It's Keats who got it right. Beauty is truth, truth beauty. Now imperfectly then perfectly. It is the only bnary that is ultimately collapsed. Peirce saw that the end of consideration is the aesthetic which means he understood that the ethical cannot be the final word. Ethics are the way to the good. Truth and beauty are unified with the good. The order is important.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sat, Oct 7, 2017 at 11:55 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Everything Peirce has said in this lecture about self-controlled conduct > (including logic) comes down to the relation between the *actual* and the > *ideal*. The ideal of conduct must be *admirable in itself*, not for any > ulterior reason. It must be *general,* *precise*, and *single*: no list > of three or four ideas will suffice. Perhaps *pleasure* will do, because > it is “the only conceivable result that is perfectly self-satisfied.” But > pleasure is only a “quality of feeling,” and can only be perfectly > self-satisfied because it is a “stationary result.” Self-satisfaction > doesn’t meet Peirce’s stringent requirements for an esthetic ideal because > it doesn’t *evolve* or “look forward to an endless future.” Why does the > ideal of conduct have to do that? Because it is strictly an ideal for > *future* conduct, the only kind that can be controlled. > > > > Even if you haven’t looked ahead, you can probably guess by this time what > Peirce will name as the only ideal which is *admirable in itself.* I’m > not sure I agree with him on this point — but we’ll come to that next time. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 6-Oct-17 08:00 > > > > Continuing from 1.6 (CP 1.611, EP2:253): > > > > 612. So, then, we appeal to the esthete to tell us what it is that is > admirable without any reason for being admirable beyond its inherent > character. Why, that, he replies, is the beautiful. Yes, we urge, such is > the name that you give to it, but what *is it?* What is this character? > If he replies that it consists in a certain quality of feeling, a certain > *bliss,* I for one decline altogether to accept the answer as sufficient. > I should say to him, My dear Sir, if you can prove to me that this quality > of feeling that you speak of does, as a fact, attach to what you call the > beautiful, or that which would be admirable without any reason for being > so, I am willing enough to believe you; but I cannot without strenuous > proof admit that any particular quality of feeling is admirable without a > reason. For it is too revolting to be believed unless one is forced to > believe it. > > 613. A fundamental question like this, however practical the issues of it > may be, differs entirely from any ordinary practical question, in that > whatever is accepted as good in itself must be accepted without compromise. > In deciding any special question of conduct it is often quite right to > allow weight to different conflicting considerations and calculate their > resultant. But it is quite different in regard to that which is to be the > aim of all endeavor. The object admirable that is admirable *per se* > must, no doubt, be general. Every ideal is more or less general. It may be > a complicated state of things. But it must be a *single* ideal; it must > have *unity,* because it is an idea, and unity is essential to every idea > and every ideal. Objects of utterly disparate kinds may, no doubt, be > admirable, because some special reason may make each one of them so. But > when it comes to the ideal of the admirable, in itself, the very nature of > its being is to be a precise idea; and if somebody tells me it is either > this, or that, or that other, I say to him, It is clear you have no *idea* > of what precisely it is. But an ideal must be capable of being embraced in > a unitary idea, or it is no ideal at all. Therefore, there can be no > compromises between different considerations here. The admirable ideal > cannot be too extremely admirable. The more thoroughly it has whatever > character is essential to it, the more admirable it must be. > > 614. Now what would the doctrine that that which is admirable in itself > is a quality of feeling come to if taken in all its purity and carried to > its furthest extreme,— which should be the extreme of admirableness? It > would amount to saying that the one ultimately admirable object is the > unrestrained gratification of a desire, regardless of what the nature of > that desire may be. Now that is too shocking. It would be the doctrine that > all the higher modes of consciousness with which we are acquainted in > ourselves, such as love and reason, are good only so far as they subserve > the lowest of all modes of consciousness. It would be the doctrine that > this vast universe of Nature which we contemplate with such awe is good > only to produce a certain quality of feeling. Certainly, I must be excused > for not admitting that doctrine unless it be proved with the utmost > evidence. So, then, what proof is there that it is true? The only reason > for it that I have been able to learn is that *gratification, pleasure,* > is the only conceivable result that is satisfied with itself; and > therefore, since we are seeking for that which is *fine* and *admirable* > without any reason beyond itself, *pleasure, bliss,* is the only object > which can satisfy the conditions. This is a respectable argument. It > deserves consideration. Its premiss, that pleasure is the only conceivable > result that is perfectly self-satisfied, must be granted. Only, in these > days of evolutionary ideas which are traceable to the French Revolution as > their instigator, and still further back to Galileo's experiment at the > leaning tower of Pisa, and still further back to all the stands that have > been made by Luther and even by Robert of Lincoln against attempts to bind > down human reason to any prescriptions fixed in advance,— in these days, I > say, when these ideas of progress and growth have themselves grown up so as > to occupy our minds as they now do, how can we be expected to allow the > assumption to pass that the admirable in itself is any stationary result? > The explanation of the circumstance that the only result that is satisfied > with itself is a quality of feeling is that reason always looks forward to > an endless future and expects endlessly to improve its results. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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