Jerry C., List:

As I mentioned previously, before moving the conversation to its own
thread, all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be
Existents (2ns).  As such, it should not be surprising that our analysis of
it *resembles* "a simplistic causal sequence"; hence Edwina's worry about
making it out to be "too mechanical."  Furthermore, since Peirce's
synechism entails that semiosis is *continuous*, rather than *discrete*,
the assignment of terms is indeed arbitrary to a degree.  In fact, that was
a source of initial confusion on my part--I was taking the falling of the
tree to be the Dynamic Object, rather than the loud sound that resulted
from it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> On Feb 2, 2018, at 10:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our
> analyses of the semiosis
>
>
> involves
>
>
>    - The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound *itself*.
>    - The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's *sensation *of the loud
>    sound.
>    - The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's neural
>    pattern that *stands for* the loud sound.
>    - The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of *possible *effects
>    of this neural pattern on the bird.
>    - The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the *actual *effect of this neural
>    pattern on the bird, which is its flight.
>
> How does your ordered list of biological temporal events differ from a
> simplistic causal sequence from the logic of antecedent to consequence?
> (With pragmatic omission of the material cause of the loud sound.)
>
> That is, the initial (mechanical?) cause of sound is not stated so that
> the symbolic terms, symbolized as DO, IO, R, II, and DI lack concrete
> meaning.
>
> By lacking concrete meaning, I infer that each of five terms could be
> replaced with 2 terms that expressed a similar meaning, generating 10
> terms, (DO1, DO2), (IO1, IO2), (R1, R2), (II1, II2), and (D1,D2).  Of
> course, one would need to be a little bit clever about how meaning of two
> words are associated with one symbol. (but, the intrinsic vagueness of each
> of these logic terms facilitates such substitutions of words for symbols.)
>
> Of course, logically one could replace each partition of primary terms
> with more than 2 terms…
> Substituting 3 terms for the identity of a symbol would generate an
> ordered list with 15 terms,
> Substituting 4 terms for the identity of a symbol would generate an
> ordered list with 20 terms,
> Substituting 5 terms for the identity of a symbol would generate an
> ordered list with 25 terms,
> and so forth by drawing upon the different neural circuitry of the brain /
> CNS and neurologic/physiologic circuits.
>
> Such a logical partitioning of grammar appears to mimic to the logical
> tactic that CSP used in the further development of his conceptualization of
> semiosis.
>
> Of particular interest is the case of adroitly substituting Firstness,
> Secondness and Thirdness for any three terms.
> Pragmatically, this could require creating a host of new terms with
> meanings specified by the contexts within the ordering relationships within
> the collection of substituted terms.
>
> One might think of the above sentences as a generative “speculative
> grammar” for creating a perplex logic.
>
> Have fun!
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
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