BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Great - I admit I'm surprised we have gotten this far in agreement -
and both of us can continue to reflect on these and other issues...

 On Fri 02/02/18  8:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Edwina, List:
 In that case, I am content for now with the level of agreement that
we have managed to achieve, and thus will not press the matter any
further at this time.  I intend to reread and reflect on Peirce's
relevant  texts like "New Elements" (1904) and "Pragmatism" (1907) as
I continue to ponder  the Immediate Object, collateral experience,
habits of interpretation, etc.
 Jon S. 
 On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - yes, I see the Representamen quite differently from you. I
think you see it as passive - it 'stands for the Object to the
Interpretant'. Whereas, I see it as an active force of mediation and
transformation. I see it, at least when it is in the mode of
Thirdness - and most of the ten classes do have it in that mode
[6/10] - as a force of general laws which are applied to the incoming
sensate data of the IO, to transform/mediate it into the

        Most certainly, even if the sensation in the IO of the bird was new,
the laws held within the general habits of the Representamen, would be
capable of dealing with it by some neural pattern. But - we must also
consider that in some cases - the laws/habits cannot deal with it -
and the sensations/input are rejected as 'noise'. 

        I also disagree that the Representamen only comes into existence
because of its Dynamic Object. The bird couldn't exist without its
infrastructure of physical-chemical and biological laws. The
Representamen as Mind - akin to Aristotle's Form - exists within the
matter - and as general - it exists as long as the matter long as the bird exists.. Admittedly, that bird only
exists when it is in semiosic interaction with its external envt,
i.e., with other Dynamic Objects. 

        I'm Ok with 'determines' implying constraint...etc..


        On Fri 02/02/18  5:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, I acknowledge that your definition of the Representamen is much
broader than mine.  Nevertheless, when I say that the neural pattern
stands for the loud sound, I am not implying anything mechanical; I
am simply repeating verbatim Peirce's own statement, which he wrote
many times throughout his life, of what a Sign or Representamen does
with respect to its Object (CP 5.286, 1868; CP 7.355, 1873; EP 2:13,
1895; CP 2.228, c.1897; CP 8.119, 1902; CP 2.92, 1902; CP 1.538,
1903; EP 2:407, 1907;  CP 1.339, undated).  As I understand it, the
key difference between  semiology and semeiotic in this regard is
that Saussure was content to treat this as a strictly dyadic relation
in which the Signifier stands for the Signified, while Peirce insisted
(rightly) that it is an irreducibly triadic relation in which the Sign
stands for the Object to the Interpretant.  Even if the bird's
sensation (IO) was "totally new"--i.e., different from anything that
any bird had ever experienced before--it would still be represented
within that bird by some neural pattern, and that is what I would
identify as the Representamen accordingly. 
 Furthermore, while I agree that the bird's neurological habits and
learned stimuli are part of the overall process of semiosis, I do not
see how they can be "located" in the Representamen.  As you said,
those habits are general, not to mention already operative within the
bird before the loud sound occurs; but any given Representamen only
comes into existence  because of its (Dynamic) Object.  If the loud
sound had not happened when and where it did, then the bird's
corresponding neural pattern would not have manifested when it did. 
 I am not sure how much (if anything) is riding on the term
"determines."  I am inclined to think that this is just a verbal form
of what Peirce elsewhere called the relation between the Object and
the Sign, and by extension the relation between the Sign and the
 CSP:  ... every sign is determined by its object, either first, by
partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an 
Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence
connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index;
thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be
interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which
term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign
a Symbol. (CP 4.531; 1906)
 CSP:  ... the Object determines (i.e., renders definitely to be such
as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. (EP 2:487; 1908) 
 CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
(i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, called
its Object ... while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual
or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant
created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein
determined mediately by the Object. (EP 2:492; 1909) 
 Especially in light of that last quote, it carries in my mind the
connotation of constraining or narrowing, rather than dictating;
i.e., reducing the range of possibilities, but not (by itself)
mandating one in particular.  This is evident in how Peirce invokes
it when discussing whether a given correlate or relation can or must
be a Possible, an Existent, or a Necessitant according to the ten
trichotomies of his late attempts at Sign classification. 
 CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a
Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by
nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a
Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,
which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate
Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, instead
of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were
independent, only yield 28 classes; and if, as I strongly opine (not
to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of
the same order of importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these
will only come to 66. (EP 2:481; 1908) 
 Here we also have one of the alternate sets of names for the three
Interpretants, which has caused a lot of consternation for me and
others who have sought to arrange the trichotomies into the proper
"order of determination."  Without trying to resolve that
conundrum--at least, not yet--your points about the Final
Interpretant are well-taken, and likewise require further
consideration.  I suspect that Perice's different labels--Final,
Ultimate, Normal, Eventual, etc.--reflect different emphases as he
himself tried to work everything out, but never quite landed on a
definitive and satisfactory scheme; "I confess that my own conception
of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536;
 However, if we end up taking the Final Interpretant to be a habit,
this will entail that it is not a matter of "truth" or "assertion of
accuracy," since those can be attributed only to propositions;
instead, it will be a matter of meaning, in accordance with the
pragmatic maxim.  The bird presumably has the general tendency (but
not mechanical necessity) to flee  whenever that specific neural
pattern occurs, even if it is not actually prompted by a loud sound;
i.e., when it  misrepresents some other phenomenon as a loud sound.
 Thanks again,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran midt [3] - [4] 
 On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon - a few comments:

        I agree with all of the phases except for your outline of the
Representamen. I don't agree that the 'neural pattern stands for the
loud sound. That's too mechanical for my view. It sets up the neural
pattern simply as an iconic system. What would happen if the
sensation - was totally new and if there was 'no neural pattern'? 

        I see the Representamen as the habits of organization of
matter/mind. In this case, the general neurological 'habits' that
enables the bird to interact with both common and novel stimuli. I
also see the Representamen, at least in species that can learn, as
consisting  also of the learned stimuli. A dog, for instance, might
be at first, neurologically,  terrified of the vacuum cleaner but
will/may learn to accept it as harmless.

        I also have a problem with the notion of 'determines' although I am
aware that Peirce used the term but I wonder if his meaning was
similar to modern usage which inserts intentionality to the word.

        I'll have to think a bit further on your outline of the FI but it
seems quite plausible to me. By 'general tendency' do you mean
confined to the one individual or to the collective? Peirce seems to
consider the FI as a property of the collective rather than the
individual.  I think his FI is associated with the 'truth' of the
nature of the DO; that is, the FI asserts that our interpretations of
the DO are accurate. This could only be carried out by a collective,
since an individual could remain locked into their invalid
interpretation all their life [I KNOW that house is haunted]. 

        Otherwise - yes - we are indeed making progress!

 On Fri 02/02/18 11:25 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Edwina, List:
 I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover
that, at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing
a loud sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially
in agreement after all.
    *The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself.
    *The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud
    *The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's
neural pattern that  stands for the loud sound.
    *The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects
of this neural pattern on the bird.
    *The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this
neural pattern on the bird, which is its flight.

What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral
experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line. 
This is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been
wondering about for quite some time.  You place them within (or as)
the R, but I am still having a hard time seeing it that way in light
of Peirce's definition (in multiple places) of the R as that which 
stands for the Object to the Interpretant.  My sense is that these
elements are instead somehow bound up in what it means for the Object
to determine the Sign to determine the Interpretant; i.e., collateral
experience is what enables the bird to "recognize" its sensation as
corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit of
interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what
prompts the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the
other possible effects. 
 One alternative is to designate the habit of interpretation as the
one correlate that is missing above--the Final Interpretant (FI).  Up
until now, my working hypothesis has been that the FI is defined as
the habit of feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of
interpretation--that the Sign would produce.  However, I had in mind
the habit that the Receiver (in this case, the bird) would develop
after sufficient repetition of the same Representamen (in this case,
the neural pattern that stands for the loud sound).  I am starting to
wonder if instead we should define the FI as the  general tendency
that governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is
produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities
that correspond to its II.  The FI would then be the cumulative
effect of all previous instances of semiosis that are somehow
relevant to this particular encounter with  this particular Sign.
 I will stop there and ask again--what do you think?  Feedback from
others would also be very welcome. 
 Jon S. 

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