Edwina, List:

In that case, I am content for now with the level of agreement that we have
managed to achieve, and thus will not press the matter any further at this
time.  I intend to reread and reflect on Peirce's relevant  texts like "New
Elements" (1904) and "Pragmatism" (1907) as I continue to ponder the
Immediate Object, collateral experience, habits of interpretation, etc.


Jon S.

On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - yes, I see the Representamen quite differently from you. I think you
> see it as passive - it 'stands for the Object to the Interpretant'.
> Whereas, I see it as an active force of mediation and transformation. I see
> it, at least when it is in the mode of Thirdness - and most of the ten
> classes do have it in that mode [6/10] - as a force of general laws which
> are applied to the incoming sensate data of the IO, to transform/mediate it
> into the Interpretants.
> Most certainly, even if the sensation in the IO of the bird was new, the
> laws held within the general habits of the Representamen, would be capable
> of dealing with it by some neural pattern. But - we must also consider that
> in some cases - the laws/habits cannot deal with it - and the
> sensations/input are rejected as 'noise'.
> I also disagree that the Representamen only comes into existence because
> of its Dynamic Object. The bird couldn't exist without its infrastructure
> of physical-chemical and biological laws. The Representamen as Mind - akin
> to Aristotle's Form - exists within the matter - and as general - it exists
> as long as the matter exists....as long as the bird exists.. Admittedly,
> that bird only exists when it is in semiosic interaction with its external
> envt, i.e., with other Dynamic Objects.
> I'm Ok with 'determines' implying constraint...etc..
> Edwina
> On Fri 02/02/18 5:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
> Edwina, List:
> Yes, I acknowledge that your definition of the Representamen is much
> broader than mine.  Nevertheless, when I say that the neural pattern stands
> for the loud sound, I am not implying anything mechanical; I am simply
> repeating verbatim Peirce's own statement, which he wrote many times
> throughout his life, of what a Sign or Representamen does with respect to
> its Object (CP 5.286, 1868; CP 7.355, 1873; EP 2:13, 1895; CP 2.228,
> c.1897; CP 8.119, 1902; CP 2.92, 1902; CP 1.538, 1903; EP 2:407, 1907;  CP
> 1.339, undated).  As I understand it, the key difference between
> semiology and semeiotic in this regard is that Saussure was content to
> treat this as a strictly dyadic relation in which the Signifier stands
> for the Signified, while Peirce insisted (rightly) that it is an
> irreducibly triadic relation in which the Sign stands for the Object to the
> Interpretant.  Even if the bird's sensation (IO) was "totally new"--i.e.,
> different from anything that any bird had ever experienced before--it would
> still be represented within that bird by some neural pattern, and that is
> what I would identify as the Representamen accordingly.
> Furthermore, while I agree that the bird's neurological habits and learned
> stimuli are part of the overall process of semiosis, I do not see how they
> can be "located" in the Representamen.  As you said, those habits are
> general, not to mention already operative within the bird before the loud
> sound occurs; but any given Representamen only comes into existence because
> of its (Dynamic) Object.  If the loud sound had not happened when and
> where it did, then the bird's corresponding neural pattern would not have
> manifested when it did.
> I am not sure how much (if anything) is riding on the term "determines."
> I am inclined to think that this is just a verbal form of what Peirce
> elsewhere called the relation between the Object and the Sign, and by
> extension the relation between the Sign and the Interpretant.
> CSP:  ... every sign is determined by its object, either first, by
> partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon;
> secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with
> the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or
> less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the
> object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural
> disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. (CP 4.531; 1906)
> CSP:  ... the Object determines (i.e., renders definitely to be such as it
> will be) the Sign in a particular manner. (EP 2:487; 1908)
> CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
> (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, called its
> Object ... while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or
> potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created
> by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by
> the Object. (EP 2:492; 1909)
> Especially in light of that last quote, it carries in my mind the
> connotation of constraining or narrowing, rather than dictating; i.e.,
> reducing the range of possibilities, but not (by itself) mandating one in
> particular.  This is evident in how Peirce invokes it when discussing
> whether a given correlate or relation can or must be a Possible, an
> Existent, or a Necessitant according to the ten trichotomies of his late
> attempts at Sign classification.
> CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
> it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
> trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
> they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I strongly opine
> (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of the
> same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these will only
> come to 66. (EP 2:481; 1908)
> Here we also have one of the alternate sets of names for the three
> Interpretants, which has caused a lot of consternation for me and others
> who have sought to arrange the trichotomies into the proper "order of
> determination."  Without trying to resolve that conundrum--at least, not
> yet--your points about the Final Interpretant are well-taken, and likewise
> require further consideration.  I suspect that Perice's different
> labels--Final, Ultimate, Normal, Eventual, etc.--reflect different emphases
> as he himself tried to work everything out, but never quite landed on a
> definitive and satisfactory scheme; "I confess that my own conception of
> this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536; 1906).
> However, if we end up taking the Final Interpretant to be a habit, this
> will entail that it is not a matter of "truth" or "assertion of
> accuracy," since those can be attributed only to propositions; instead, it
> will be a matter of meaning, in accordance with the pragmatic maxim.  The
> bird presumably has the general tendency (but not mechanical necessity) to
> flee whenever that specific neural pattern occurs, even if it is not
> actually prompted by a loud sound; i.e., when it misrepresents some other
> phenomenon as a loud sound.
> Thanks again,
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt
> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>> Jon - a few comments:
>> I agree with all of the phases except for your outline of the
>> Representamen. I don't agree that the 'neural pattern stands for the
>> loud sound. That's too mechanical for my view. It sets up the neural
>> pattern simply as an iconic system. What would happen if the sensation -
>> was totally new and if there was 'no neural pattern'?
>> I see the Representamen as the habits of organization of matter/mind. In
>> this case, the general neurological 'habits' that enables the bird to
>> interact with both common and novel stimuli. I also see the Representamen,
>> at least in species that can learn, as consisting also of the learned
>> stimuli. A dog, for instance, might be at first, neurologically,  terrified
>> of the vacuum cleaner but will/may learn to accept it as harmless.
>> I also have a problem with the notion of 'determines' although I am aware
>> that Peirce used the term but I wonder if his meaning was similar to modern
>> usage which inserts intentionality to the word.
>> I'll have to think a bit further on your outline of the FI but it seems
>> quite plausible to me. By 'general tendency' do you mean confined to the
>> one individual or to the collective? Peirce seems to consider the FI as a
>> property of the collective rather than the individual.  I think his FI is
>> associated with the 'truth' of the nature of the DO; that is, the FI
>> asserts that our interpretations of the DO are accurate. This could only be
>> carried out by a collective, since an individual could remain locked into
>> their invalid interpretation all their life [I KNOW that house is haunted].
>> Otherwise - yes - we are indeed making progress!
>> Edwina
>> On Fri 02/02/18 11:25 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>> Edwina, List:
>> I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover that,
>> at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud
>> sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially in agreement
>> after all.
>>    - The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself.
>>    - The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud sound.
>>    - The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's neural
>>    pattern that stands for the loud sound.
>>    - The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects of
>>    this neural pattern on the bird.
>>    - The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this neural
>>    pattern on the bird, which is its flight.
>> What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral
>> experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line.  This
>> is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been wondering about
>> for quite some time.  You place them within (or as) the R, but I am still
>> having a hard time seeing it that way in light of Peirce's definition (in
>> multiple places) of the R as that which stands for the Object to the
>> Interpretant.  My sense is that these elements are instead somehow bound up
>> in what it means for the Object to determine the Sign to determine the
>> Interpretant; i.e., collateral experience is what enables the bird to
>> "recognize" its sensation as corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit
>> of interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what prompts
>> the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the other possible
>> effects.
>> One alternative is to designate the habit of interpretation as the one
>> correlate that is missing above--the Final Interpretant (FI).  Up until
>> now, my working hypothesis has been that the FI is defined as the habit of
>> feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of interpretation--that the Sign 
>> would
>> produce.  However, I had in mind the habit that the Receiver (in this
>> case, the bird) would develop after sufficient repetition of the same
>> Representamen (in this case, the neural pattern that stands for the loud
>> sound).  I am starting to wonder if instead we should define the FI as the 
>> general tendency
>> that governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is
>> produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities that
>> correspond to its II.  The FI would then be the cumulative effect of all 
>> previous
>> instances of semiosis that are somehow relevant to this particular
>> encounter with  this particular Sign.
>> I will stop there and ask again--what do you think?  Feedback from others
>> would also be very welcome.
>> Thanks,
>> Jon S.
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