All through this, it seems to me that no form of logic can be tied to one
or two or three. If all thought is signs getting into specifying where they
are is impossible since they are everywhere.I see Peirce as an ethicist and
aesthetician who never got to the logical conclusion of how the
pragmaticist maxim would play out in the world. But he knew that he was
onto something and that it is not what Aristotle had in mind exactly.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Sun, Sep 3, 2017 at 10:30 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.aau.dk>
wrote:
> Dear All -
>
>
>
> To the question of category-classification of inference types:
>
> In Peirce's mature years, after 1900, he vacillated between two solutions,
> both having Abduction as First, but one version taking Induction as Second
> and Deduction as Third; the other vice versa.
>
> The 1-Ab, 2-De, 3-In version, however, seems to have become the most
> elaborated in the sense that here, Peirce developed proposals for the
> relevant 1-2-3 subdivisions: Corollarial vs. Theorematic for Deduction; and
> Crude vs. Qualitative vs. Quantitative for Induction.
>
> The Ab-De-In also follows his preferred epistemological sequence: Ab
> proposes a new hypothesis; De infers some of the ideal consequences of that
> hypotheses; In verifies or falsifies some empirical support of those
> consequences.
>
> I am not certain, however, whether the epistemological sequence is really
> an argument relevant for the category issue. Maybe they are independent
> issues so that the sequence may be maintained even with the alternative
> 1-Ab, 2-In, 3-De classification.
>
>
>
> Best
>
> Frederik
>
>
>
> *From: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Reply-To: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Date: *Sunday 3 September 2017 at 15:26
> *To: *'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject: *RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>
>
>
> Helmut, you wrote
>
> “Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.”
>
> Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary
> reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity,
> it plays a role in Peirce’s system of existential graphs, which handle only
> deductive arguments, but doesn’t really enter into abduction.
>
>
>
> Most people would associate abduction with firstness and deduction with
> thirdness.
>
>
>
> As for “metaphysics,” you might use the index of EP2 to get a better sense
> of how Peirce uses the word, or just search the CP.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> } The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
> convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall
> be done. [G. Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
> *Sent:* 2-Sep-17 18:54
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>
>
>
> Dear List Members,
>
>
>
> did Peirce assign the three kinds of inference to the categories? when I
> think about them, I come to the conclusion, that deduction is firstness,
> induction secondness, and abduction thirdness:
>
>
>
> First the classical way of assignment: Firstness has one mode, secondness
> two, and thirdness three:
>
> The modes of inferences are possible outcomes, I think, as inferences are
> about trying to find something out.
>
>
>
> Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.
>
>
>
> Less sure argument in square brackets:
>
>
>
> [The other way of assignment is by me: Firstness is situated between past
> and present, secondness between present and future, thirdness between past
> and future:
>
>
>
> Deduction has premises from the past, and the conclusion is sure knowledge
> now.
>
> Induction: The observation is completed now (status quo in the present),
> the conclusion is anticipation (future).
>
> Abduction: Something has been somehow (past), similarity is anticipated
> (future).]
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
>
>
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