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Hi Edwina, List,
You answered just as I thought you might:
On 10/20/2017 4:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky
wrote:
I'd say that Peirce's semiosis is more basic than
and necessarily includes the three categories. The three
categories are, in themselves, purely intellectual constructs. But
Peirce, as a pragmatist, doesn't live in the world of 'pure
intellect' but is concerned with and is exploring the nature of
the cognitive world, which is to say, the operation of Mind and
how Mind operates within/as Matter - which includes all matter
[Matter is effete Mind] - both physical and biological...as well
as the operation of the human mind.
So, let me ask a couple of more questions.
- Where may the ideas of spontaneous chance or of the
"surprising fact" be explained by/captured by/explicated by
semiosis?
- How may semiosis provide an explanatory framework for the Big
Bang?
- Where/how is the sense of continuity captured by Peircean
semiosis?
- How does one explain abductive reasoning given the terminology
of semiosis?
- How does one distinguish between perceptions (perceived
external actions) and our own actions (our pushing against the
door) using Peircean semiosis?
My suspicion is that, with much legerdemain, one might be able to
formulate responses to these questions in the terminology of
semiosis, But, even so, I further suspect these would be derivatives
of terminology (concepts) already found in the universal categories.
For example, to me, the ground of Firstness is spontaneous chance.
I'm not quite sure how to treat that in the context of semiosis and
sign terminology. I think I do know how to address these questions
using the universal categories.
I personally see semiosis as more akin to information theory,
Spontaneous chance leads to new information structures, with
evolution favoring those representamen that provide the fastest free
energy consumption (which is equivalent to the greatest energy
dissipation or maximum entropy production), all of which occurs in
those localized cosmic conditions where there are very high free
energy spikes (topologically the spines of a porcupinefish); namely,
Earth for one. Approaching the limits to "truth" is the evolutionary
favoring of dissipative structures (representamen) that maximize
this entropy production in the fastest increment of time. DNA and
social networks are two approximate examples.
Signs, to me, are for sure the mediating construct for this process.
If you recall, Peirce first embedded his triadic logic between the
bookends of Being and Substance. I have come to feel, however, that
Peircean scholars who focus on semiosis, which I know includes
yourself, are resorting to Maslow's hammer. I prefer the richer
toolbox of the universal categories.
I'm not quite sure one can be pragmatic without being intelligent.
Pragmatists should adopt the best logic, concepts, terminology and
methods available in order to address their inquiries of need in the
quickest and most effective manner. It's too bad we can't ask these
questions directly to Peirce.
Since my questions, in terms of our differing perspectives, are
likely more rhetorical than anything else, I look forward to your
responses, if any, but will likely cease commenting on this thread.
Thanks for your input. I thank Gary R. for starting this thread.
Best, Mike
Edwina
On Fri 20/10/17 4:36 PM ,
Michael Bergman [email protected] sent:
Hi
Edwina,
On 10/20/2017 2:45 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Mike - here, I strongly disagree
with you, when you wrote:
>
>
> Your comment ' we need to talk
about signs when our discourse is
> representation'...is
something that is very common in the semiological
> world, but is, I suggest, invalid
in the Peircean world.
Please. Forget the labels and the easy dismissal that I have
engaged in
some Saussurean fallacies here.
All I am suggesting is to focus on the "nature of the object,"
which I
don't think I or Peirce would say is the same as the "nature of
the sign".
What I have tried to suggest is that the more fundamental
"Peircean"
interpretation comes from the lens of the universal categories,
which,
by the nature of usage and wealth of terminology, subsumes the
notion of
semeiosis. 1ns, 2ns and 3ns provide a richer pool of concepts
for
investigating metaphysical questions than does the terminology
of
representation (signs). Otherwise, why does Peirce ever use
them?
None of this is to say the I like the child better than the
parent or
vice versa, just that the universal categories are best suited
to
questions of metaphysics, semiosis to sign representations.
As an exercise, please just answer this three-choice question:
A. Peirce's semiosis subsumes the idea of his universal
categories
B. Peirce's universal categories subsume the idea of his
semiosis
C. Peirce's semiosis is synonomous with/equivalent to the
universal
categories.
I don't believe that picking B requires me to burn at the stake.
;)
Mike
>
> Semiosis and signs are NOT about
'representation' but about the
> true nature of reality and
actuality - both of which function only
> within semiosis, which is to say,
within the triadic Sign. Therefore -
> metaphysics and the 'true nature
of Objects' is the real topic of
> discourse within any examination
of Signs.
>
> That blueprint, as a
rhematic iconic sinsign - is its semiosic
> definition as AN OBJECT. Nothing
to do with 'representation' of the
> blueprint, but everything to do
with defining its nature as an object.
> With defining how it exists and
how we interact with it.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
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