List,
When Peirce introduces the subject of Thirdness, he often presents an argument against the nominalistic denial of its reality. In this lecture, he begins by conceding (even applauding) the value of skepticism in general, but then argues that honest skepticism about the reality of "meaning in things" would lead to a recognition of that reality, because the idea of it would "shine out clearly" in a mind capable of overcoming its own prejudice against it: he "will not allow petty intellectual predilections to blind him to truth, which consists in the conformity of his thoughts to his purposes." This is, for Peirce, an unusual way of defining truth, and sounds like a rather crass form of pragmatism. But I think it's designed to appeal to hard-headed skeptics about "spiritual truth," whose "purposes" should be to apply severely critical thinking to all "intellectual predilections" including their own. At the same time, Peirce's argument for recognition of an irreducible "element of thought" in Nature (and not just in human minds) seems to anticipate his "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" five years later, where the argument has weight because the idea is "instinctive" (EP2:443). I wonder whether any of the skeptics in the audience found this argument convincing. Gary f. From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 10-Dec-17 09:23 To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.3 Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.2, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13882 There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any real meaning or law in things. This scepticism is strongest in the most masculine thinkers. I applaud scepticism with all my heart, provided it have four qualities: first, that it be sincere and real doubt; second, that it be aggressive; third, that it push inquiry; and fourth, that it stand ready to acknowledge what it now doubts, as soon as the doubted element comes clearly to light. To be angry with sceptics, who, whether they are aware of it or not, are the best friends of spiritual truth, is a manifest sign that the angry person is himself infected with scepticism,- not, however, of the innocent and wholesome kind, that tries to bring truth to light, but of the mendacious, clandestine, disguised, and conservative variety that is afraid of truth, although truth merely means the way to attain one's purposes. If the sceptics think that any account can be given of the phenomena of the universe while they leave Meaning out of account, by all means let them go ahead and try to do it. It is a most laudable and wholesome enterprise. But when they go so far as to say that there is no such idea in our minds, irreducible to anything else, I say to them, "Gentlemen, your strongest sentiment, to which I subscribe with all my heart, is that a man worthy of that name will not allow petty intellectual predilections to blind him to truth, which consists in the conformity of his thoughts to his purposes. But you know there is such a thing as a defect of candor of which one is not oneself aware. You perceive, no doubt, that if there be an element of thought irreducible to any other, it would be hard, on your principles, to account for man's having it, unless he derived it from environing Nature. But if, because of that, you were to turn your gaze away from an idea that shines out clearly in your mind, you would be violating your principles in a very much more radical way." http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903
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