rhema contains a verb within itself. Thus, "butcher" is a term, "is a butcher" is a rhema, and so is "slaughters." In primitive languages there is strictly no such thing as a common noun. Old Egyptian and Arabic are instances. What proves this is that if in those languages one wishes to say "Smith is a butcher" and one feels the need of inserting something between "Smith" and "butcher," instead of feeling that a verb is needed, it will be a pronoun that will be inserted. . . . Since nothing is essential to a term except its containing at least one blank, it is plain that this blank form may contain demonstrative pronouns or proper names, that is, indicative words.Thus, in Arabic one will say "Smith he butcher." No verb is ever introduced unless a definite meaning is attached to it, as in "Became Smith butcher" or "Remains Smith butcher" or "Continues Smith butcher" and in Egyptian the word pu, which is often translated "is," is unquestionably a relative or originally a demonstrative pronoun [note: elsewhere Peirce offers "which" as the Ancient Egyptian pronoun GR]. Indeed even in Greek a verb is not necessary in a sentence, and though Aristotle sometimes makes the verb a separate part of the proposition in accordance with one mode of expression in the Greek language, he does not usually do so; so that what modern and medieval logicians called the copula of a proposition never received a name until the time of Abelard. You concluded your message by commenting on the proposition in light of this principle: GF: This explains why Peirce analyzes the proposition into subject and predicate, rather than following the traditional three-term analysis into subject, predicate *and copula*. Peirce’s logic has here come a long way from Aristotle's distinction between *onoma* and *rhema* (see http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/), but in my view the developmental path has been continuous in all its twists and turns. Or, as you put it in the conclusion of your blog post: GF: Through all these conceptual and terminological changes, there is a kind of continuity with Aristotle’s usage of *rhema* for a “verb” as distinguished from a “noun” (*onoma*). Peirce uses *rheme* for a predicate as opposed to a subject of a proposition. Both predicates and subjects can be called “terms,” but in Existential Graphs that represent propositions, rhemes are primarily signs of qualitative possibility or Firstness while the latter are primarily signs of actual existence or Secondness. *The joining or copulation of predicate and subject is the key to the act of meaning performed by the proposition, just as the joining of icon and index is key to the **informing power of a symbol* <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#symcity>*, its genuine Thirdness* [emphasis added by GR]. I find the comparison in your final sentence of considerable interest, and hope we can discuss it in this thread. I wish I had time today to write more, but vitally important tasks need to be taken up now. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 9:03 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, I trust you are eventually going to say something relevant to the > content of my “Rhematics” post, but in the meantime, here’s the follow-up I > promised, which specifically relates developments in Peirce’s logic to his > categories and his Existential Graphs. > > > > Peirce was critical of logicians who, like Aristotle, tried to derive > logical principles from what were really characteristics of language. He > was also critical of “psychologism” or the attempt to draw logical > principles from the study of how *human* minds work. But that doesn't > mean he had nothing to say about psychology or linguistics; it's just that > his remarks about them usually occur in a logical (sometimes > phenomenological) context. > > > > Linguistics, in its analysis of the “parts of speech,” makes a basic > distinction between nouns and verbs, which is often taken as equivalent to > the distinction between subject and predicate in logic. Peirce on the other > hand distinguished between proper nouns (names of individuals) and common > nouns (general nouns), and he grouped common nouns with verbs and other > “words which signify.” For instance, CP 4.157 (c. 1897): > > [[ The mind, by its instinctive adaptation to the Outer World, represents > things as being in space, which is its intuitive representation of the > clustering of reactions. What we call a Thing is a cluster or habit of > reactions, or, to use a more familiar phrase, is a centre of forces. In > consequence, of this double mode of association of ideas, when man comes to > form a language, he makes words of two classes, words which denominate > things, which things he identifies by the clustering of their reactions, > and such words are proper names, and words which signify, or mean, > qualities, which are composite photographs of ideas of feelings, and such > words are verbs or portions of verbs, such as are adjectives, common nouns, > etc.]] > > > > In one of his drafts for the Cambridge lectures of 1898, Peirce applied > this distinction to his early terminology for Existential Graphs. NEM4:338 > (R439): > > [[Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity attached > to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I call a verb. > The places at which lines of identity can be attached to the verb I call > its blank subjects. I distinguish verbs according to the numbers of their > subject blanks, as medads, monads, dyads, triads, etc.]] > > > > At this point, the lines of identity are themselves verbs, but their > *ends* are proper nouns or demonstrative pronouns. Together with the > juxtapositions and the “ovals” which later became “cuts,” this gives us > three kinds of sign corresponding to Peirce's three categories. NEM4:339 > (R439): > > [[In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very > different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. Among > these is the line signifying identity. But, second the ends of the line of > identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having such loose ends) > are signs of a totally different kind. They are demonstrative pronouns, > indicating existing objects, not necessarily material things, for they may > be events, or even qualities, but still objects, merely designated as this > or that. In the third place the writing of verbs side by side, and the > ovals enclosing graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last > is continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great difficulties > of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different kind of sign. Signs > of the first kind represent objects in their firstness, and give the > significations of the terms. Signs of the second kind represent objects as > existing,—and therefore as reacting,—and also in their reactions. They > contribute the assertive character to the graph. Signs of the third kind > represent objects as representative, that is in their thirdness, and upon > them turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was > considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct the > system of graphs.]] > > > > This, i would submit, represents an early stage in the evolution of the > trichotomy *rheme/dicisign/argument*. If so, it shows the continuity > between Aristotle's *rhema*, or verb, and Peirce's *rheme* (or predicate) > as represented in Existential Graphs. > > > > Another observation Peirce made later about linguistics reiterates the > idea that common or general nouns are more like verbs than they are like > proper nouns or pronouns. This is an important point for Peirce because it > shows that logicians err in separating the copula from the predicate in > their analysis of propositions – and the error seems to arise from a > psycholinguistic prejudice which prevents them seeing the primacy of verbs > over common nouns. EP2:285: > > [[It happens to be true that in the overwhelming majority of languages > there are no general class names and adjectives that are not conceived as > parts of some verb (even when there really is no such verb) and > consequently nothing like a copula is required in forming sentences in such > languages. The author (though with no pretension to being a linguist), has > fumbled the grammars of many languages in the search for a language > constructed at all in the way in which the logicians go out of their way to > teach that all men think (for even if they do so, that has really nothing > to do with logic). The only such tongue that he has succeeded in finding is > the Basque, which seems to have but two or three verbs, all the other > principal words being conceived as nouns. Every language must have proper > names; and there is no verb wrapped up in a proper name. Therefore, there > would seem to be a direct suggestion there of a true common noun or > adjective. But, notwithstanding that suggestion, almost every family of man > thinks of general words as parts of verbs. This seems to refute the > logicians' psychology.]] > > > > This explains why Peirce analyzes the proposition into subject and > predicate, rather than following the traditional three-term analysis into > subject, predicate *and copula*. Peirce’s logic has here come a long way > from Aristotle's distinction between *onoma* and *rhema* (see > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/), but in my view the > developmental path has been continuous in all its twists and turns. > > > > Gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 29-May-17 17:00 > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com > > > > Gary, List ... > > > > Re: http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/ > > > > I hope to comment more fully, eventually, but the uses to which Susan > Awbrey and I turned Aristotle's passage from De Interp can be found in our > paper from 1992/1995: > > > > * Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action > : The Risk of Inquiry”, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the > Disciplines'' > > 15(1), pp. 40–52. … > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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