John, List. (I preface my remarks with several quotes from earlier posts in an attempt to establish the context of my post and John’s response, which I do not understand. It is a bit confusing, but I think this is a critically important issue with respect to the scientific foundations of semiotics. That is, are all signs emanations?)
> On Aug 5, 2017, at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a > triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I > think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe > wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he > wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and > subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am > interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in > CSP´s theory of signs. > > Best, > Helmut 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi <mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: Helmut, Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense (meaning) it is used nowadays. I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in more detail. I wrote Jerry LR Chandler CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc Armando, List: Consider the meaning of the chromaticity (spectra) of 1,2,3… A, B, C,… H, He, Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F, Ne,… A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, B, C,… (musical scales) nad A, nad B, and nad C, etc, (genetic symbols with closure over a set of genetic symbols that represent the potential of inheritance of the genome) Each of these five symbol systems is an accepted social symbol system that is used publicly in everyday communication and by different academic tribes. The factual meaning of the latter three symbol systems are established by factual (reproducible) observations from objects. Now, consider the CP 2.230 (1910) in relation to the systems of modern thought. [[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense—for the word “fast,” which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means “rapidly” and quite another when it means “immovable,” and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must “represent,” as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical “property” the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence “Cain killed Abel,” which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having “a killing” as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how—upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the “species” of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the “ratio,” or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 (1910) ] How can we find a meaningful interpretation of this CSP text today? My questions: How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s late 19th / early 20 th Century rhetoric? How can we think of a symbol as "as embodying the “ratio,” or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it.” WHAT IS THE SYSTEM that generates the sign the “emanated from it”? (In my published works, Perplexity lies in the origin of the emanation from an integer number (index) with finite chromaticity.) Is Tarski’s approach to the formal logics of metalanguages essential to give coherence to communication with the broad array of modern synthetic symbol systems? Cheers Jerry John wrote: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc On 8/7/2017 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s late 19th / early > 20 th Century rhetoric? Very directly. Peirce had provided the logical foundation for describing all of them. John: Some of the copies of posts that motivated this thread are given above. Please note that the hisotrical roots of the thread are grounded in the relationships between Helmut’s desire to interpret Stan’s work. My response to Armando focused on the specificity on the chromaticity (chromatin?) of synthetic symbol systems. More specifically, I was and am concerned about the meaning of a symbol as: "as embodying the “ratio,” or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it.” Further, does this mean that CSP logic of signs is grounded on the necessity of an object as the origin of every symbol? I do not understand your response, John. I do not understand how it is relevant to the context of the thread. Can you clarify your meaning? Perhaps with specific CSP texts that relate: quali-sign, Sin-sign, legi-sign icon, index, symbol, rhema, dicisign and argument to either general systems theory, mathematical systems theory or Tarski’s conceptual foundation of symbolic logics? Cheers Jerry
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