Jon, Edwina, list,

I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back!

Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be
helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read
my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful. I
think it might be easier to get a 'handle' on this question focusing on
human semiosis (anyhow, I'm finding the 'bird' example 'tricky').

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
> soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
> frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
> non-cognitive example.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation
>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in
>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer
>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis
>> added by me in all cases).
>>
>> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
>>
>> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
>> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
>>
>>
>> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
>>
>> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
>> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
>> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
>> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
>> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
>> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
>> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
>>
>>
>> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
>>
>> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
>> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
>> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
>> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
>> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
>> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
>> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
>> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
>> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
>> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
>> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
>> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
>> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
>> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
>> instant of the interval a new idea.
>>
>>
>> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
>>
>> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
>> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
>> of a sign.* [—]
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>
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