Jerry C, Gary f, list, You wrote: "I am not familiar with the notion of "(Partial) signs."
This is actually Gary f's coinage. In a post in this thread Gf offered three Peirce quotations and commented on them. In his comments he suggested that in these passages Peirce was saying that only the proposition (or dicisign) has an Immediate Object. Quotation/commentary #2: [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277, c.1908] Gf: A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have immediate objects because they resemble propositions “in a truncated fashion.” Gf: Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "*may* have Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes) will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis) As Bellucci and Stjernfelt have argued, the Proposition (Dicisign) has parts (I agree). Gary further suggest that when Peirce says in the quotation above that "a Complete Sign has or may have Parts" that this sounds like he's referring to the proposition and that these Parts "may therefore be called (Partial) signs." Again, he (and I believe Jeff) are taking the position that only Dicisigns have Immediate Objects (although Gf recently hedged on that assertion, so I'm not clear as to what his current position on this topic is). In any even, I commented in reply to his Comment #2 above: GR: Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "*may* have Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes) will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis). As you may have gathered, I hold that all signs have Immediate Objects, this following Peirce (see the several quotes to this effect). I'm not sure what Peirce means by "Complete Sign" (I think he may mean any of the three classes of Symbols), but whatever he meant, I coined my own expression, "Incomplete Sign," to include the 7 other classes. That is, whatever Peirce meant by 'Complete Sign', that it matters not a whit since any one of the 10 classes will have an "*Immediate object or object as the sign represents it**, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*)." Gary f has not replied to my response to his three quotation and comments (today he discussed only the final part of my message on techniques I employ, making thought experiments or observing my own semioses "on the fly"), so I have no idea why he coined the expression "Partial) signs," nor what he thinks of my response to his comment above nor his two other comments. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > > On Jan 29, 2018, at 4:12 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may > have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore > be called (Partial) signs, > > > I am not familiar with the notion of "(Partial) signs” > > Could you give an example? or this a coinage relate to mereology? > Cheers > > Jerry >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
