BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - a few comments:

        I agree with all of the phases except for your outline of the
Representamen. I don't agree that the 'neural pattern stands for the
loud sound. That's too mechanical for my view. It sets up the neural
pattern simply as an iconic system. What would happen if the
sensation - was totally new and if there was 'no neural pattern'? 

        I see the Representamen as the habits of organization of
matter/mind. In this case, the general neurological 'habits' that
enables the bird to interact with both common and novel stimuli. I
also see the Representamen, at least in species that can learn, as
consisting also of the learned stimuli. A dog, for instance, might be
at first, neurologically,  terrified of the vacuum cleaner but
will/may learn to accept it as harmless.

        I also have a problem with the notion of 'determines' although I am
aware that Peirce used the term but I wonder if his meaning was
similar to modern usage which inserts intentionality to the word.

        I'll have to think a bit further on your outline of the FI but it
seems quite plausible to me. By 'general tendency' do you mean
confined to the one individual or to the collective? Peirce seems to
consider the FI as a property of the collective rather than the
individual.  I think his FI is associated with the 'truth' of the
nature of the DO; that is, the FI asserts that our interpretations of
the DO are accurate. This could only be carried out by a collective,
since an individual could remain locked into their invalid
interpretation all their life [I KNOW that house is haunted].

        Otherwise - yes - we are indeed making progress!

        Edwina
 On Fri 02/02/18 11:25 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover
that, at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing
a loud sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially
in agreement after all.
    *The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself.
    *The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud
sound.
    *The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's
neural pattern that  stands for the loud sound.
    *The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects
of this neural pattern on the bird.
    *The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this
neural pattern on the bird, which is its flight.

What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral
experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line. 
This is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been
wondering about for quite some time.  You place them within (or as)
the R, but I am still having a hard time seeing it that way in light
of Peirce's definition (in multiple places) of the R as that which 
stands for the Object to the Interpretant.  My sense is that these
elements are instead somehow bound up in what it means for the Object
to determine the Sign to determine the Interpretant; i.e., collateral
experience is what enables the bird to "recognize" its sensation as
corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit of
interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what
prompts the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the
other possible effects. 
 One alternative is to designate the habit of interpretation as the
one correlate that is missing above--the Final Interpretant (FI).  Up
until now, my working hypothesis has been that the FI is defined as
the habit of feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of
interpretation--that the Sign would produce.  However, I had in mind
the habit that the Receiver (in this case, the bird) would develop
after sufficient repetition of the same Representamen (in this case,
the neural pattern that stands for the loud sound).  I am starting to
wonder if instead we should define the FI as the  general tendency
that governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is
produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities
that correspond to its II.  The FI would then be the cumulative
effect of all previous instances of semiosis that are somehow
relevant to this particular encounter with this particular Sign.
 I will stop there and ask again--what do you think?  Feedback from
others would also be very welcome. 
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 7:04 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - with regard to the example in section 3.

        I maintain that the Representamen is the bird's knowledge base. This
is not just its individual collateral experience but also the
biological 'habits' or laws of its species. So, this Representamen
includes the bird's individual life experiences plus its own
species-specific 'internal awareness of the sound - the as you say, 
instinctive 'neural pattern that enables the bird to 'recognize the
loud sound'...'. So- to me, the Representamen is both the biological
habits AND the living experience habits. 

        The II - I agree - the range of possible effects..of this neural
pattern..

        And the DI - is flight.

        Edwina 
 On Thu 01/02/18  7:49 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1.  Again, I am still sorting out what the IO is, beyond being the
Object as represented in the Sign.  I have not said anything to
suggest that it is "mechanical."
 2.  Again, we do not disagree about this at all.
 3.  Okay, I understand now that you are treating the loud sound--the
physical waves of compression and decompression propagating through
the air--as the DO.  Let us take the bird's flight as the DI, so that
we do not get sidetracked in "the mental workings of the human brain."
 That narrows our different analyses to the Sign itself as the
(internal) triad of IO-R-II.   In this specific case, I am even
willing to concede that the IO can be identified as the impinging of
the sound waves on the bird's ears and/or the resulting nerve
impulses, although I still maintain that the IO is not defined as
"sensate data," and would not be "sensate data" for other kinds of
Signs.  That leaves the R and the II.  You say that the R is the
bird's "knowledge base," which I characterize instead as its 
collateral experience ; and that the II is the bird's "internal
awareness" of the sound.  For me, the latter is the R; presumably the
(largely instinctive) neural pattern that stands for the loud sound
within the bird.  As for the II, as usual I see it as the range of
possible effects that this neural pattern may  have on the bird, one
of which is obviously the flight that actually results from it (DI).
 In other words, for this particular example--in which all of the
correlates are Existents (2ns), which I suspect helps minimize the
discrepancies--it looks to me like the only difference in our
analyses is that your R is my collateral experience, your II is my R,
and my II is something that you do not include, at least not
explicitly.  What do you think? 
 Thanks,
 Jon S.
 On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 5:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon

        1. You still haven't explained' what is the IO. It surely can't be
just a mechanical 'site' within the Sign. It has to have some
informational content.

        2. Peirce's objective idealism is that 'the one intelligible theory
of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws'. 6.25.  That is -
Mind-as-Matter.

        "all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter'. 6.268 

        And - "the one original law [is] the recognized law of mind the law
of association, of which the laws of matter are..mere special
results' 6.277.

        3. The loud sound - is the Dynamic Object. This loud sound has its
own Dynamic Object[s] [the tree and the wind]...But, to the human,
the cat, the bird, who are each full Signs in themselves...their
interaction with the external world is just: the loud sound.  They
are affected by this sound and must interpret it. The human, the cat,
and the bird are NOT themselves, Signs of that loud sound! They simply
receive it..and must interpret it. ..and as such, are affected by it;
their knowledge base [Representamen] will change...and thus, as a
Sign, they too change. 

        Edwina 
 On Thu 01/02/18  5:25 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1.  Again, I have been trying to sort out what I think the IO is
throughout this thread; but where did Peirce ever define it as
"sensate data"?
 2.  Peirce's stated view was "that matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25,
EP 1:293; 1891), not the other way around.  Of course, he later
famously said that "the entire universe--not merely the universe of
existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as 'the truth'--that all this universe is perfused with
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n1, EP
2:394; 1906).  So we actually do not disagree about this at all. 
 4.  Yes, the Receiver is a Sign, but not the Sign that I thought we
were discussing--the loud sound.  I see now that this may be the very
root of our overall disconnect.  You seem to be suggesting that the
loud sound is the Dynamic Object of the human, the cat, and the bird,
each of which is a Sign of that loud sound.  That is not consistent
with my understanding of Peirce's terminology at all.
 Again, just to be clear--I emphatically do not  "confine semiosis to
the mental workings of the human brain," any more than you do.  I just
analyze it much differently than you do.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - we are simply light-years apart..

        1] What do you think the IO is - if not sensate data received from
the external world?

        2] You and I have a totally different view of 'what is a Sign'. As
I've said - I follow Peirce's view that 'Mind is Matter' - and that
this matter is, as a whole, a Sign. The whole biochemical unit - is a
sign. An atom, a molecule - is a Sign. It exists as such in
interaction with other Signs, i.e., other atoms, other molecules.
What do you think a Sign is - merely a mental concept in someone's
mind? 

        The bird is a whole Sign - and is receiving sensate data from
another Sign...let's say...from another bird.

        3] I am not going to get into a discussion of reality vs
existentiality. The Representamen, as a qualisign, a sinsign, a
legisign, does not exist per se, separately. It exists as such -
within the triad of the whole Sign. This is basic to Peirce and
Aristotle.

        4] The Receiver is a Sign! The bird, as a whole, is a Sign. The
human, as a whole, is a Sign. And - to be a Sign, it is always
receiving and sending information to other Signs.  

        You confine semiosis to the mental workings of the human brain. I
view semiosis as basic within all matter...Mind-is-Matter. Peirce was
quite specific - that Mind functions within all matter.

        So- quite frankly- we have very little in common about these issues.

        Edwina

        On Thu 01/02/18  4:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
 sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Again, my reading of Peirce is very different from yours.
 1.  If you have quotes where he explicitly defined the Immediate
Object to be "sensate data," I would like to see them; I did not find
any in CP or EP.  This whole thread is about trying to get a better
handle on what the IO is.
 2.  The Sign must be in a relation with the DO, which is external to
it; the DO is not part of  the Sign.  I was sure that we agreed on
that, as long as your (correct) emphasis on the (necessarily)
interactive nature of semiosis is kept firmly in view.  What you call
"a knowledge base" is not the Representamen, it is the result of
collateral experience.  Here you call the bird "the whole Sign," but
before you called it the "Receiver" of the Sign; which is it?
 3.  There are Real Qualisigns and Legisigns, but none of them 
exist, except as Sinsigns (replicas).  Likewise, all of the other
five correlates and four relations only exist, strictly speaking,
when they are Existents (2ns), not when they are Possibles (1ns) or
Necessitants (3ns); but those in the latter two Universes can
nevertheless be Real.
 5.  There is no "reduction" here, just faithfulness to Peirce's own
terminology.  As far as I know, he never referred to the six
correlates themselves  as "relations," only the four relations that
the Sign has to the three external correlates (DO, DI, FI).
 6.  Again, the Representamen is internal to the Sign, not to the
Receiver.  Now, some Signs are internal to the Receiver--Interpretant
Signs and thought-Signs being obvious examples.  Sensing the sound
waves in your body is a Dynamic Interpretant--an actual effect that
an external Sign (the loud sound) produces.  Your thoughts  about
this sensation are subsequent Signs.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
  On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. There is simply a HUGE gap
between your view and mine - and an even bigger gap between my view
and that of Gary F.

        1. I can come up with quotes as well....and your use of 'represented
in the sign' doesn't explain what this means. What do you think the IO
is?

        2. No - I told you that the Sign must include the Dynamic Object. I
don't keep archives as you do and so can't check - but to have the
Sign as strictly and only internal and subjective - doesn't make any
sense. The whole point of semiosis - is that it is interactive,
relational. Not just subjective - which would be nominalistic. What I
agreed to was that there WAS a basic internal triad [since some people
reject even the IO and the II] - but - there need not be a DI. But
there has to be a DO - The Sign is not an isolate subjective 'thing'
or 'event'. It is interactional. 

        I don't agree with your diagrams of the IO as the 'site' on the Sign
where the DO bonds to it. To me - that doesn't make any sense. That
almost sounds as if 'the IO site already exists within the
'Sign'..and the DO simply 'bonds/attaches to it! That doesn't make
sense to me. 

         My diagram is that the whole Sign [let's say a bird] - carries
within it a knowledge base [physiological, mental]..known as the
Representamen. When a Dynamic Object, which is an external
Sign/Mind-as-Matter interacts with this Bird/Sign/Mind-as-Matter....
the sensate data from that DO enters the body/mind of the bird. That
information is the IO.  The Representamen acts on this data..and
transforms it into an Interpretation [II and DI].

        3. The Sign is NOT just the Representamen! [qualisign, sinsign,
legisign!!]. It's the whole triad! Therefore, it does exist -
otherwise it wouldn't be a Sign.

        5] I don't agree with your reduction of the phases of semiosis to
'correlates'. They are vital components of the whole semiosic
process. Each functions within a Relation.  That is, each can
interact within a different categorical mode - though there are
restrictions in their 'whole set of relations'.  

        6 The external loud sound can hardly be the Representamen!!! The
Representamen is INTERNAL - and this loud sound is coming from an
external source! Plus, the Representamen has the function of
mediation between the O and the I.

        The falling of the oak tree is the final - the FI; all that I get -
is the DO, which is the loud sound. I have no idea what it is. 

        And the sensate effect of this loud sound - is the Immediate Object.
I can 'feel' the sound waves in my body. Then, my body, via its
physiological and mental Representamen capacities - must 'interpret'
this. ..to.., as an II - first - that it's a loud force external to
me and also, that it's something outside.  

        7. You say 'internal to the Sign' - not internal to the receiver.
But where is the sign?

        Edwina

        On Thu 01/02/18  2:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
  Edwina, List:
 As you know, my reading of Peirce is very different from yours, but
hopefully we can engage in some constructive dialogue anyway.
 1.  Here are three quotes where Peirce explicitly defined the
Immediate Object to be the Object as it is represented in the Sign. 
"… there are two aspects of the object: 1. The object as acting on
the sign. That is called the real object. 2. The object as
represented in the sign, or the  immediate object" (R 1334:53; 1905).
 "... one must distinguish the Object as it is represented, which is
called the Immediate Object, from the Object as it is in itself" (R
793:14; 1906).  "We must distinguish between the Immediate
Object,--i.e., the Object as represented in the sign,--and the Real
(no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose
a different term; therefore:), say rather the Dynamical Object ..."
(EP 2:498; 1909).  On the other hand, I am not aware of  any passage
where Peirce explicitly defined the Immediate Object to be "sensate
data."
 2.  You agreed with me about this a little less than a year ago; has
something changed?  I wrote, "We now agree that the Sign is a triad 
in the sense that the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are
 internal  to it.  What remains is whether the Dynamic Object and the
Dynamic Interpretant are also parts  of the Sign as a single triad,
or distinct correlates of a triadic relation ...  both the (Dynamic)
Object and (Dynamic) Interpretant are distinct  Subjects that are 
independent of the Sign ...  the Object is 'something else' than the
Sign, while the Interpretant is the 'effect' of the Sign; so again,
it strikes me as saying that they are  separate ."  You replied, "I
would agree that the internal triad is thus basic - and the external
parts could be called correlates - and are not necessarily found at
the same time."  The necessity of the Dynamic Object to determine the
Sign has never been at issue between us, nor the fundamentally
interactive nature of semiosis in general.  Diagrammatically, I think
of the Immediate Object as something like the site  on the Sign where
the Dynamic Object "bonds" to it, and the Immediate Interpretant as
the site  on the Sign where the Dynamic Interpretant "bonds" to it.
 3&4.  I tend to treat the Sign as an individual site/node for
abstract analytical purposes, but Gary R.'s concrete thought
experiments are helping me to recognize some of the limitations of
that approach.  I am uncomfortable with your use of "existential" in
this context, since only Sinsigns strictly exist; that is why
Qualisigns and Legisigns must be embodied as Sinsigns in order to 
act as Signs (CP 2.244-246, EP 2:291; 1903).  A word is not only a
Sign as a Token (Sinsign), it is also a Sign as a Type (Legisign)--a
general whose Reality is not confined to its actual instantiations,
but includes the inexhaustible continuum of its potential
instantiations.
 5.  Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, Representamen, Immediate
Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant are
Peirce's terms for six correlates or  subjects that are involved in
semiosis, not six relations.  He identified four relations, each
including the Sign itself--its dyadic relations to the Dynamic
Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant; and its triadic
relation to the Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant.  Together these
correspond to the ten trichotomies of his 1908 Sign classification (CP
1.342-376, EP 2:478-490).  There are no  distinct relations of the
Sign to its Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant, because
those are both  parts of the Sign itself.
 6.  We agree that every Sign-action must have at least the first
four correlates, although we define them quite differently.  In your
example, given your characterization of several Dynamic
Interpretants, I am inclined to identify the loud sound as the
Representamen, the falling of the oak tree as the Dynamic Object, and
the entire range of possible effects of the loud sound on anything and
everything as the Immediate Interpretant.   As such, these correlates
are  the same for the human, the cat, and the bird; only their
Dynamic Interpretants are different, as a result of the different
habits of interpretation that they have previously developed.   I
understand the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant to be
internal to the Sign , not internal to the Receiver ; in particular,
"'It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the
Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign" (EP 2:480; 1908).
 However, this thread has called my attention to the difficulty of
clarifying exactly what it means for the Immediate Object to be
"internal to the Sign," and I find myself unsure about "where to
locate it" in this case.  
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]   
 On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 11:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        List - I've kept out of this baffling exchange because ...it was too
baffling. I had and have no idea what Gary F and Jon AS are talking
about. I'll just try to clear up a few things - as I see them.

        1. The Immediate Object is not the 'Object as it is represented in
the Sign'. The IO is the sensate data before
'representation/interpretation'.

        2. I did not and do not agree that the Sign is a 'triad of the
Immediate Object/Representamen/Immediate Interpretant'. That would
make the Sign a strictly INTERNAL proposition - and the whole nature
of the Sign [capital S] is that it is  existential and not just
subjective. The external Dynamic Object MUST be part of this semiosic
process.

        3. I'll try to explain my understanding.  I totally reject Gary F's
confinement of the term 'sign' to the single site/node ..Semiosis is
a complex process; it is an action, a process - and consists of
Relations between 'existential units'...which are constantly
interacting informationally. There are a number of steps within the
Sign. We could best understand the Sign as a syllogism - but - I
won't get into that.  

        4. We should first understand that semiosis is an interaction
between - let's say for simplicity, two 'existential units' [though
in reality, the interactions and units are without count].  Each
unit, as existential, will be itself a Sign. 

        What is a Sign? It is an existential form of Mind-as-Matter. So, a
stone, a leaf, a plant, an insect, a tree, a human, a word....these
are all Signs. They are all existential forms of Mind-as-Matter. They
are also all constantly in semiosic interaction with other Signs. If
there is no such interaction - then, they cease to exist as Signs, as
Mind-as-Matter. 

        5. The process of this semiosic interaction is necessarily complex.
Why? Because such complexity enables the generation of diverse forms
of new Signs/Mind-as-Matter.

        The semiosic interaction is: - in its full  stage - made up of 6
interactive phases.

        Dynamic Object- Immediate Object- Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant-Dynamic Interpretant-Final Interpretant.

        Each interaction is a Relation, ..and can be in any one of the three
categorical modes of Firstness; Secondness; Thirdness. I won't get
into that. 

        6. The basic semiosic interaction - known as The Sign is:
O-R-I...but we must break this down into..

        DO-IO-R-II. Note- we MUST have two existences, two units, two
Mind-as-Matter units in the semiosic situation. The external
'thing'...and..the Receiver..

        An example: 

        DO- a loud sound. Now - this loud sound...enters the 'sensual
awareness' of three Receivers. A human  being, a cat, a bird

        IO - this is the sensate data that is subjective, it is INTERNAL to
each of the three Receivers. Each of them 'hears' or receives this
loud sound in a different way. 

        R - this is their knowledge base. It mediates the data from the
IO...and, according to each different capacity, will come up with and
Interpretation....[Note - this is what Gary F refers to as the sign,
and this, I suggest, ignores that the Sign is the whole complex
process, not just one Relation].

        II - this is their subjective, INTERNAL 'awareness' of that loud
sound. The human will be physically aware that there is some loud
force outside of themselves. The cat..will be equally
aware...but..might feel it even in their body. Same with the bird. 

        DI- here, at this phase, the human will articulate: Oh - that old
Oak tree finally fell. The cat will watch the human to see if what it
heard/felt should be interpreted as alarm. The bird's interpretant is:
Flee.

        -----------------------------------------------------------------------

        I'll just note that the Representamen - which can be in any
categorical mode, is a powerful, powerful mediative force. Since it
can be in 1-1 [Pure Firstness] or 2-2 , or 2-1; or 3-3, or 3-1, or
3-2.....then, it can add and transform to the sensate data of that
Immediate Object - to produce a completely novel Interpretant. 

        Edwina 


Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to