04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
Helmut,
You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
and
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
which
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
at
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
those
issues.
Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
CSP
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
the
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
three
logically necessary approaches.
I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
I
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
Best, Kirsti
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
> Kirsti, List,
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
and
> hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
> understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
> eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
"NAND",
> but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
> where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
> composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
> composition is just a matter different from classification.
Therefore
> a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
> matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
> triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
to
> say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
> them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
not
> possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
topics
> (make them one topic) to understand both.
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
CSP
> just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in
Peircean
> philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
> classifications.
> This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
> only,
> or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce
definitely
> left this road.
>
> By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
> they
> are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
> research
> relying on Peircean Categories.
>
> It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
> Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
> the
> reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
> issue
> was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on
the
> issues involved.
>
> To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
> misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
> traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
>
> Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces"
only
> work in the context of his work as a whole.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> > List,
> > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
> is
> > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I
think,
> is
> > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with
composition.
> Is
> > that so? It is my impression.
> > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him?
So
> > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
> transcendental
> > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> > wrote:
> > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
> > question
> > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
> of
> > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
> into
> > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
> >
> > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
> > 2000's.
> > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
> > refer
> > to the list archives.
> >
> > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read
Karl-Otto
> > Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> > published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
> >
> > What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting,
is
> > that
> > his starting points were different from those most often refered
> and
> > discussed here in the list.
> >
> > Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was
thoroughly
> > familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
> > developed
> > his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
> >
> > In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on
> hermeneutics.
> > Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
> > only
> > analytical philosophy.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Kirsti
> >
> > CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
> > >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond
> > <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and
> expansion
> > >> of this classification recently discussed here was an
important
> > part
> > >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even
his
> > >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
> > >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important
structural
> > >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
> > >
> > > Well I think we're saying the same thing the question is more
the
> > > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just
> curiosity
> > of
> > > structure in general. That's a more subtle point I don't have
> > > strong positions on although I'm sympathetic to what I took
> Kirsti
> > > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime
> > driver.
> > > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry
> was.
> > >
> > > I'd love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being
the
> > > driver.
> > >
> > > My own beliefs here (which I'm more than happy to change with
> > > further information) come largely from the same paper you
quoted
> > > earlier "Pragmatism" from 1907 (MS318) In particular the
> different
> > > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a
strong
> > focus
> > > on meaning.
> > >
> > >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
> > >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
> > >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of
> hard
> > >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever
> stripe
> > >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior
and
> > >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is
> > quite
> > >> another affair.
> > > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
> > >
> > > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
> > > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking
> about
> > > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by
> > asking
> > > how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns
for
> > that
> > > to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is
> ultimately
> > > conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
> > > pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always
> > keeps
> > > that topic of meaning in sight. It's true that by the middle of
> the
> > > paper he's shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
> > > signification. But that's merely because it's a more precise
way
> > > of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
> > > discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign
> > can't
> > > be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the
> > meaning
> > > of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms
of
> > > "would be" as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.
> > >
> > > He finally closes by going through the various types of
> pragmatism
> > > contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of
> > meaning
> > > using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the
> whole
> > > point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the
> differences
> > > between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and
> > others.
> > >
> > > Again, I'm fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far
> > > better versed in the nuances of Peirce's development than I.
But
> it
> > > really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others
> over
> > > meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the
> structure
> > of
> > > the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades.
> > >
> > >>
> > >
> > >>> SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision
> > about
> > >>> what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt
to
> > >>> use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to
> now?
> > >>> Maybe it is both. . .
> > >>
> > >> This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times
by
> > >> Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at
times
> > >> emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought,
> > while
> > >> others at times emphasize using his ideas to further
> contemporary
> > >> thought. But this appears to be mainly a matter of _emphasis_,
> and
> > >> it seems to me that some of the strongest contributors to this
> > forum
> > >> see it as a both (that is certainly my position).
> > >
> > > If the list is only for understanding the history or exegesis
of
> > > Peirce's own writings then it's far too limited to be of that
> much
> > > interest I must confess. It's in application that Peirce's
> thought
> > > has most value. Whether that be in philosophy (my own interest)
> or
> > > chemistry or related fields as others have focused on. But if
> it's
> > > merely dry history of philosophy with no interest in relevancy
> then
> > > the list will surely die quickly.
> > >
> > >> I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's
> work
> > on
> > >> meaning has been more influential than his work in semiotics,
> > >> especially in recent decades. While it is true that James and
> > Dewey
> > >> didn't fully (really, not all that mujch) embrace Peirce's
work
> on
> > >> signs. But this field of modern semeiotics which Peirce had
> pretty
> > >> much invented (although drawing from Classical, Medieval, and
> > other
> > >> sources) was, naturally, both entirely new to them and quite
> > >> difficult to fully grasp (as it is even in our day, although I
> see
> > >> some considerable progress in this regard). As I see it,
neither
> > >> James nor Dewey had studied enough of the developments in the
> > logic
> > >> of Peirce's time to fully (much) understand his semiotic (this
> was
> > >> especially so for James, while Peirce did not think very much
of
> > >> Dewey's work in logic).
> > >
> > > Sorry, I should have clarified that I meant within philosophy
> > proper.
> > > In terms of semiotics you are of course correct. Within
> philosophy
> > > though the import of Peirce's logic and semiotics have not yet
> been
> > > appreciated I fear. My personal opinion is that had people like
> > Dewey
> > > (or later Rorty and Putnam) applied the logic more a lot of
> > > philosophical dead ends would have been avoided. (Indeed I
think
> > most
> > > of Quine's major works largely end up positions Peirce already
> held
> > > due to his logic)
> > >
> > >> Again, while I agree with the important of, not only the
> pragmatic
> > >> maxim, but all of his work in pragmaticism, your notion that
> "the
> > >> place of meaningfulness . . . in some ways exceeds his work on
> > >> signs" is your opinion, while many would disagree. I haven't
> time
> > to
> > >> discuss this at the moment except to say that I am of that
camp
> > >> which would _strongly_ disagree.
> > >
> > > Well again I'm limiting myself to philosophy and again noting
> that
> > > in saying how importance meaning is that doesn't mean his logic
> is
> > > unimportant. Just not as important.
> > >
> > > I still have to address your earlier points which are well made
> and
> > > need engaged with. Hopefully later this week. I hope that I
> > clarified
> > > that I'm speaking more of philosophy rather than applied
> semiotics.
> > >
> > >>
> >
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