Gary f, Jon S, list, Yes, what I gave are not examples but definitions of "immediate object," something I recognized immediately after sending it, but it was too late to do anything about it because, despite the few seconds delay I have built into my email system, it had already been sent.
I wonder why Peirce would consistently offer so many definitions which include the idea that *all* signs have an immediate object if he weren't convinced that that were so?This one, from 1907, even adds that without an immediate object "a sign would not be a sign." Pretty definitive language for him to use, I'd say. 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15 …all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: *the Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR). As for your "stormy day" example, it's one which analyzes not any other kind of sign but a proposition. Yes, it would be excellent if Jon or I (or anyone) could find an example Peirce gives of an immediate object in a sign other than a proposition. But, as I have looked at the matter over the years, I would agree with Peirce in the definitions I offered that every sign (at least those employed in human semiosis) has an immediate object and that without one "a sign would not be a sign." So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that, according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects" Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:08 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Gary R, Jon et al., > > What you’ve listed here, Gary, are examples of *definitions* of > “immediate object.” They are not examples of *signs which have* immediate > objects, still less are they examples of *immediate objects*. I think we > need to look at those, if we can find them, to clarify what an immediate > object is. > > Here’s one example, from a 1909 letter to William James: > > [[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that > afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* > is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but > whose Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived > from peeping between the window-curtains.* … I reply, let us suppose: > > “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate Object* is the > notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and > mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. The *Dynamical > Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* meteorological > conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is the *schema* in > her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the > different Images of a stormy day. ] EP2:498 ] > > I include that last sentence to further emphasize Peirce’s distinction > between the *character* of a “notion” and the *identity* of it. This > distinction is essential to the analysis of a Dicisign or a proposition, so > it is clear that signs of that type must have immediate objects. The > immediate object of such a sign is, as Peirce explains, the object of an > Index which is necessarily a part of a Dicisign because it indicates what > the sign *represents itself* to be about, > > Now, can you show us where Peirce gives an example of an immediate object > of a rheme or icon, or any other sign which is not of a Dicent or > propositional nature? If so, we can assure ourselves that we are not > confusing the immediate *object* with the immediate *interpretant* by > conflating the *identity* of an idea with its *quality*. > > Gary f. > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 21:15 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell > Lecture 3.14) > > > > Gary f, Jon S, list, > > > > I have to agree with Jon S that *every* sign has an immediate object. > Here are a few examples (taken from the *Commens* Dictionary) to that > effect. > > 1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an > Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s) > > …*every* sign has *two* objects (emphasis added by GR). It has that > object which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has > no other being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative > Being. . .; and on the other hand there is the Real Object which has > really determined the sign[,] which I usually call the Dynamical Object. . . > > 1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:407 > > … the *requaesitum* which we have been seeking is simply that which the > sign “stands for,” or the idea of that which it is calculated to awaken. [—] > > This *requaesitum* I term the *Object* of the sign; - the *immediate* object, > if it be the idea which the sign is built upon, the *real* object, if it > be that real thing or circumstance upon which that idea is founded, as > on bedrock. > > 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15 > > …all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: *the Immediate > object or object as the sign represents it**, (and without this one, a > sign would not be a sign*); the other [the] Real object, or object as it > is independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by > GR). > > 1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:24-5 > > The immediate object is the object as the sign represents it: the real > object is that same object as it is, in its own mode of being, independent > of the sign or any other representation. [—] *Every* sign must plainly > have an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign > [emphasis added by GR]. > > 1908-12 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.343 > > … it is necessary to distinguish the *Immediate Object*, or the Object as > the Sign represents it, from the *Dynamical Object*, or really efficient > but not immediately present Object. > > 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495 > > As to the Object, that may mean *the Object as cognized in the Sign and > therefore an Idea*, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any > particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and > final study would show it to be. *The former I call the Immediate Object*, > the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object that > Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science) > can investigate (Emphasis added by GR). > > 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:498 > > We must distinguish between *the Immediate Object, – i.e., the Object as > represented in the sign*, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object > is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say > rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign > *cannot* express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter > to find out by *collateral experience *(emphasis added by GR). > > 1910 | Letters to Paul Carus | ILS 284 > > Then there are 3 divisions that relate to the Object. One according to *the > form under which the Sign presents its Object. This is of course the > object as the sign represents it, i.e. the Immediate Object *(emphasis > added by GR). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 8:47 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > > > You say “Peirce very clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning > already in 1904 (CP 8.336)--that *every *Sign has an *Immediate *Object.” > I don’t think it’s that clear at all. CP 8.336, to take your example, does > not say anything about “every sign.” Moreover, in much of his late semiotic > Peirce refers to propositions as “complete” signs, while simpler sign types > are “partial” or “fragmentary”; and it looks to me as if many of his > references to “signs” in general at this time (and even earlier) are > references to such complete signs. > > > > In the Syllabus passage that refers to “primary” and “secondary” objects, > Peirce is clearly focused on Dicisigns, which are very much like > propositions, and what Bellucci actually says is that “There is a sense > in which only propositions and proposition-like signs have immediate > objects.” (His 2015 paper is a free download and is well worth reading, in > my opinion.) Reading this part of Peirce’s Speculative Grammar, around > EP2:276, is described by Peirce himself as “threading our way through a > maze of abstractions,” but it seems quite plausible to me that the > “Secondary Object,” being a part of the sign, fits reasonably well Peirce’s > later definitions of the Immediate Object. > > > > I think this will need some further looking into. Which I don’t have time > for right now, partly because I want to read your Additament piece first! > > > > Gary f > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 17:09 > *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture > 3.14) > > > > Jeff, List: > > > > CP 2.311 is from the 1903 Syllabus and discusses the Secondary Object, not > the Immediate Object. Peirce referred to the Immediate Object earlier in > the very same writing (CP 2.293)--a fact that is obscured by the editors' > unfortunate insertion of CP 2.295-308, which came from elsewhere, but is > evident from EP 2:274-277. That being the case, what is the warrant for > treating the two terms as designating the same thing? Perhaps Bellucci is > correct that only propositions have *Secondary *Objects, but Peirce very > clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning already in 1904 (CP > 8.336)--that *every *Sign has an *Immediate *Object. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 5:54 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > Gary R, Gary F, Jon S, > > One of the texts that was giving rise to my questions about the relations > between immediate objects, on the one hand, and their relations to signs > and interpretants, on the other, is the earlier discussion of primary and > secondary objects at CP 2.311-14. That discussion of the Dicisign is one of > the main passages that Bellucci cites in support of his interpretative > claim that only propositions have immediate objects. > > In order to make sense of Peirce's discussion, I am drawing on an analysis > of the phenomena at hand. As such, I'm focusing on our experience of making > assertions in propositions and of interpreting the propositions asserted by > others. In doing so, I am trying to be careful to avoid confusing matters > of phenomenology and matters of semiotics. > > Jon S suggests that there is only one place (that he knows of) where > Peirce characterizes the immediate object of a dicisign in terms of how > the interpretant represents the existential relation between an individual > dynamical object and an indexical sinsign. As such, we might consider > ignoring that one passage and, instead, focus on the places where he > characterizes the immediate object in terms of how the dynamical object is > represented in the sign. In fact, I believe there are many places where > Peirce characterizes the immediate object in terms of how it is represented > in both the sign and in the interpretant. One extended discussion is found > in the text cited above. Other passages are cited in Belluci's papers and > monographs on the speculative grammar. See, for instance, chapter 7 on the > Syllabus in his monograph. > > Gary F and Gary R suggest that I do seem to be confused about the way > Peirce is applying the modality of possibility within the contexts of both > Peirce's phenomenology and his semiotics. I, on the other hand, am > wondering about the sources of confusions--both mine and others--that might > lurk in both areas of inquiry. > > As such, I want to point out just how many places where Peirce talks about > the phenomena that can be observed using the following sorts of modifiers: > scientific phenomena, physical phenomena, mental phenomena, objective > phenomena, subjective phenomena, etc. I think that the term phenomena is > being used in the context of a philosophical theory of phenomenology in a > way that is entirely consonant with the way that scientists, like Peirce, > would describe the phenomena that can be observed in the special > science of, say, physics. For example, consider the debate that took place > between the American groups (under Peirce's direction) and the European > groups over whether one set of observations or another contained > observational errors. In order to sort out the sources of such error, the > two groups could observe the same gravitational phenomena at the same time > and at the same place--but with different pendulums and stands. Hence the > importance of thinking of the phenomena as public and reproducible. > > In saying that Peirce is using the term "phenomena" in phenomenology in a > manner that is consonant with the way the term is used in the special > sciences, I am pointing out that the main difference between the two is > that philosophy focuses on phenomena that can be observed without any > special equipment at any waking hour by any person. > > If we turn to semiotics and Peirce's discussion of the way possibility > applies to different kinds of signs and how those representations are > related to their objects and interpretants, this is the sort of passage > that I find particularly puzzling: > > "An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility involving a possibility, and > thus the possibility of its being represented as a possibility is the > possibility of the involved possibility." CP 2.311 > > Figuring out how the modal conception of possibility modifies each part of > that assertion is, I think, no easy task given the nested character of the > modal operators. If anyone thinks it is easy, feel free to have a go at it. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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