Gary f, list, You wrote: "your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from mine, because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy . . .I on the other hand take “immediate” to mean “not mediate,” in contrast to the dynamic object, which is *mediately* “present to the mind”
It is exceedingly difficult, as Peirce himself noted, to give clear and simple examples of much in semiotics, that is, simple examples of semiosic events, certain facets or aspects of semiosis and semeiotic--for example, the various classes of signs, the immediate object, etc. And it has been not infrequently noted that Peirce himself didn't offer many examples in areas in which we might have hoped he would. But, again, it's difficult to do that both in phenomenology and in certain parts of semiotics. Differently from how you've characterized 'our views' of the immediate object', I would suggest that what you've characterized as my "view" or "concept" of the immediate object is not my view at all, but rather one of my approaches to researching semiosis in actual experience as well as in thought experiments. This is to say that what you call my "view" is rather my one of my ways of examining semiosis as it occurs on the fly, in existential reality, as process and in human experience of it. That approach is *necessarily* temporal. This is to my way of thinking a legitimate way of examining human semiosis--one which Peirce himself obviously employed. How else would one ever come to adequate semeiotic theories? By examining the writings of others on the matter? That may help, but seems to me insufficient. Your own view as you presented it seems to me rather abstract, legitimate in its own way and context. But I think you mischaracterize my view as suggesting that it is a matter of mere "first impressions," for while I sometimes begin there (as I do in some--but not all--of my phenomenological research), that is hardly where I conclude my analysis. So, in a word, my *concept* of the immediate object cannot be reduced to a sense of mere "temporal immediacy" as you put it, but is perhaps best suggested by this quotation, one in my recent list of quotations in which Peirce states or infers that *all* signs have immediate objects. 1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:407… the *requaesitum* which we have been seeking is simply that which the sign “stands for,” or the idea of that which it is calculated to awaken. [—] This *requaesitum* I term the *Object* of the sign; - the *immediate* object, if it be the idea which the sign is built upon, And here one should, of course, take "idea" in that sense in which Peirce often employs it to mean no mere abstraction but what comes before the mind. I would not say that your understanding is incorrect, but it is entirely theoretical. However, if you yourself see it as "quite different" from mine, I would hope you would consider how abstract your concept is and how concrete my experimental process is. My own view, as noted, is another matter and to conflate the two is, I think, unfortunate. But perhaps we're not as far apart as you'd suggested, and so I'm hoping that we'll find some middle ground in this matter. But to reduce my view (you wrote, "what you have in mind") as a matter of some mere sense of mine of a "temporal immediacy," when in fact it is not at all my view at all, but part of my process, is for me at least, not presently very helpful as we explore this interesting topic. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:06 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Gary R, > > > > Thanks for those thought experiments! Now I see where the disagreement > lies: your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from mine, > because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy, so your “immediate > objects” are pretty close to “first impressions.” I on the other hand take > “immediate” to mean “not mediate,” in contrast to the dynamic object, which > is *mediately* “present to the mind” because the sign is mediating the > determination of the interpretant by the object. Right now it’s difficult > for me to see how the examples you give in your thought-experiments conform > to Peirce’s definition of “immediate object,” but I’ll have to sleep on > that. > > This difference in conceptions is the sort of thing I was referring to at > the end of my post. We don’t agree on what it means to say that “every sign > has an immediate object” — we don’t know what *that* sign means — if we > don’t have a common idea of what the object of that sign is. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 29-Jan-18 17:12 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell > Lecture 3.14) > > > > Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list, > > > > Gf: "I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate > object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that > statement *means*." > > > > I'm not exactly sure what your meaning could be here. It seems that > earlier you *were* arguing (and Jeff seemed to agree) that only > propositions have immediate objects. If you are now "not challenging the > statement that 'every sign has an immediate object'," then why would the > "context," as you strongly suggest, make a significant difference except by > in some way limiting the meaning of 'Sign' in some formal logical > abstraction of the idea of 'Sign'? > > > > This, or something like it, seems to be the case as I reflect on the > quotations you just gave and commented on. > > > > Quotation/commentary #1: > > > > [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of > propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition > can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of > concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported by > the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of > signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no > logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a > proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents > of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906] > > This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” *because > it is a constituent of a proposition.* > > > > As I read this quotation, it is not that "every sign has an immediate > object” *because it is a constituent of a proposition*," but that "no > sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts > belong — can arise except in a proposition" as these are employed in > existential graphs. That is all that Peirce seems to be claiming. > > > > Quotation/commentary #2: > > > > [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or > set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in > its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its > Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately > determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. > This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a > Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of > the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, > c.1908] > > A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may > have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore > be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects > because they resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s > another statement in the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a > shorthand for “proposition”: > > > > Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "*may* have > Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a > proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every > even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes) > will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis) > > > > Quotation/commentary #3: > > > > [[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of > the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a > human being can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being > a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies > a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] > CP 6.341,344, 1909] > > The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer > to a generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, > which latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, > is a proposition or quasi-proposition or essential *part* of a > proposition. The only way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for > a given statement about “signs” is to read the context clues. > > > > Well, it still is sounding like you are arguing that only propositions > have immediate objects. I continue to disagree. > > > > However, I will agree that in the fullness of "the composition of > thought," that a "generic 'sign'," as you put it, or even a single actual > sign, hasn't much to offer to that fullness which is "the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality." Still, this > doesn't deny that there are what I've just termed "Incomplete Signs" which > have immediate objects. > > > > And, of course, I fully agree that all signs are triadic. Yet even each > "generic 'sign' " in the 10 fold classification of signs is given as > triadic in that classification, so a fortiori, any actual sign had, has, > and/or will have an "*Immediate object or object as the sign represents > it**, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*)." > > > > Yet I principally understand semiosis as a consequence of my quotidian > experience of it (naturally now deeply informed by Peirce's semeiotic > science) or in thought experiments. This thought experiment (which I've > made a number of times) I'll call, "The First Thing I See." > > > > I walk into a room I'm not familiar with, sit down, close my eyes, then > turn my head to the right, open my eyes, and the first thing I see is an > object of a peculiar shape (of course I haven't thought of it in these > terms, but it isn't at all immediately clear to me what it is), then in a > moment I recognize it as a 'vase' (a rheme, not a dicisign), albeit a > peculiarly shaped one. In my later analysis I see that I have had at least > two immediate objects set before my mind, a complex mix of qualisigns > (shape, colors, etc.), so, at first not recognizable as "something," and a > rhematic one, as I quickly identify this "something' to be a vase. And it > seems clear enough to me that at that moment of recognition I did not think > a proposition ("That is a vase"), but merely the rheme, 'vase'. > > > > Another thought experiment, this one based on one Peirce himself offers on > how learning occurs, so which I'll call "The Child Learns a Lesson." > > > > Although the toddler has been told by mom to stay away from the stove's > burners, that they're 'hot' and will 'burn' her so that she'll feel 'pain', > yet when mom isn't looking, the child steps up to the stove, experiences > the pain of the burn as she screams "Aie!!!" and immediately withdraws her > hand. Well, while I'm certain some here will argue otherwise, to my way of > thinking there isn't much in the nature of dicisignificance going on in > this situation, especially given that the child has only a few words at her > disposal at this point in her development. > > > > For me there can be little doubt that the child has 'experienced' > (although that is hardly the correct word) at least one and probably > several immediate objects. And while it is wholly unlikely that they all > happened in an abstract 'instant', they certainly occurred in a fraction of > a second, a 'moment' as Peirce analyzes the minimum of time. And, to boot, > one can see in that moment several semiotic events: the qualisign which is > the heat, the resultant pain (another qualisign), the immediate withdrawing > of her hand (involving now 2ns), and the cry (perhaps involving 3ns as > she's a French girl and has heard mom cry out "Aie!!!" when she herself was > in pain or saw that her daughter was in pain). How complex even the > simplest semiotic event appears to be! > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 2:02 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Jon, Gary R, > > The crucial question here is: What is the Real Object of the term “sign” > in each of these definitions? In each case, we would have to gather what > clues we can from the context of the definition (since, as we all know, the > sign cannot express its object). And when we do, I think it would be wise > to bear in mind some other general statements Peirce made about “signs,” > such as this one: > > [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of > propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition > can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of > concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported by > the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of > signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no > logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a > proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents > of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906] > > This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” *because > it is a constituent of a proposition.* > > Or consider this statement: > > [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or > set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in > its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its > Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately > determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. > This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a > Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of > the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, > c.1908] > > A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may > have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore > be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects > because they resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” And here’s > another statement in the same vein, which apparently uses “sign” as a > shorthand for “proposition”: > > [[ The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of > the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality.… Signs, the only things with which a > human being can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction, being > a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies > a form of fact, which latter it brings into connexion with the former. ] > CP 6.341,344, 1909] > > The definitions of immediate objects which you’ve cited may likewise refer > to a generic “sign” which “denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, > which latter it brings into connexion with the former” — or in other words, > is a proposition or quasi-proposition or essential *part* of a > proposition. The only way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for > a given statement about “signs” is to read the context clues. That’s what I > intend to do when I come across such statements in the future. > > In short, I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an > immediate object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what > that statement *means*. Our concept of “immediate object” depends on > that. > > Gary f. > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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