Edwina, List: In that case, I am content for now with the level of agreement that we have managed to achieve, and thus will not press the matter any further at this time. I intend to reread and reflect on Peirce's relevant texts like "New Elements" (1904) and "Pragmatism" (1907) as I continue to ponder the Immediate Object, collateral experience, habits of interpretation, etc.
Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - yes, I see the Representamen quite differently from you. I think you > see it as passive - it 'stands for the Object to the Interpretant'. > Whereas, I see it as an active force of mediation and transformation. I see > it, at least when it is in the mode of Thirdness - and most of the ten > classes do have it in that mode [6/10] - as a force of general laws which > are applied to the incoming sensate data of the IO, to transform/mediate it > into the Interpretants. > > Most certainly, even if the sensation in the IO of the bird was new, the > laws held within the general habits of the Representamen, would be capable > of dealing with it by some neural pattern. But - we must also consider that > in some cases - the laws/habits cannot deal with it - and the > sensations/input are rejected as 'noise'. > > I also disagree that the Representamen only comes into existence because > of its Dynamic Object. The bird couldn't exist without its infrastructure > of physical-chemical and biological laws. The Representamen as Mind - akin > to Aristotle's Form - exists within the matter - and as general - it exists > as long as the matter exists....as long as the bird exists.. Admittedly, > that bird only exists when it is in semiosic interaction with its external > envt, i.e., with other Dynamic Objects. > > I'm Ok with 'determines' implying constraint...etc.. > > Edwina > > On Fri 02/02/18 5:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > Yes, I acknowledge that your definition of the Representamen is much > broader than mine. Nevertheless, when I say that the neural pattern stands > for the loud sound, I am not implying anything mechanical; I am simply > repeating verbatim Peirce's own statement, which he wrote many times > throughout his life, of what a Sign or Representamen does with respect to > its Object (CP 5.286, 1868; CP 7.355, 1873; EP 2:13, 1895; CP 2.228, > c.1897; CP 8.119, 1902; CP 2.92, 1902; CP 1.538, 1903; EP 2:407, 1907; CP > 1.339, undated). As I understand it, the key difference between > semiology and semeiotic in this regard is that Saussure was content to > treat this as a strictly dyadic relation in which the Signifier stands > for the Signified, while Peirce insisted (rightly) that it is an > irreducibly triadic relation in which the Sign stands for the Object to the > Interpretant. Even if the bird's sensation (IO) was "totally new"--i.e., > different from anything that any bird had ever experienced before--it would > still be represented within that bird by some neural pattern, and that is > what I would identify as the Representamen accordingly. > > Furthermore, while I agree that the bird's neurological habits and learned > stimuli are part of the overall process of semiosis, I do not see how they > can be "located" in the Representamen. As you said, those habits are > general, not to mention already operative within the bird before the loud > sound occurs; but any given Representamen only comes into existence because > of its (Dynamic) Object. If the loud sound had not happened when and > where it did, then the bird's corresponding neural pattern would not have > manifested when it did. > > I am not sure how much (if anything) is riding on the term "determines." > I am inclined to think that this is just a verbal form of what Peirce > elsewhere called the relation between the Object and the Sign, and by > extension the relation between the Sign and the Interpretant. > > CSP: ... every sign is determined by its object, either first, by > partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; > secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with > the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or > less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the > object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural > disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. (CP 4.531; 1906) > > CSP: ... the Object determines (i.e., renders definitely to be such as it > will be) the Sign in a particular manner. (EP 2:487; 1908) > > CSP: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined > (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, called its > Object ... while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or > potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created > by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by > the Object. (EP 2:492; 1909) > > > Especially in light of that last quote, it carries in my mind the > connotation of constraining or narrowing, rather than dictating; i.e., > reducing the range of possibilities, but not (by itself) mandating one in > particular. This is evident in how Peirce invokes it when discussing > whether a given correlate or relation can or must be a Possible, an > Existent, or a Necessitant according to the ten trichotomies of his late > attempts at Sign classification. > > CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; > it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a > Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the > Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign > itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the > Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six > trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if > they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I strongly opine > (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of the > same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these will only > come to 66. (EP 2:481; 1908) > > > Here we also have one of the alternate sets of names for the three > Interpretants, which has caused a lot of consternation for me and others > who have sought to arrange the trichotomies into the proper "order of > determination." Without trying to resolve that conundrum--at least, not > yet--your points about the Final Interpretant are well-taken, and likewise > require further consideration. I suspect that Perice's different > labels--Final, Ultimate, Normal, Eventual, etc.--reflect different emphases > as he himself tried to work everything out, but never quite landed on a > definitive and satisfactory scheme; "I confess that my own conception of > this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536; 1906). > > However, if we end up taking the Final Interpretant to be a habit, this > will entail that it is not a matter of "truth" or "assertion of > accuracy," since those can be attributed only to propositions; instead, it > will be a matter of meaning, in accordance with the pragmatic maxim. The > bird presumably has the general tendency (but not mechanical necessity) to > flee whenever that specific neural pattern occurs, even if it is not > actually prompted by a loud sound; i.e., when it misrepresents some other > phenomenon as a loud sound. > > Thanks again, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - a few comments: >> >> I agree with all of the phases except for your outline of the >> Representamen. I don't agree that the 'neural pattern stands for the >> loud sound. That's too mechanical for my view. It sets up the neural >> pattern simply as an iconic system. What would happen if the sensation - >> was totally new and if there was 'no neural pattern'? >> >> I see the Representamen as the habits of organization of matter/mind. In >> this case, the general neurological 'habits' that enables the bird to >> interact with both common and novel stimuli. I also see the Representamen, >> at least in species that can learn, as consisting also of the learned >> stimuli. A dog, for instance, might be at first, neurologically, terrified >> of the vacuum cleaner but will/may learn to accept it as harmless. >> >> I also have a problem with the notion of 'determines' although I am aware >> that Peirce used the term but I wonder if his meaning was similar to modern >> usage which inserts intentionality to the word. >> >> I'll have to think a bit further on your outline of the FI but it seems >> quite plausible to me. By 'general tendency' do you mean confined to the >> one individual or to the collective? Peirce seems to consider the FI as a >> property of the collective rather than the individual. I think his FI is >> associated with the 'truth' of the nature of the DO; that is, the FI >> asserts that our interpretations of the DO are accurate. This could only be >> carried out by a collective, since an individual could remain locked into >> their invalid interpretation all their life [I KNOW that house is haunted]. >> >> Otherwise - yes - we are indeed making progress! >> >> Edwina >> >> On Fri 02/02/18 11:25 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover that, >> at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud >> sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially in agreement >> after all. >> >> - The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself. >> - The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud sound. >> - The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's neural >> pattern that stands for the loud sound. >> - The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects of >> this neural pattern on the bird. >> - The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this neural >> pattern on the bird, which is its flight. >> >> What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral >> experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line. This >> is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been wondering about >> for quite some time. You place them within (or as) the R, but I am still >> having a hard time seeing it that way in light of Peirce's definition (in >> multiple places) of the R as that which stands for the Object to the >> Interpretant. My sense is that these elements are instead somehow bound up >> in what it means for the Object to determine the Sign to determine the >> Interpretant; i.e., collateral experience is what enables the bird to >> "recognize" its sensation as corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit >> of interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what prompts >> the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the other possible >> effects. >> >> One alternative is to designate the habit of interpretation as the one >> correlate that is missing above--the Final Interpretant (FI). Up until >> now, my working hypothesis has been that the FI is defined as the habit of >> feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of interpretation--that the Sign >> would >> produce. However, I had in mind the habit that the Receiver (in this >> case, the bird) would develop after sufficient repetition of the same >> Representamen (in this case, the neural pattern that stands for the loud >> sound). I am starting to wonder if instead we should define the FI as the >> general tendency >> that governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is >> produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities that >> correspond to its II. The FI would then be the cumulative effect of all >> previous >> instances of semiosis that are somehow relevant to this particular >> encounter with this particular Sign. >> >> I will stop there and ask again--what do you think? Feedback from others >> would also be very welcome. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon S. >> >>
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